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This book series addresses the causes, dynamics and understandings of global urban 
transformation in the twenty-first century. We live in an era when numerically the 
greatest number of people moving to cities are in the parts of the globe normally 
characterised as the global south. It is also the case that in recent years much of the 
most interesting, innovative and insightful work around contemporary urbanisms has 
addressed the global condition through a disposition that speaks internationally both 
from and to this new cartography.
We have put together this series with Manchester University Press to reflect and 
capture these trends and realities and look for new voices that might articulate and 
curate these new realities through fresh lenses.
We look to publish work that is:
International, working within a global frame of reference, where cases are generative 
of larger transnational processes. The series aims to move urban studies to a focus 
that transcends a traditional separation of literatures of the global south and global 
north.
Interdisciplinary, originating mostly but not entirely from within the social sciences. 
The orientation of the series seeks work that rethinks interdisciplinarity in an urban 
context, drawing on insights from natural sciences and humanities as well as the social 
sciences.
Informed by the past but future oriented, addressing the challenges of the emergent 
cities of the twenty-first century. This perspective values the particularities of history 
and geography; the path dependencies of urban change; and the realities of spatial 
variation. It recognises the predictive value of new methods of data collection and 
technological change but considers that such a ‘future’ city orientation moves beyond 
extrapolation from trend to a more multidimensional sensibility.
Addressing multiple audiences working across conventionally defined urban scholarly 
and professional interests (such as architecture, planning, city politics and urban 
regeneration), privileging work that has value for city thought leaders and activists, 
the general reader as well as students and the specialist academic audience.
Multi-scalar, recognising the value of different scales of analysis, commissioning 
work that focuses on geographies that range from trends in rapidly expanding megacity 
regions, smaller towns or the dynamics of neighbourhood change.
Multi-actor, welcoming contributions that detail stakeholder interactions that drive 
urban change, including tracking the power dynamics and institutional politics between 
residents, civil society, the state, business or traditional authorities.
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Introduction: urban presence and 
uncertain futures in African cities
Michael Keith with Andreza Aruska de Souza Santos
Distance is not a safety zone but a field of tension.
Theodor Adorno (Minima Moralia)
In their collection Africa’s urban revolution Sue Parnell and Edgar Pieterse 
argue that, ‘as the continent that will be disproportionately shaped by the 
way in which society thinks about cities, Africa must assume an increasingly 
central position in the urban imaginary of theorists and practitioners’. 
They suggest that African cities demonstrate rapidly growing agglomerations 
of building and dwelling but that ‘most African countries are not able to 
capitalise on this demographic shift because urban residents are structurally 
trapped in profoundly unhealthy conditions that impact negatively on 
productivity, economic efficiencies and market expansion’ (Parnell and 
Pieterse, 2014: 15).
At the heart of this assertion is the sense that as cities grow they mobilise 
vast resources of investment and major structural changes to the built 
environment in terms of systems of transport, drainage, sewage and 
electrification systems, places to work and places to live. Urban transforma-
tions disrupt and reconstruct the relationship between humanity and 
nature, disturbing existing ecosystems and generating new levels of carbon 
emission, domestic and industrial sources of (rarely low-carbon) energy. 
But these changes are not material alone. They reconfigure the ways in 
which cities choose (for better and for worse) to govern their citizens, 





















































2 African cities and collaborative futures
of their own. Before they are constructed, land is often cleared, people 
displaced, real estate traded. Sacrifices and interventions in the present 
day are frequently justified in terms of long- or medium-term futures. 
Attempts to rationalise the city are also commonly attempts to tame it, 
to control its morphology and to optimise its demography. And the people 
who live in cities appropriate these interventions. Both material infra-
structures and the logistics that link them are mediated by the histories 
that weigh on the present, the deep cultures of the everyday and the 
experimental and inventive ways in which those who live in cities do not 
always choose to behave in the ways they are meant to.
Positioning questions of critical distance
These combinations of cultural practice of vernacular skills and crafts, 
international forms of professional and scientific knowledge and emergent 
landscapes of built environment foreground the city as a space of never-
ending mutation. Nowhere is this combination of the material and the 
cultural more urgently demonstrated than in contemporary Africa, the part 
of the globe witnessing the most rapid urbanisation as the third decade 
of the twenty-first century begins. In this collection we have brought 
together a series of interventions in the study of African cities that address 
both academic debates and a more general audience in city halls, civil 
society and engaged communities. It explores practically how African cities 
might consider their futures more effectively. Each of the chapters in turn 
examines the sense in which the rapid growth of African cities reconfigures 
the relationship between urban social life and the built environment of 
housing, energy, transport, waste and transport infrastructures.
The authors share a rooting in the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC)’s Urban Transformations programme.1 One element of the pro-
gramme involved a partnership between scholars in Africa and the UK 
with support from both the ESRC and the South African National Research 
Foundation in association with the (South African) Human Sciences 
Research Council. The volume is the result of that collective endeavour 
to link researchers across international borders to think about the challenges 
confronting African cities. All members of the endeavour were obliged 
to commit to work that was:
●	 Interdisciplinary, in particular recognising the combinations of culture, 






















































together the strengths of the social sciences in working with both 
the natural sciences and the humanities.
●	 Working across urban professional interests to address policy com-
munities and city stakeholders.
●	 Multi-scalar, recognising the challenges of geographical scale that 
structure the contemporary city globally, from the renewed interest 
in neighbourhood studies to the complex formations of the megacity.
●	 Internationally comparative, acknowledging that urban studies have 
moved beyond both a celebration of the iconic urban experiences of 
the global north and a straightforward valorisation of scholarship of 
the global south.
●	 Future oriented, working not only from the projection of past trends 
but also through an analytical focus on the challenges of the emergent 
city.
All of the authors of the volume have shaped their work to address these 
criteria. But the practices of working across borders is rarely straightforward: 
borders of training, borders of profession, borders of knowing – all generate 
communities of interest and boundaries of separation that sometimes 
reinforce and sometimes undermine borders of geography and history. 
And so the collection starts by asking two fundamental questions. To 
what extent does the interdisciplinary field of urban studies imply a 
‘synthesis’ of forms of knowledge that can help us understand how the 
city works, how to ‘see like a city’ in twenty-first-century Africa? Or are 
different approaches creating exchanges and comparisons of ways of making 
the world visible through very different lenses that are fundamentally 
incommensurable?
As we collected and curated this collection, these questions in turn 
raised a series of three secondary issues that are provoked by the architecture 
of our endeavour, addressing in turn the nature of the interdisciplinary 
in urban studies, the practices and ethics of research and the dominant 
paradigms of social science research on cities.
In terms of the nature of interdisciplinarity in urban studies, the collection 
intervenes to suggest that it is imperative to move beyond pious appeals 
for scholars of different backgrounds to work together. Instead it considers 
a more contentious domain. The collection addresses how different forms 
of knowledge and science ‘land’ in African cities, whether it is conventional 
understandings of housing markets, received wisdoms on city resilience 





















































4 African cities and collaborative futures
systems. It explores what it might mean for citizens and city halls to 
consider what happens if different forms of knowledge production – for 
example urban economics, risk and resilience, ecosystems analysis and 
engineering logics – are deemed fundamentally incommensurable.
In this sense it makes an old case for cities to understand the importance 
of local context in shaping the possibilities of their own futures. It also 
calls for a study of how different knowledge systems open up different 
options for urban futures in Africa and suggests that the trade-offs and 
incommensurabilities between these forms of knowledge are central to 
any consideration of city futures. Commensuration is in this sense a regime 
of urban knowledge mediation and an everyday feature of city governance 
practices. Most people working in city halls recognise this as self-evident 
as they balance the demands of conflicting interests and diverse forms 
of professional expertise in planning, welfare, regulation and economic 
development. They confront daily realities of ‘least worst’ interventions, 
the rationing of scarce resources and the clumsy solutions that do not 
always work when confronting ‘wicked’ problems. Yet all too often, this 
is something that scholars in the business of providing ‘golden bullet’ 
solutions to single systems in transport dilemmas, building homes or city 
electrification overlook.
In terms of the ethics of research, the logic of the shared endeavours of 
the authors of this volume has a significant implication for the organisation 
of the academy. Academic power commonly reflects deeper economic and 
historical relations, privileging particular sites of knowledge production. 
This edited collection argues that twenty-first-century urban research, 
particularly in an African context, demands new forms of collaboration 
that recognise these institutional configurations. These include collabora-
tions between cities and scholars – scholars working across disciplinary 
boundaries in the humanities, natural sciences and social sciences, and 
scholars working across geographical boundaries in the global south 
and the global north. Putting these principles into practice, the volume 
consequently comprises six substantive chapters, an introduction and 
conclusion, in total involving over forty authors, mostly from Africa 
and the UK but also of nationalities from across the world. This in turn 
implies a different way of thinking about research practice, never erasing 
the power relations of the academy but at least acknowledging them and 
seeking to address their implications.
In terms of the dominant paradigms in urban research, the collection 






















































cities internationally is emerging from the challenging experiences of the 
African continent. They speak back to the realities of the global north 
and inflect the ways we might rethink Chicago or Paris as much as Lagos 
or Nairobi. The edited collection evidences some of the engaged and 
practical dimensions of what these claims might mean in terms of cutting-
edge research contributions from leading scholars in the field.
The chapters all reflect original research, the overwhelming majority 
of which emerges from collaborations between institutions of the global 
north and the global south. Most of the contributions are from South 
Africa, although three chapters draw cases from a much wider set of 
locations across sub-Saharan Africa. This in turn is partly a reflection of 
the relative institutional power of the South African university system. 
Chapters consider a number of locations across the continent, but South 
African cities appear more often than others. When this volume is making 
a case for the importance of consideration of the legacies of history and 
geography in shaping urban futures, it also raises the question of whether 
South African urbanisms should be seen as particular to or shared in 
common with the rest of the continent.
However, as the well-regarded political economist and postcolonial 
historian Mahmood Mamdani has argued in his award-winning book 
Citizen and subject, ‘there is a historical specificity to the mode of rule 
on the African continent’ (Mamdani, 1996: 294). The city plays a generic 
role in most of postcolonial Africa which makes the urban in South Africa 
exemplary rather than exceptional to a continental trend. Mamdani’s 
framing is both provocative and contested as reception of his work at the 
time and subsequently demonstrates (Aseka et al., 1997; Chen, 2017; De 
Goede, 2017; Kamola, 2011). His work is also powerful because in these 
and other texts he emphasises the trajectories of histories in place that 
undermine flat readings of the present day in favour of deeper readings 
of specific historical and geographical conjuncture. More significantly, 
his arguments undermine what was seen as South African exceptionalism 
and are founded on a reading of colonial legacies that starts with what 
is continentally shared (whether in post-apartheid South Africa or 
contemporary Darfur) but rests on what is historically particular.
Mamdani argued that the bifurcation of power in colonial Africa 
structured the organisation of the rule of populations and the architecture 
of the state. It was generated from the deep logics of legal, formal and 
informal classification of the governed in colonial settings resulting from 





















































6 African cities and collaborative futures
rule, historically rooted in colonial legacies structurally distinguishing 
between the rural and the urban but also defining the relational link 
between the two. In the bifurcation of the postcolonial, states were left 
with urban systems that relied on civil power and rights (with the colonised 
excluded on the basis of race) juxtaposed with systems of rural governance 
that appealed to tradition and culture to enforce rule by ‘custom’. So for 
Mamdani in this sense apartheid and the South African experience were 
less ‘exceptional’ to the rest of Africa than was commonly argued. South 
African cities were in some ways the ultimate exemplification of the colonial 
lock-ins of African urbanism; their study cannot be simply ‘exported’ to 
explain other national trajectories, but their underlying logic frames the 
historical legacies of the continent as a whole. In this spirit we are careful 
about the use of the couplet ‘African city’ in the collection. More specifically 
the volume is weighted more to anglophone than lusophone or francophone 
settings, a recognised limitation notwithstanding some significant con-
tinental similarities of colonial history. But instead the authors make clear 
their setting in specific urban contexts in Cape Town, in Dar es Salaam, 
in Karonga or Ibadan. In this sense the volume as a whole is locally 
sourced but globally oriented, addressing international perspectives framed 
by particularly pressing local contexts.
What makes the African city particular? To what extent is the city in 
Africa part of a subset of concentrations of humanity that we call cities 
that will over time display the characteristics of what was once evoked 
as the ‘urban age’, the rules, laws, and evolutionary forms of urban science?
In one sense these two questions nuance our starting position and 
open a discussion of this volume that is central to the future of urban 
studies in Africa in particular but also globally. Across urban studies the 
call for ‘interdisciplinary’ or ‘cross-disciplinary’ modes of scholarship and 
research have become something of a cliché. All the contributors in this 
volume share a commitment to bring together different forms of empirical 
evidence and diverse approaches to urban Africa. But what are the terms 
of trade in such pluralities? To what extent does the interdisciplinary field 
of urban studies imply a ‘synthesis’ of forms of knowledge that can help 
understand how the city works? If we take commensuration itself as a 
focus of our work, to what extent is it possible to fuse engineering, neoclas-
sical economics, normative aid interventions addressed at those most in 
need and medical science into a singular way of seeing and thinking 
about how cities make sense in the present day and might structure their 






















































They invoke the extent to which combinations of humanities, social science 
and natural science perspectives may throw together diverse approaches, 
dispositions and epistemologies of the city that are in structure, form and 
logic incommensurable. They also make problematic the geometry of 
critical distance on which research is commonly premised.
Diverse approaches to urban research in Africa
In one of the more cogently argued overviews of African urbanism, Somik 
Lall et al. (2017) in a 2017 World Bank analysis suggest that African cities 
are dysfunctional (cf. Macamo, 2018: 6). They lay out the structure of 
their argument in terms of the fundamental basic premises of economic 
theory. The failings of cities in Africa relate both to challenges in the 
urban form and to related weaknesses in the urban economic structure. 
In terms of urban form, the authors argue that evidence demonstrates 
that African cities are crowded, disconnected and costly (Lall et al., 2017: 
13). ‘Crowded’ is a term juxtaposed with density, the former pejorative, 
the latter not. Crowded cities have weakly developed infrastructure and 
poorly managed access to formalised residential housing; the negative 
externalities of disorganisation outweigh benefits of concentration. They 
lack connectivity across urban space, fragmenting travel to work areas and 
diminishing the propensity to scale up growth. And Lall and colleagues 
argue further that wage costs and transaction costs are disproportionately 
high and so labour costs reduce return to investment.
These challenges in turn translate into significant – if not insuperable 
– weaknesses in the economic structure of urban transformation. Standard 
urban economics highlights the city as a driver of economic growth through 
agglomeration economies, economic diversity and associated developments 
of rich reservoirs of human capital (Glaeser, 2011; Glaeser and Gottlieb, 
2009). But for Lall and colleagues high costs for food, transport and 
housing diminish the potential advantages of African urban agglomeration. 
Weak property rights and institutional flaws also generate extra costs. 
Consequently the cities of Africa are ‘locked in’ to non-tradable goods 
and services, rendering the megacities and other urban concentrations 
of the continent in some ways fundamentally parochial and starved of 
global investment. This lock-in is prompted particularly by the ‘Dutch 
disease’ of concentrations of economic activity in natural resource exports 
and by the inefficient urban morphologies attributed to sub-optimal 





















































8 African cities and collaborative futures
The response to contemporary weaknesses in urban form and economic 
structure are straightforward:
To grow economically as they are growing in size, Africa’s cities must open 
their doors to the world. They need to specialize in manufacturing, along 
with other regionally and globally tradable goods and services. And to 
attract global investment in tradables production, cities must develop scale 
economies, which are associated with successful urban economic development 
in other regions. (Lall et al., 2017: 13)
As with other less plausible and more boosterist studies such as 
McKinsey’s championing of cities of the continent as the ‘African lions’ 
(McKinsey, 2016), the architecture of the scholarly argument is clear. 
Identify the lessons of urban form and economic structure from other 
parts of the world and develop this logic so that it lands in Africa. Econom-
ics, what Thomas Carlyle once called the ‘dismal science’, is transformed 
into analytically coherent, policy-friendly recipes for interventions in cities 
across the continent. A dismal science that draws on the medium- and 
long-term imperatives of a utilitarian calculus to make a case for the 
rationalisation of the future African metropolis. If cities in Africa can be 
made to look more like the successful engines of growth in other parts 
of the world, then majoritarian prosperity and economic development 
(however benefits are distributed) will follow.
In the post-Cold War decades, such science may have escaped the 
juxtaposition of development models that owed their legitimacy either 
to postcolonial appropriations of Soviet socialism or proxy interests of 
Western governmental geopolitical models of continental change. But 
fundamentally, a neoclassical economics toolkit that appeals to clarified 
property rights, minimised transaction costs, optimised resource allocation 
of factors of production and efficient independent judiciaries to regulate 
and minimise rent seeking and state-legitimated corruption speaks clearly 
to a plausible everyday policy prospectus. Thus realised, the structure 
and form of economic reason speaks powerfully to the futures of cities. 
But perhaps only so far.
When science is defined as a search for the universal, the particularities 
of time and space, the distinctive powers of history and geography, are 
barriers to be overcome in the analytical frame. In the context of urban 
studies more generally, cities of the urban age are teleologically defined. 
So one of the critiques of economic reason as much as of economics 






















































specificity, both in the name of universal reason and in the knowledge 
claims of norm-free science.
While such framings may be at times both analytically powerful and 
politically persuasive, they can also generate a less unalloyed response 
from scholars in disciplines other than economics. The erasure of the 
normative in the name of critical distance is also at times explicit in other 
claims of scientific expertise but may lead in different directions. So a 
focus on the metabolism and ecosystems that reveal the disequilibrium of 
the systemic combinations of nature, culture and material form embodied 
in the built environment and infrastructures can also direct the analytical 
gaze elsewhere, maybe towards the temporalities of change and the power 
of ecosystem lock-ins and path dependencies that shape the city that is yet 
to come. If for John Maynard Keynes the long term is famously inhabited 
by the dead, those more ecologically inclined see it as the inheritance of 
our grandchildren. Timescales are measured differently through different 
scientific lenses. And where the normative domain is more explicit, appeals 
to the policy demands of poverty reduction might prioritise interventions 
of the here and now over the scientific promise of a future city realised at 
an uncertain date. Where a history of the present brings to the surface the 
enduring legacies of regimes of power and authority, the contested grounds 
on which reforms are mooted become analytically as well as descriptively 
relevant to making sense of what is possible in tomorrow’s urbanism.
Most obviously this tends to appear in clashes between more activist-, 
NGO- or charity-focused foregrounding of the commonly grim realities 
of contemporary urban life on the one hand and the sort of diagnosis, 
prognosis and prescription of the urban condition found in the reports 
of the World Bank or McKinsey. But equally, in the appeal less to the 
vernacular than to the power of what anthropologists might describe as 
‘local knowledges’, there is at times a fundamental challenge to the structur-
ing of arguments that follow neoclassical economic reason. In this sense, 
while economic reason may simultaneously produce ‘truths’, those truths 
might be subjected to contrary evidence and different conclusions from 
different analytical starting points and contested normative futures. As 
Nobel economist Paul Krugman has argued, economics cannot tell you 
what values to have and where to start such analytical foundations. He 
has suggested that the tendency to ignore, neglect or mask interests is 
characteristic of certain structures of economic reason and that economics 
can rarely provide an exhaustive ‘truthful’ account of all dimensions of 





















































10 African cities and collaborative futures
In terms of scholarship, this in part opens up a domain of intercultural 
dialogue which recognises the possibly incommensurable truths revealed 
by economic reason alongside other forms of ‘science’. For Krugman it 
also opens up a different sort of exchange in city halls and policy domains 
where he finds himself too often ‘arguing with zombies’, ‘ideas that should 
have been killed by contrary evidence, but instead keep shambling along, 
eating people’s brains’ (Krugman, 2020: 4). Such an alternative form of 
dialogue could involve a recognition that it is possible to acknowledge 
that you may ‘have your own opinions but not your own facts’ yet also 
recognises that these facts may reflect disciplinary weaknesses as well as 
strengths.
If we are to unpick the DNA of the city and to recognise a diversity of 
approaches to the urbanisms of the twenty-first century, such an element 
of humility might be essential. So in this volume we are trying not to 
privilege any particular take on such long-running institutional dilemmas 
of academic politics and metropolitan realities. However, in a collection 
that brings together contributions that cross a range of social scientific 
backgrounds, we hope at least to curate some terms of engagement which 
might structure the sort of cross-disciplinary exchanges that are in this 
fashion more productive than polemical.
Diverse dispositions to urban research in Africa
Within the social sciences an instructive exchange on the disposition of 
work on African cities characterised the pages of American academic 
prose in the early 2000s. It involved a published essay by Michael Watts 
responding to the work of Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall.
Michael Watts is a distinguished geographer of development who locates 
his own work in the Marxian and post-Marxian traditions and whose 
powerful research has described over many years a committed theoretical 
and empirical engagement with the grim systemic underdevelopment 
of contemporary Africa in general and the extractive capitalisms that 
structured the Nigeria of the city of Port Harcourt and the Ogoni people 
in particular. In 2005 he published a high-profile critique of what might be 
seen in hindsight as a new disposition for thinking about the contemporary 
African city. In responding to the work of Achille Mbembe and Sarah 
Nuttall, Watts railed against what he appeared to see as the performatively 
spectacular but analytically and politically foreclosed celebrations of African 






















































production and also almost a lack of a ‘moral seriousness’ of the project 
of Mbembe and Nuttall and their various networks of collaborators 
and colleagues, working at the time mostly within the South African 
academy. Even reading the Watts critique in hindsight, some years on, it 
comes across as morally serious, rooted in a deeply normative reading 
of emergent African urbanisms but also in a tone that castigates scholar-
ship that might for Watts speak more to the ivory tower than the city 
streets.
For Watts, Mbembe (and co-author Nuttall) through a focus on cultural 
exploration retreated away from empirical reality towards paradoxically 
European theory, privileging ‘Simmel over Sandton’, using evocative 
textual strategies to extend a ‘panoptic account of Africa as a space of 
radical uncertainty, of “nonlinearity, of chains of fragmented events, that 
has been misrepresented” by “the faked philosophies of Marxism and 
nationalism”’ better grasped through the exploration of other archives 
capable of yielding both ‘the power of falsification’ and the processes 
through which Africans ‘stylize their conduct’. Watts saw Mbembe in 
particular as creating texts that did not want to ‘be encumbered by what 
he has elsewhere called the worn-out pretext of miserabilism’. The result 
may have been poetic but for Watts it was ‘too conceptually undeveloped to 
be of much utility, and often the contours and pathologies of metropolitan 
psychic life [in Mbembe’s writing] are weakly anchored in empirical data’ 
(Watts, 2005: 188).
In contrast, Mbembe, a powerfully erudite social theorist, looked at 
Johannesburg through a lens that built on his own embedded critical 
engagement with multinational philosophical traditions and African 
modernities. Through turning his attention to the African metropolis in 
his work on the city, he adopts a particular disposition that responded 
to some of the motivations for his seminal monograph ‘On the postcolony’ 
(Mbembe, 2001). In this landmark work Mbembe famously and funda-
mentally challenged the ways of seeing late twentieth-century African 
social life. He subsequently explained how his strategy had been consciously 
provocative, invoking the economic anthropologist Jane Guyer’s work to 
criticise three powerful analytical traditions that block key African realities 
from view: the (monetary) reductionism of economics and its associated 
tyranny of quantitative methodologies, the positivistic framing of the 
parameters of economic reason in turning African landscapes into economic 
science, but also the cultural particularism of anthropology that can make 





















































12 African cities and collaborative futures
on Western experience and institutions’ (Mbembe, 2006, quoting Guyer, 
2004: 172).
Mbembe was writing against a series of ‘isms’ of late twentieth-century 
academic scholarship. He rejected the scientism of certain forms of neoclas-
sical economics, the presentism of scholars that forgot or erased the legacies 
– we might even say the ‘path dependencies’ – of African history in 
descriptions of contemporary urban life, and the cultural empiricism 
particularly found in some genres of anthropology. It is possible to see 
this project as reconfiguring both the geographical imaginaries and histori-
cal sensibilities that might structure how stories are narrated of African 
cities. This project is founded on a novel relational intellectual architecture 
of theory and praxis that confounds conventional disciplinary boundaries 
but also consequently in some ways lacks the institutional supports of 
disciplinary epistemological self-assurance (or self-satisfaction).
The reason for referencing this debate of some time ago is not to privilege 
one or other of these takes on African urban life. All three scholars 
(Mbembe, Nuttall, Watts) have remarkable careers, committed engagements 
and impressive bibliographies. The intention is instead to suggest that in 
microcosm the debate encapsulates some distinctive choreographies of 
divergence in literatures on the African city in particular. It also foregrounds 
an urban studies more generally that privileges the theoretical insights 
of the urbanisms of the global south in general. The texts of Michael 
Watts were no more, no less normative than Achille Mbembe’s. Neither 
made claims in the name of critical distance or scientific truths. Theirs 
was a difference of disposition.
The urban scholarship of the global south has provided in the last 
decade some of the most exciting forms of new thinking about cities. 
Within the social sciences a standard trope of criticism has long been 
that paradigms, theories and approaches to the city that have been nurtured 
in a limited number of privileged metropolitan sites of the global north 
do not always serve particularly well when they land in those parts of 
the globe with the most significant increases in urban populations in the 
twenty-first century; in China, in India and in Africa in particular. Well-
argued critiques of urban theory of the global north abound, drawing on 
postcolonial, feminist and other framings of urban life to contrast 
deliberately with the insights of the mainstream traditions of urban studies 
(Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Pieterse, 2010). Jennifer Robinson and 
Ananya Roy have gone so far as to argue that that the appeal to the 






















































live in cities that are characterised by informality, multiplicity, marginality 
and dispersion unrecognised in the cities most commonly theorised by 
leading economic geographers, in the process (citing a phrase from Linda 
Peake) ‘seeing everything from nowhere’ (Robinson and Roy, 2017: 185).
But perhaps more productively still, some traffic might run in different 
directions. Strands of African urban theory speaks to the African city in 
particular but also transcend geographical specificity from a southern 
disposition. The various collaborations of Edgar Pieterse and AbdouMaliq 
Simone perhaps exemplify this trend. Pieterse was one of many that long 
called for an urban studies that could ‘think and theorise the specificity 
of African cities’ based on both an obligation for research to address the 
pressing dilemmas of the urban condition and the recognition that ‘there 
is no direct correlation between better theory and effective policy’ (Pieterse, 
2011: 2).
In an early collaboration Pieterse and Simone (2013) try to outline the 
configurations of a specifically southern urbanism that draws in particular 
(though not exclusively) on the patterns and processes of contemporary 
African urban life. For Sharad Chari (2014) their work highlights five 
themes of specific ‘“urbanisms” (what are our diverse African cities), 
“palimpsests” (how are multiple temporalities used, handled, sorted or 
denied), “deals” (Pieterse has it that “the term ‘economy’ … is virtually 
meaningless in African cities” and that “deal-making” relates more to 
everyday pragmatics), “governmentalities” (how does state and non-state 
power work) and finally “interstices”’ (Chari, 2014: n.p.). This taxonomy 
of plural urbanisms, palimpsests, deals, governmentalities and interstices 
makes visible particular forms of urban life. But it also travels and is as 
recognisable on the streets of contemporary east London or New York 
as in the particularities of Johannesburg or Cape Town. Similarly, Simone 
and Pieterse have more recently argued that a paradox of contemporary 
urban life is that the global majority who ‘presently don’t have much 
access to rights, resources and opportunities actually prefigure, in their 
making something out of difficult conditions, what many urban futures 
may need to look like’ (Simone and Pieterse, 2017: 110). In their New 
urban worlds three vectors of redescription, secretion and resonance 
generate different ways of seeing the city anew.
But again these powerful descriptors can also inflect the ways in which 
we might understand a contemporary European condition characterised 
by post-austerity uncertainty, the ongoing and recurrent legacies of a 





















































14 African cities and collaborative futures
travel. Importantly, the organising principles of the creativities, pragmatics 
and alternative worlding practices at the heart of their work draw less 
from the vocabulary of ‘rights’ discourse that structures much writing in 
the field and more from the performative, theatrical, extemporised strategies 
and tactics of everyday life. There is a sense, then, that the scope of such 
work cannot be confined in straightforwardly geographic terms. It is a 
standard trope of postcolonial studies approaches to make the familiar 
strange, the strange familiar and to ‘provincialise’ the dominant ways of 
telling stories and constructing narratives in the social sciences. But it 
would be a paradox if precisely this tactical move inhibited the propensity 
of such theory to speak back to a global urbanism that is locally inflected 
but internationally germane. The valorisation of ‘southern urbanisms’ 
should not inhibit flows both south/north and north/south. We might 
rethink how Cape Town speaks to London but equally how Shanghai 
might speak to New York, London to São Paulo. Such conversations imply 
a slightly different disposition of theoretical labour that is not straight-
forwardly ‘comparative’.
However, several different arguments, occasionally conflated, become 
central to such positioning. All are legitimate, although each has slightly 
different implications. The specificity of African (most often South African) 
urbanisms, the push back against the scholarship of the global north and 
the rejection of an academic gaze that is instrumentally linked to tech-
nocratic policy formation are all shared by critical theoretical dispositions 
internationally. But what is perhaps most significant analytically and 
germane politically about their work is the positioning of the researcher 
in situ. The researcher is engaged. The outcomes of research are translational, 
they build on site and offer back to whence they came. Not necessarily 
co-productions as such, but Pieterse and Simone’s collaborative and 
individual work is characterised by a sense of proximity. The view from 
up close. It involves an epistemology that undermines a valorisation of 
critical distance.
Informing Pieterse and Simone’s work is clearly a project that is highly 
normative in both the forms of engaged scholarship on which it is based 
and the practically translational research which it advocates. So there are 
two dimensions which we are suggesting in this volume might be con-
structively brought together through an alternative framing of urban life. 
One relates to how we locate the alternative ways of inhabiting the city 
that Simone and Pieterse describe. The other involves how we seek to 






















































about how the experiences and tendencies of cities in Africa speak back 
to a global urban condition.
The sense of critical distance is not a safety zone but a field of tension, 
as Adorno once argued. But however productive making the city visible 
from up close might be, it is also essential at other times to retreat and 
make the lenses through which scholarship is generated explicit. Such 
movement questions how such mobile engagement might work; what are 
its spaces of translation, how does it envisage the time over which it 
operates, the relationship between the snapshot presentation of today and 
the propensity of tomorrow? Proximity begets a certain sense of plurality. 
Data observed and data analysed are data interpreted through specific 
frames of reference and knowledge productions that measure value dif-
ferently. The calculus of economic value, optimal mobilities of transport 
systems, elongations of life expectancy, the calibration of happiness, the 
territorial extension of food, water and energy management and the 
generation of ecological sustainability – all are premised on measures of 
value and worth that are distinctive and particular to specific scholarly 
disciplines. They speak to a diversity of epistemologies that we also showcase 
in this volume.
Diverse epistemologies of urban research in Africa
The engagement up close and from a distance invokes different ways of 
producing knowledges of cities. What appears to be ‘merely’ perspectival 
can on closer inspection reveal some fundamental challenges to different 
epistemologies, regardless of how institutionally powerful their disciplines 
are in shaping the behaviours of city actors. In part this is no more than 
a restatement of some of the foundational truths of social science and its 
relationship to the urban world. W.I. Thomas, founder of what became 
the Chicago School of Sociology and the man who gave Robert Park a 
job, made the point a century ago that in the social sciences there was 
no straightforward correspondent theory of truth. You cannot choose 
your own facts. But people may choose their own ways of seeing the 
world and in this sense whether or not their interpretations of the world 
are factually correct is at some times and places irrelevant precisely because 
when situations are defined ‘as real, they are real in their consequences’ 
(Thomas, 1928: 572).
And what goes for cartographies of position applies equally for registers 





















































16 African cities and collaborative futures
ways of making the city visible in research. Some people have jobs. Others 
have careers. Others again struggle to get by day to day. The difference 
between these objective demographics describes how rational actions are 
qualified by temporal horizons. Equally, the logics of profit maximising, 
utility optimising, mobility preference or sustainable building may subsume 
socially constructed measures of speed, rhythm and expectations.
In the context of late twentieth-century global forms of economic govern-
ance and structural readjustment programmes led by international regimes 
of lending and investment, Jane Guyer, a former member of the World 
Bank International Advisory Group and distinguished anthropologist of 
sub-Saharan Africa – whose work so influenced Mbembe – has highlighted 
the power of cultural constructions of the temporal for an understanding 
of African life. Foregrounding the counterintuitive similarities between 
late twentieth-century forms of monetarism and evangelical Christianity, 
she argued that both define knowledge systems that ‘privatize the near 
future while socializing the present and the distant horizon’ (Guyer, 2007: 
411). Their similarities contrast with alternative readings of the temporal 
in (respectively) alternative traditions of twentieth-century neoclassical 
economics and many centuries of biblical thought historically. She goes 
on to suggest that ‘the new indexing of diagnosis of the present to an 
“infinite horizon” in the future places people in emotional and sociological 
terra nova. The nesting of temporalities and the relative emphasis and 
mutual entailment for different populations, or for the same population 
in different affective states, becomes the ethnographic question’ (2007: 
413), an issue that the work of Irmelin Joelsson in this volume situates in 
contemporary Dar es Salaam (see also the work on Togo by Pinot, 2010).
The shift towards the temporal rhythms of neoliberal economic 
knowledge systems was itself a reconfigured relationship between legal 
and utility logics in the law and economics tradition emerging from 
economists such as Ronald Coase in the 1960s (Keith, 2019). For Guyer, 
an unintended consequence of the forms of neoclassical economics reason 
deployed in late twentieth-century Africa shifted mainstream economics 
thinking from a conventional taxonomic distinction between the short 
term and the long term to a privileging of the importance of the long 
term and diminution of short-term considerations. She then highlighted 
how this shift complements and mirrors a framing of fundamentalist 
Christianity which privileges the millennial and rewards in the hereafter 
over the contemporary moment. Both monetarism/neoliberalism and 






















































suffering in the name of longer-term reward. Simplifying her argument 
slightly, the overlaps as well as the divergences between neoliberal regimes 
of government and fundamentalist Christianity translate into regimes 
and rhythms of development time in sub-Saharan contexts structured by 
market state reforms. The paradigmatic differences of each with other 
forms of neoclassical economic thinking and biblical reason respectively 
are diminished by the structural similarities of implicit, not explicit, 
measures of the calculus of time.
For Guyer the plural registers of economic reason imply but do not 
always make explicit normalisation and valorisation of rhythms, speeds 
and horizons of the temporal. A cultural translation of internationally 
nuanced registers of temporality is consequently essential for any under-
standing of developmental interventions, infrastructural investments or 
forms of market liberalisation. Such an argument is not a form of ‘relativism’. 
The argument follows instead the landmark choreography of Clifford 
Geertz’s (1984) case for ‘anti anti-relativism’, asserting that to make our 
knowledge systems subject to forms of cultural translation pluralises our 
systems of knowledge production but does not equate to making equivalent 
all forms of truth or scholarship. It sits easily with a sense that we must 
understand that how multiple knowledge systems of universal economic 
reason, hydrology, engineering, climate science ‘land’ in context matters. 
Not in altering the internal logics of these disciplines as such but in 
making sense of how particular logics are inserted into the systems of 
systems of city change that are structured by individual legacies, path 
dependencies and lock-ins to particular organisations of social and 
economic life. It complements the renewed interest in anthropologies of 
time that interrogate the epistemological implications of temporal registers 
of different forms of scholarship and science (Born, 2015; Connolly, 2011; 
Goldstone and Obarrio, 2016; Nielsen, 2011; Pinot, 2010).
Guyer’s rhetorical structure of argument reflects an obligation to make 
the familiar strange and the strange familiar that is also central to an 
anthropological sensibility. Curiously, the productive urban studies theoreti-
cal domain has at times reflected less on what it has derived from such 
argumentative structure and the anthropological discipline than it perhaps 
sometimes warrants. Yet the ability to link the view from up close with 
a perspective from a distance, to link the micro and the macro, has long 
been a mainstream dimension of such work.
Such a sensibility becomes particularly important when considering 





















































18 African cities and collaborative futures
cities. Within mainstream urban studies research on infrastructure-led 
transformation has at times been characterised as an ‘infrastructural turn’, 
normally reflecting the influence of the work of Bruno Latour’s use of 
the Foucauldian notion of the assemblage in combinations of material 
structures and cultural forms (Amin and Thrift, 2017; Howe et al., 2015). 
Yet the traditions of thinking about such combinations has deep roots in 
anthropological inquiry and the infrastructural turn owes much to the 
early anthropological investigations of scholars such as Penny Harvey 
(Harvey, 2005 and 2012; Harvey and Knox, 2015) and Brian Larkin (Larkin, 
2013).
Larkin’s influential work argues that infrastructures must be seen in 
terms of what they justify and invoke as much as what they deliver in 
purely technocratic terms. A road, a bridge, a pipeline makes claims on 
the land which imply specific notions of ‘development’. And development 
brings with it cultural baggage that is aesthetic, ethical and political. It is 
the claim of ‘progress’ that has long been contested in cultural theory but 
more straightforwardly links in cities the micro changes of the sidewalk, 
the drains or the domestic boiler to the legitimacy, trust and politics of 
macro systems of mobility, waste or energy or development economics 
(Larkin, 2013).
So, analytically the focus on infrastructure works productively to shift 
the analytical gaze from proximity to critical distance and back again. 
Social life on the ground works through these multi-scalar realities in 
every dimension of urban life, but academic research can at times separate 
them. Engineering challenges technocratically defined in terms of what 
is possible demand a time horizon different from returns on capital or 
from social or ecological impact assessments of particular interventions. 
Hence in part what the anthropological engagement with infrastructure 
facilitates is an ability to set up an analytical frame that can accommodate 
the scale of infrastructure investments, the upheavals, opportunities and 
transformations envisaged, engaged or delivered with the ways in which 
such changes land in urban contexts in terms of both geographical scale 
and rhythms of time and speed (Anand et al., 2018). Critical distance 
and proximate engagement are held alongside one another. Not a form 
of relativism but a facet of perspectival realities.
Similarly, Andrew Barry has argued that the wide exponential growth 
of an interest in infrastructural forms often neglects the four-dimensional 
locus of systems that are built, modified and eventually rendered obsolete. 
Barry distinguishes the notion of infrastructure as an ‘installed base’ from 






















































soil and water, as integral to the ongoing existence of infrastructure. 
Infrastructures such as pipes, roads and cables should not be considered 
a solid and static base in part because they rest on, or are built into, a 
further base’ (Barry, 2017: 187). But if the three-dimensional context is 
vital in determining what the infrastructural forms might become, then 
the fourth dimension of the temporal creates its own speeds of implementa-
tion, rhythms of operation and horizons of disruption, breakdown and 
eventual decay or obsolescence. And within the temporal itself the register 
of human and non-human time run together in strange ways. And so 
Barry likewise cites the powerful return to an interest in the anthropologies 
of the temporal in this context.
This analytical choreography replicates that of the multi-scalar. Temporal 
scale is also not a safety zone but a field of tension. The logics of the here 
and now may be quite properly different, based on different values, different 
knowledge systems and different epistemologies when we compare 
immediate needs of the impoverished with rates of return on investment 
and temporalities of urban ecosystems. It is fine to say that the gas boiler 
is not ecologically sustainable but such a rhetoric alone will not prevent 
utilities and industry companies servicing the demand for such com-
modities, people in need of heating demanding them or government 
legislating the exchange, planning and building regulations through which 
they are installed. The same is the case for almost any piece of infrastructural 
fabric. Timescale is not a safety zone but is a field of tension akin to that 
of scalar distance.
Of course the multi-scalar and the multi-temporal are realised simultane-
ously in city life characterised always by an excess of sensory information, 
cultural perception and historical legacies. And so for the purposes of 
this volume, the argument of the book as a whole and across the individual 
chapters identifies the importance of the imperative to ‘only connect’. We 
cannot understand the urban without thinking about the rural, make 
sense of the periphery of the city without thinking about where its periphery 
flexes socially, is defined by regulations and is mapped by scholars and 
city governments (Chapter 2). Urban morphology is one medium through 
which we make visible the multi-scalar.
In many ways, every urban plan sketches a future. The promises 
contained in master plans, whether of new pipes, roads, houses or sanitation, 
already organise the present, inverting the logic that the present dictates 
the future (de Souza Santos, 2019; Larkin, 2013; Nielsen, 2011). But creating 
new presents with promises of a better future is not an equal resource. 





















































20 African cities and collaborative futures
become (quite literally) concrete vary. While residents wait for roads to 
be tarred with asphalt, their rents may already become more expensive. 
Local governments may prefer to invest more on road tarring than sanita-
tion. The latter, which should come first, is invisible and thus politically 
less appealing. In this intersection of people, place and time, tensions 
brought by frustrations and delays undermine the promise, and urban 
plans all too often go awry before they are even complete.
‘Cures that harm’ is how McCord (2003) described unintended con-
sequences of crime prevention programmes and when turning the logic 
from individuals to cities; risk mitigation in African cities is what often 
inflicts risk (Chapter 3). Goodfellow (2017) reminds us that road construc-
tion can inflate land value and evict residents who are already vulnerable. 
‘Cures’ can be a dangerous guessing game when adrift and not well 
connected to people, place and time. But who speaks for the people? How 
do communities engage with infrastructural futures? How do they 
incorporate heterogeneous practices in informal settlements? Participatory 
projects, when trying to connect residents, technicians and politicians, 
may give the right to voice to different groups, and yet, without safe 
employment and housing, frustration at the inability to confront those 
in power may result in a backlash. More commonly certain modes of 
community voice can legitimise top-down approaches when socio-economic 
disparities are not alleviated (Chapter 4).
The ‘new urban sciences’ in this world is a term that is increasingly 
used to characterise the interface of multiple forms of scientific practice 
to make sense of the complex systems of the urban. For Michael Batty 
(2013), the science of cities relates particularly to the theorisation of advanced 
spatial analysis. However, it is also the case that not only infrastructural 
investment but also the metabolism of urban forms, built environment 
interests, urban ecosystems and medicine have developed similar research 
sub-disciplines in the city. Specialisms of city engineering, biosystems, 
life sciences and public health have linked new sources and methodologies 
for garnering data at city scale such as satellite technologies, mobile phone 
records, mobility data, using data analytics to consider the interfaces 
between systems in settings of urban complexity. Such approaches have 
developed an extraordinary capacity to generate exponential increases of 
data in real time when paradoxically the speed of innovation and adoption 
of disruptive technologies in cities makes the longer term harder to predict. 
This highlights the need to consider how the new urban sciences land in 






















































(STS) approaches work to understand how genres of scientific knowledges 
make sense of the city. The city simultaneously adopts (or does not adopt) 
scientific reason and the social processes of technological innovation 
become a rich research focus in their own right (UN-Habitat, 2020). STS 
repeatedly demonstrates how diverse epistemologies generate analytical 
frames that land and impact on how cities behave as complex systems 
(Howe et al., 2015; Krause and Guggenheim, 2012). A century on from 
W.I. Thomas’s invocation of a social ‘science’, modes of seeing change 
patterns of behaviour.
Complex systems logic demonstrates why seeing like a city demands 
recognition of geographical specificity and path-dependent social settle-
ment, opening contextual opportunities of place that render bespoke local 
city ‘clumsy’ solutions to ‘wicked’ urban problems more plausible. Cities 
of the global south have the potential to leapfrog the twentieth-century 
lock-ins of car-based urbanism and wasteful city metabolisms of water 
and waste. But equally, different histories of colonialism and systemic 
underdevelopment weigh heavily in specific parts of the world; alternative 
visions of the good life balance the imperatives of the city commons, the 
architecture of markets and the freedoms of regimes of rights differently. 
We have argued elsewhere that such a perspective demands a different 
framing of cross-disciplinary engagement between social science, humani-
ties and natural science epistemologies of knowledge production (Keith 
and de Souza Santos, 2020). The tensions between time-space contextual 
framing and diverse epistemological approaches to the urban share a 
recognition of the powers of the new urban sciences and the capacity to 
predict in real time (P), the contingencies of emergence in complex systems 
(E), technological disruptions that are adopted differently (A) according 
to distinct local systems of commensuration that demand an experimental 
disposition to urban futures that promote innovative knowledge exchange 
across urban systems (K). This disposition of ‘PEAK Urban’ creates a 
frame through which technological change might be harnessed by cities 
that are reflexive and flexible in their response to technological disruption, 
optimistic yet also pragmatically realistic about the propensity for tech-
nological change to shape their futures (Keith, 2020).
Such a focus on emergence in complex systems does not equate to a 
sense of developmental immaturity. It instead highlights and problematises 
an acknowledgement that Africa is the part of the globe where by some 
measures urbanisation is moving fastest and a recognition that this in 





















































22 African cities and collaborative futures
life. When divergent dynamics shape individual cities, they create particular 
articulations of these shared logics, combinations of local culture and 
global trends that create relational similarities between cities and also 
particular patterns of combination and hybridisation within each. How 
these processes of urban transformation can be theorised depends in part 
on how we make sense of such a process of combination and hybridisation. 
In this context Marilyn Strathern in the 1990s forensically examined 
Latour’s analytical device of the assemblage that is central to his actor 
network theory that has become so influential in the urban studies of the 
last two decades. Her critique argues that in Latour (and in long-standing 
anthropological traditions) the combinations of material objects and 
cultural life create new forms of the hybrid. Latour analyses the links 
between the hybrid forms of the material, social and cultural, his networks 
that constitute actor networks are famously neither simply human nor 
non-human; not modern, just unfinished. Or put more simply, they are 
always in the process of becoming. She points out that Latour’s logic of 
networks and hybrids is potentially endless through its fractal form and 
so she suggests that what might be of interest is as much how networks 
are cut as how they are held in place and stabilised in the short, medium 
or longer term. Interpretation ‘must hold objects of reflection stable long 
enough to be of use’ (Strathern, 1996: 522; see also Strathern, 2015), but 
it is in the cutting as much as the assemblage of the hybrid forms that 
novelty becomes, new parts of the systems emerge, ontology asserts itself.
Significantly, she illustrates this principle by citing the creation of 
intellectual property through patents that rely partly on individual or 
corporate innovation but also partly on knowledge made by others as 
scientific advance stands on the shoulders of its predecessors. Intellectual 
labour becomes property when law cuts the network itself. For Strathern, 
law ‘cuts’ the normative domain – ‘the limitless expansion of justice’ – when 
it creates a ‘manipulable object of use’ to which can be attributed a property 
value. In this sense ‘there is a good case for seeing property as a hybridizing 
artefact in itself ’ (Strathern, 1996: 525). Similarly, when science ‘lands’ 
in the city, it structures how we might think about the urban but also 
creates new permutations, new ontologies of social, cultural and economic 
systems through which cities themselves evolve.
It is in this sense that in the contemporary city, where proprietary data 
is the clichéd new oil of tech giants such as Google, Uber or Amazon, 
future propensity cuts the network and becomes a property in its own 






















































ever recorded of a public company and yet still pursue a major initial 
public offering of share value which bets on future data powers to enclose 
the virtual commons of the metropolis, urban futures are as tradable as 
futures in any other commodity. The city becomes a crucible of forms of 
expertise and knowledge practice. And in liberalised urban markets such 
as South Africa’s Johannesburg, Uber captures market share far more 
rapidly than in other more regulated cities. For better and for worse.
In this spirit this volume shares a concern with how epistemological 
logics and regimes of particular expertise land in the cities of Africa, 
whether in generating novel forms of risk and institutional interdependency 
(Chapter 3), how regimes of law and economics frame interventions in 
upgrading and ownership in informal settlements (Chapter 4), the socio-
technical systems and intersectionality of energy systems (Chapter 6) or 
the nexus of waste systems and contemporary science (Chapter 5). They 
share a recognition that, in order to make sense of the contemporary 
moment through a geographically sensitive lens, a global urbanism lands 
in the cities of Africa through diverse approaches, diverse dispositions 
and diverse epistemologies.
Outline of the book
This book brings together different disciplines and scholars from across 
the globe to discuss the nature of African cities – the interactions of resi-
dents with infrastructure, energy, housing, safety and sustainability, seen 
through local narratives and theories.
African peripheries usually face disqualification when represented by 
what they are not (Mbembe, 2001). Paula Meth et al. (Chapter 2) outline 
what an urban periphery is. The focus of this chapter is to conceptualise 
these heterogeneous spaces, often marked by constant change, in terms 
of governance and experience. Looking at case studies in five South African 
and two Ethiopian cities, the authors frame urban peripheries across 
distinct categories that epitomise economic, housing and governance 
arrangements. Despite efforts to create taxonomies and typologies, the 
authors conclude that such categories are not mutually exclusive; they 
are complex, contradictory and variable. The category of the periphery 
is problematic but is still a valuable descriptor of urban form. When 
discussing fast-paced urbanisation across the globe, it is important to 
account for the fact that ‘suburbanisation’ is ‘now the dominant form of 





















































24 African cities and collaborative futures
categories may be, because peripheries are spaces of urban transformations, 
the sociology of definitions and categories responds to the call to define 
African cities by what they are and not what they lack. The creation of 
new categories in the study of urban peripheries should aid the allocation 
of policy resources as well as the use of analytical tools avoiding a one-
fits-all solution.
In a similar vein, Mark Pelling et al. (Chapter 3) consider the paradox of 
development in African cities. The authors point out that often development 
itself can be the root of risk as much as it aims to mitigate risks. The authors 
look at Karonga (Malawi), Ibadan (Nigeria), Niamey (Niger) and Nairobi 
(Kenya) and discuss natural risks (floods, droughts, earthquakes) as well as 
everyday risks (inadequate sanitation or poor water quality) and explore the 
governance of disaster. When analysing these distinct urban forms (from 
small cities to megacities), the authors call for a better understanding of 
the interaction between multiple nodal actors: government, universities, 
civil society, among others. Without such understanding, development 
projects, despite their aims, may harm rather than service cities.
Nodal actors and reflections on development projects are also part of 
Maria Christina Georgiadou and Claudia Loggia’s chapter (Chapter 4). 
The authors analyse upgrading projects in informal settlements in Durban, 
South Africa. Georgiadou and Loggia consider that participation is more 
than providing feedback to projects previously agreed before community 
appraisal. The construction and management of integrated systems to 
think and intervene in urban peripheries are both necessary and chal-
lenging. Empirical data shared in this chapter shows that participatory 
processes will demand new tools and methodologies to deliver empower-
ment, local ownership and resilience. A successful participatory upgrading 
project will not be one that delivers infrastructure and services, but one 
that offers full ownership of the upgrading and tenure security. The 
measurement of successful policies from state and community perspectives 
deserves greater attention.
The question informing Henrik Ernstson et al.’s piece (Chapter 5) is 
‘who benefits from reframing waste as a resource, and in what ways?’ The 
authors examine how green technology and livelihoods working in and 
with waste can antagonise in the process of being transformed. What is 
ecologically and technologically sensible is not always socially inclusive, 
and the politics of waste needs to encompass different voices to understand 
what makes waste ‘valuable’ economically, socially and ecologically. Listen-






















































plays and capacity of individuals to determine what waste can become. 
Collaborative governance is consequently considered conceptually and 
theoretically in the chapter.
While Chapter 5 sheds light on sustainable development and Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) when tackling waste, this discussion is 
continued in the chapter by Federico Caprotti et al. (Chapter 6), where 
urban energy is the key concern. The authors work with an understand-
ing of the socio-technical nature of energy systems, where socio-spatial, 
environmental and economic inequality co-exist and for that reason cannot 
be studied separately. To make energy transformations inclusive demands 
an understanding of South Africa’s development. From the country’s 
industrialisation to its cheap workforce, it is possible to map how energy 
is distributed in the country. Socio-spatially, the chapter describes how 
informally built shacks and locally run solar power are challenged by 
both the physical material of the fabric and the path-dependent legacies 
of energy provision in South Africa, where municipal revenues relate to 
a single provider and an existing grid. Most shacks considered in their 
study could not bear the weight of a solar panel, while municipalities 
are perversely tied to extending centrally controlled twentieth-century 
energy systems to raise their own revenues and realise the fiscal stability 
needed to achieve just transitions. Echoing previous discussions, the 
chapter turns to multi-level governance for inclusive energy transition 
and better quality of life.
In the final substantive chapter, the infrastructural turn in urban studies 
is addressed head-on by Irmelin Joelsson’s (Chapter 7) consideration of 
how the construction of a major piece of transport infrastructure in Dar 
es Salaam – a landmark river crossing – reconfigures the DNA of the city 
through its interface with global finance, the introduction of a pension 
scheme linked to the revenues generated by tolls on the road bridge and 
the social policies and practices of insurance. The emergence of welfare 
nets in contemporary Africa brings together international finance and 
new ways of governing urban populations. Welfare systems are meant to 
create providential systems for protecting individual futures. But in this 
chapter the author considers how such forms of urban governance have 
to be understood ethnographically alongside other traditions of getting 
by, hedging and networking to mitigate risk in the everyday lives of the 
citizens of Dar es Salaam.
These chapters, we believe, share a sense of the possibilities and also 





















































26 African cities and collaborative futures
of this volume we go on to suggest that they also share a disposition that 
in some ways advances urban studies more generally from a focus on the 
powers of infrastructures of the city to a complementary but alternative 
focus on the architecture of the platform economies they configure and 
the logistics through which cities themselves manage to function in even 
the most challenging circumstances.
Note
1 The ESRC Urban Transformations (UT) programme was a portfolio of research 
funded by the ESRC from 2015 to 2020. It involved over seventy projects and 
international partnerships with equivalent research bodies in Brazil, China, 
India and South Africa. The UT programme was directed by Michael Keith. 
This book was completed with support from UT and also from the PEAK 
Urban programme, funded by UKRI’s Global Challenge Research Fund (Grant 
Ref: ES/P011055/1).
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Introduction
This chapter explores how transformation in the spatial peripheries of 
three African city regions is shaped, governed and experienced, drawing 
on the findings of a three-year Economic and Social Research Council/
National Research Foundation (ESRC/NRF) funded research project in 
South Africa and Ethiopia. We discuss both intellectual and methodo-
logical challenges, along with reflective insights of undertaking research 
on the dynamics and drivers of change and the ‘lived experiences’ of 
residents living on the peripheries of cities, using a mixed methods 
approach.
The chapter emphasises practices of collaborative research and reflects 
on our conceptualisations of terms such as ‘periphery’ and ‘drivers of 
change’. It then turns to question the process of knowledge production, 
examining what or whose lived experiences are captured or can be known. 
In doing so it briefly points to some initial findings of the project, but its 
aim is not to address these findings substantively, rather to explore the 
conceptual and practical challenges of undertaking research in African 
city peripheries. This exploration is extended through a reflection on 
various methodological issues, including issues of comparability and 
managing differentials in data depth and coverage. It concludes by 
highlighting the richness of researching the peripheries and the wider 





















































 At the city edge 31
Introducing mixed methods in urban peripheries research
The key research questions of the project were as follows:
●	 What are the main characteristics of economic transformation and 
infrastructural change?
●	 Who has driven these changes, and what is their significance for 
inclusive urban development?
●	 What governance mechanisms shape these infrastructural and 
economic changes?
●	 How are these urban changes experienced by different residents of 
urban peripheries?
●	 What are the comparative lived experiences in urban peripheries?
●	 What are the implications of such drivers and experiences of urban 
change for reducing urban poverty and improving urban inclusion?
The project aimed to address and answer these questions through the use 
of a mixed methods approach which coheres around a focus on seven 
case studies representing different kinds of urban peripheries across African 
cities. Specifically, our cases included places where older and new low- and 
middle-income areas are close to major new areas of infrastructure 
investment (Waterloo/Hammond’s Farm/Verulam near to King Shaka 
Airport, eThekwini in Durban); a traditional authority area close to areas 
of formal residential, commercial property and shopping mall investment 
(Molweni/Crestholme close to Hillcrest, eThekwini: see Figure 2.1 for 
Molweni); a ‘mega-human settlement’, major social housing, lower-middle 
income private development and vulnerable informal settlement on the 
edge of Soweto, Johannesburg (Lufhereng/Protea Glen/Waterworks); places 
with a history of ‘displaced urbanisation’ and relocations linked to apartheid 
homeland policy (Winterveld, Tshwane) and apartheid-originated industrial 
decentralisation (Ekangala/Ekindustria/Bronkhorstspruit, Tshwane) where 
‘new cities’ or mega-human settlements are planned.
In the city of Addis Ababa, our two cases are Tulu Dimtu and Yeka 
Abado/Legetafo. In both cases there is large condominium housing 
investment by the state. Tulu Dimtu is a new residential area of predomi-
nantly condominium and cooperative housing located in the south-eastern 
edge of Addis, relatively near to an industrial park, a site of significant 
employment straddling the municipal boundary between Addis Ababa 
and Oromia State (see Figure 2.2). Yeka Abado is a relatively established 





















































32 African cities and collaborative futures
with Oromia State and quite close to the eastern end of the city’s new 
light railway. On the other side of the boundary but adjoining Yeka Abado 
is Legetafo, an area of high-end private residential villas abutted by rural 
farmland.
Though the choice of case studies was by no means straightforward, a 
key feature of most of the cases is their multi-nodal nature. This means 
they are highly differentiated both in their composition and between cases: 
for example, a single case may include areas of informal housing, formal 
middle-class housing and state-subsidised housing for the urban poor.
The project used diverse methods and activities in order to gather data. 
It has primarily adopted a mixed qualitative methods approach, under-
pinned by ideas of comparative urbanism on the one hand and a com-
mitment to seeing the peripheries from the ‘everyday’ perspectives of 
those who live within them, on the other. The research activities encom-
passed solicited diaries, auto-photography and interviews with residents 
in case study sites, accompanied by surveys of a sample of residents in 
these sites. In addition it included key informant interviews with govern-
ment officials, planners, business representatives, developers and leaders. 
This field research was in turn underpinned by close virtual and physical 
communications between team members across three countries with joint 
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activities such as workshops ensuring a regular dialogue across the project 
and strong collaboration.
This chapter now moves to consider two conceptual issues that underpin 
the overarching aims of the project, namely how we conceptualise the 
periphery and what we understand ‘drivers of change’ to mean. It concludes 
with some reflections on methodological challenges and opportunities 
that have shaped the project.
Conceptualising the periphery
Globally, scholars have made various efforts to make sense of and con-
ceptualise the peripheries of cities. These have informed the conceptualisa-
tions and framings that we detail below, but have also proved limited in 
adequately capturing the complexities evident in diverse African peripheries. 
Literature on peri-urban change (e.g. Mbiba and Huchzermeyer, 2002) 
has suffered from allegations of limited theoretical clout, though it does 
continue to provide important insights into particular forms of land use 
and tenure changes on the edges of some African cities. Nonetheless, the 
nature of changes increasingly documented, particularly in the African 
context, is evidently more complex and varied. The now extensive literature 





















































34 African cities and collaborative futures
(McKee and McKee, 2004; Phelps, 2012; Stern and Marsh, 1997) on edge 
city development, originating in North America (Garreau, 1991) but now 
applied globally, is arguably a poor lens through which to explore trans-
formations on the edges of African cities. This is because of its assumptions 
about the pivotal role of private vehicle ownership, private-sector investment 
and the peripheralisation of economic opportunities and commercial 
functions. Many of these are poorly evidenced in African peripheries. 
However, given its foundational nature, we do speak to this literature but 
– cognisant of the limitations of this work – we argue that theorisations 
from a contextualised southern perspective are thus essential (Parnell 
and Robinson, 2012; Watson, 2014). Our work aims to contribute to this 
growing scholarship through our analyses of lived experiences of the 
peripheries to inform grounded, contextualised understandings of complex 
urban change.
Beyond conceptualisations of ‘urban edges’, literature on city regions is 
important in pointing to the spatial complexity of these places, particularly 
their economic multi-nodality, multi-directional movement patterns 
and multiple governance arrangements, which complicate concepts of 
peripherality. However, this literature has not paid much attention to 
African cities (Beall et al., 2015). Recent research on ‘global suburban-
isms’ (Ekers et al., 2012), understood as ‘the combination of non-central 
population and economic growth with urban spatial expansion’ (Ekers 
et al., 2012: 407) has documented the diverse ways in which this growth 
is occurring internationally. It argues that ‘suburbanisation’ is now the 
dominant form of urban development globally (Keil, 2018). This research 
has included some work on African cities. Bloch (2011) has pointed to 
rapid growth on the urban periphery linked to economic expansion and 
the rise of the middle class, while Andreason et al. (2017) argue that 
informal residential development on cheaper land on the periphery might 
be seen as a form of suburbanisation in Dar es Salaam. Both describe 
quite particular forms of peripheral development. Mabin et al. (2013) 
review African literatures and demonstrate the diversity of forms of 
growth in African cities, and the need for deeper exploration of these 
patterns. Work in this realm is limited, however (Buire, 2014; Jenkins, 
2013), particularly in relation to governance mechanisms, different forms 
of infrastructural investment and how these explicitly shape the lives of 
residents. Partly tied to this agenda and focusing specifically on the urban 
periphery is work by Sawyer (2014). She examines the differentiated 
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piecemeal ways in which urbanisation proceeds. This important work 
is highly relevant to our understandings and framings of the periphery 
but evidences a raft of processes that are less familiar or commonplace 
in both South Africa and Ethiopia. In these contexts, state coordination 
is more evident, although we can recognise that the extent of planning 
or state intervention is ‘loosening’ in the South African cases rela-
tive to that witnessed during the apartheid era (Harrison and Todes,  
2015).
We explored the work of Caldeira (2017) and her concept of peripheral 
urbanisation but found it to be less useful. It collapses peripheral urbanisa-
tion into auto-construction, and uses it to describe practices of producing 
cities rather than examining urban peripheries per se. Auto-construction 
is a practice we see within peripheral spaces, but we do not necessarily 
ascribe it as being of such spaces. In other words, we view peripheries as 
more multi-faceted than an emphasis on auto-construction suggests. 
Essentially, we are dissatisfied with much of the literature available to us 
in terms of its explanatory value and relevance, and we aim to contribute 
to this debate.
We conceptualise the peripheries as spaces where complex socio-political, 
spatial and economic processes work to complicate and inform urban 
change, including in ways that are contradictory and variable. We view 
the peripheries as layered, relational spaces. Our conceptualisations 
encompass an understanding of peripheries which privileges the ‘peripheral’ 
geographical location of settlements but recognises that the idea of ‘being 
peripheral’ is subjectively determined. It also does not assume that the 
peripheries are necessarily economically, politically or culturally peripheral 
to the city region or spatially marginal (Pieterse, 2018); hence we include 
wealthier investments, spaces of power and varying ways of living in our 
framing of urban change, although in reality gaining insights into everyday 
life in these wealthier spaces has proved tricky. Some of the key features 
of peripheries in our understanding are that they are generally spaces 
located geographically some distance from a main urban core, recognising 
that this in itself may be fluid and relative, and that they may be close to 
new growing cores. They are areas of changing land use, where development 
may be relatively less dense and where a lack of services and infrastructure 
may be evident. The spaces are commonly residential but not always, and 
can be heterogeneous, depending on their particular histories. They often 
offer elements such as fresher air, cheaper land, access to affordable housing 





















































36 African cities and collaborative futures
be complex and shifting). Such spaces often attract speculative investment 
and work as footholds in the city for particular residents, they may also 
show evidence of being incremental and unfinished, and they may be 
boring, feel dislocated and offer limited employment opportunities and 
transport facilities. Many of these spaces are in transition, and the temporal 
dimensions of urban change underpinning urban peripheries are key to 
our conceptualisations.
Drawing on the multiple forms of peripheral experiences and contexts 
we encountered in our research, we have through collaborative working 
initially identified five different categories of urban periphery which we 
aim to reassess, amend if needed, and expand upon in future publications 
and theorisations. We do not view these categories as hierarchical, exclusive, 
all-encompassing or finite: rather, they can operate in overlapping and 
hybrid ways, recognising that multiple categories can usefully be applied 
to each of our seven case study areas and that categories bleed into each 
other in important ways.
The five categories are as follows:
●	 The speculative periphery. As the labelling suggests, this refers to 
urban spaces targeted (usually but not always or not exclusively) by 
private capital investment for the purposes of profit generation. This 
may be in the form of housing estates, commerce, industry or agri-
business (or even major new multi-use developments) or may refer 
to spaces where particular investments generate and extend power 
bases of individuals or institutions. This category evidences the 
presence of relatively cheaper land, with sometimes easier (or less 
controlled) mechanisms of access, ownership and financing – although 
this is not a straightforward relationship.
●	 The vanguard periphery. This refers to peripheral spaces within cities, 
which are at the forefront of urban change or are spaces of urban 
experimentation, state ambition, innovation and development. These 
may include new forms of housing, including mixed and sustainable 
housing forms, areas of integrated development, or areas with 
experimental forms of urban governance, which seek to manage 
potentially conflictual histories of rule and power broking.
●	 The auto-constructed periphery. This is akin to Caldeira’s (2017) 
conceptualisation, which privileges an understanding of the role of 
informality in parts of the urban periphery referring to both the efforts 
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or ignore planning legislation, building codes and environmental 
concerns. Hence, auto-construction can cut across wealth barriers 
and describe forms of urban change usually directed by individuals, 
but most commonly evidences poor informal housing developments 
on parcels of land on the edges of urban centres.
●	 The transitioning periphery. This captures many features of change 
often evidenced within peri-urban descriptors of spaces including 
changing land use from rural uses including agricultural to more 
urban uses such as residential, institutional or retail. Processes may 
include the densification of spaces through the reduction of plot size, 
growth in housing and other built forms as well as the building of 
infrastructure which transforms spaces, such as roads, electricity, 
water provision, bus shelters and shopping facilities. These may be 
areas with long settlement histories, but where change is very evident. 
This category also accounts for transitions in forms of governance 
across urban peripheries.
●	 The inherited periphery. This describes spaces on the urban edge 
which were often produced by the state and commonly evidence 
decline or a failure to progress in various ways, such as employment 
opportunities, investment (particularly in business), infrastructure 
and basic services. Such spaces may continue to exist as spaces of 
obligation for the state, created for particular political and historical 
reasons and which continue to exert expectations and pressures on 
a weak authority. Economic opportunities may be narrow and vulner-
able to change. The areas may be spatially fragmented, and for some 
residents living there, they can be poorly connected or have unaf-
fordable transport provision. These are areas where residents’ narratives 
of change or the lack thereof evidence hopelessness, marginality, 
feelings of being trapped and neglected. At the same time, they may 
also contain social networks or investment in housing valued by 
residents, or be places where more diverse activities can occur, so 
they are not necessarily perceived in uni-dimensional ways. They 
may also include more middle-class residents with historical investment 
in housing or work in the area, and thus may be more differentiated 
than is immediately apparent. Finally, inherited peripheries may 
contain aspects of governance typifying that of the ‘informal strong-
man’ who is powerful and effective but can also be dangerous, operating 






















































38 African cities and collaborative futures
As devices these labels are useful to us in several ways: they broadly catego-
rise and summarise the types of urban peripheries we have encountered; 
they provide a shorthand to reflect differences and distinctions between 
them; and they suggest something of their ‘status’, role or trajectory within 
larger urban conglomerates. But, as noted, the categories are not mutually 
exclusive and may exist alongside one another in nearby localities, or 
form overlapping layers in an area undergoing change. We invoke these 
categories of urban peripheries in the three city regions studied in our 
project. This focus on the scale of the city region is a conscious spatial 
and analytical practice. We argue that the geographical peripheries of city 
regions are relatively absent in research terms, particularly in relation to 
African cities (aside from a few key analyses outlined above), and that there 
is a lack of understanding of the state and non-state developments they 
are attracting – and of their potential for dynamic change, intervention 
and decline.
Our struggles over our conceptualisations of the urban peripheries 
were keenly tested through the process of case study selection, where we 
debated various tensions around the multiple meanings of ‘peripheral’, 
including the geographic question of being peripheral relative to different 
legal and political boundaries around cities, regions and states. A case in 
point is that of Lufhereng, Protea Glen and Waterworks, which operates as 
a case peripheral to the city of Johannesburg but is less peripheral when 
considered within the wider city region of Gauteng. This case, as well as 
that of Yeka Abado in Addis, forced us to question the geographical and 
spatial assumptions inherent in the idea of the periphery and what centres 
or cores we were privileging in our analyses. We foreground the notion, 
identified above, that living in the urban peripheries is a relational practice, 
and we take as central residents’ own interpretations of where they live 
and how they define their home spaces. Thus we view the periphery as 
geographic, relational and lived as these quotes from participant diaries 
indicate:
We are still a rural area of which they say we are urban. (PK, Diary, 
Ekangala)
Kangala is a township situated in a semi-rural area, although it being a 
township with semi urban lifestyle habits … you still experience the beauty 
of African cultures around here; people still practise tradition and isiNdebele. 
(Q, Diary, Ekangala)
Living in this area has a distinct feeling. I mean, I’ve never lived in such 
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you don’t see farmers farming, collecting, preparing and storing their harvest 
and that creates a certain form of joy. (010, Diary, Tulu Dimtu)
There is nothing unique about this area when you compare it to other 
areas. Considering that it’s a rural area, I assume the change is that there 
is now water and power provision and a school is constructed. (039, Diary, 
Yeka Abado)
We recognise that distance, accessibility, visibility and mobility are all 
critical, but we ask from and to what or where, rather than assuming the 
city centre as the obvious focus. The siting of interventions and the relative 
governance practices and engagement all shape the lived experiences of 
the periphery.
Debating ‘drivers of change’
Our project makes use of the idea of ‘drivers of change’ in order to capture 
the multi-scalar processes shaping urban change in the peripheries. This 
term allows us to explore a wide range of processes, including economic, 
governance, environmental, political, individual, etc., at multiple scales. 
We argue that the diversity of such drivers of change is significant and it 
suggests simplistic accounts of the peripheries are highly problematic. Our 
research reveals that in some areas, large-scale formal investment is evident 
(such as in Tulu Dimtu in Addis), while other areas are predominantly 
characterised by informal development or a complex mix of formal 
and informal processes, as in Molweni in eThekwini and Winterveld 
in Tshwane. We argue that theoretical framings, which focus only on 
growth, are misleading (although growth is evident, such as in northern 
eThekwini through planning and other forces) (Todes, 2017). Edges can 
also be places of economic and population decline, with Ekangala an 
example of decline of industrial opportunity over time. Governance can 
be weaker on the edge than in the core, or divided between adjacent 
authorities or between different forms of governance, as in Molweni 
or Yeka Abado/Legetafo. We use these ideas to move beyond work on 
African cities which either overlooked peripheral areas or focused on a 
donor-driven conception of the ‘peri-urban’ concerned primarily with 
changes to land use and farming (Mbiba and Huchzermeyer, 2002). 
However, we note that interactions with the land vary in such spaces, 
with some offering opportunities for subsistence farming or as places 






















































40 African cities and collaborative futures
Rather than a conceptual focus on the interface between urban and 
rural, this research explores urban peripheries as distinct sites that can 
be subject to major investments, new urban visions, contingent governance 
practices and processes of growth and decline. It aims to understand how 
people live in these critical spaces of twenty-first-century urbanism, as 
well as the potential of these sites for economic development and poverty 
reduction. Given very high rates of urban growth and complex forms of 
urban spatial expansion across most of the African continent (Doan and 
Oduro, 2012; Fox, 2012; Parnell and Pieterse, 2014), the challenge of 
peripheral urban governance and poverty reduction is affecting African 
states and residents in complex and diverse ways. In South Africa, for 
example, city governments result from local government consolidation 
and often cover large areas, with some city regions crossing other admin-
istrative jurisdictions, e.g. Gauteng. Other countries on the continent are 
dominated by a capital or ‘core’ city in a highly unbalanced urban system, 
placing particular strain on the land surrounding one specific city (Thuo, 
2013) and associated governance institutions. In Ethiopia and Uganda, 
this process of core city expansion is further complicated by ethnic 
dimensions of territorial governance, as the city spills over borders into 
the surrounding region (Goodfellow, 2010 and 2017; Gore and Muwanga, 
2014) and as our Addis cases reveal, associated conflicts over land result.
Fringe locations, where local economic activities such as mining or 
manufacturing can either integrate into the city region or alternatively 
decline – through restructuring, for example – can be transformed through 
state housing or speculative land improvements. Development in these 
areas can result in mobility and access challenges which impact employment 
opportunities. However, our findings show that this is often very varied 
locally, with adjacent neighbourhoods experiencing quite significant 
differences. Developments in such areas can strain viable infrastructure 
and service delivery at scale, requiring private-sector (including transna-
tional) investments in the face of energy, telecommunications and water 
shortages (Simone, 2014; Todes, 2014). Major infrastructure projects 
financed by foreign aid or international assistance, particularly from China 
as in the case of Addis (e.g. the light railway), are rapidly transforming 
urban edges in contradictory ways, fostering inclusion for some, but 
exclusion for others (Liu and Lefèvre, 2012).
Peripheries may also be characterised by environmental challenges 
(Aguilar, 2008), social exclusion and low levels of cohesion. In other 
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may prove highly desirable. Similarly, cross-border ethnic or political 
differences can paralyse negotiations between actors, but simultaneously 
privilege those who are able to exploit different governance systems and 
policy approaches between bordering municipalities (Todes, 2014). For 
some residents, then, urban peripheries are localities of choice, but for 
others they represent spaces of curbed choice. Nonetheless, people’s presence 
on the edge has significant implications in terms of services, welfare, 
employment, labour force and markets for current and future development 
by both state and private market actors. The relationships between particular 
drivers, including the private sector, and their associated ‘markets’ can 
be intense and complex in terms of the specifics of what is included in 
particular engagements: the importance and multi-functional role of the 
Spar supermarket in our northern eThekwini case is an example of the 
significance of such spatially particular relationships.
The ways in which infrastructure and economic changes are concep-
tualised, realised and distributed (given their unevenness) and how these 
relate to everyday urban practices are key (Simone, 2014). Much of the 
recent research on and interest in infrastructure, which dominates urban 
theory currently, focuses on larger-scale infrastructural investments 
(Nugent, 2018). Our project reveals how in fact it is the smaller-scale, 
localised infrastructure interventions which are often the most significant 
drivers of change for residents. These may include investments in toilet 
blocks, road surfacing and local transport. These ‘micro drivers’ of change 
only emerge through a focus on the lived experiences of urban change 
and would be easily missed if such an engagement had not occurred.
This appreciation of the lived experiences of places and these ‘drivers’ 
of change’ processes has an important intellectual trajectory as well as 
methodology within urban studies, geography and planning. Often it 
draws on deep insights from urban anthropology (Bank, 2011; De Boeck 
and Plissart, 2004; Ross, 2010) and sociology (Mosoetsa, 2011) which are 
concerned with how people live, work, eat, move, consume, sleep, parent 
(Meth, 2013), love and die in place. Much urban research, particularly 
that informing meta-scale urban intervention, relies on limited survey 
instruments often assessing quantitative outcomes. Charlton (2013) and 
Meth (2015) have argued that there is a lack of understanding of the 
social outcomes and the lived experiences of major interventions, as well 
as of more micro-scaled material changes. These are arguably significant 
drivers of local change, including the provision of state-provided housing, 





















































42 African cities and collaborative futures
Meth and Charlton (2016) and Charlton and Meth (2017) reveal how 
such housing shapes livelihood challenges and how it has mobility implica-
tions, positive impacts on identity and security, but with gendered distinc-
tions around power, violence and sexuality. These insights inform an 
analysis of housing concerned with welfare, social change and poverty, 
i.e. a lived experience interpretation of key drivers of change. Our project 
thus uses a methodology closely attuned to lived experiences to shed light 
on how larger as well as more micro drivers of change are experienced, 
and how they shape the urban peripheries in complex ways.
Capturing the everyday: emphases and omissions
We have argued here that conceptualising the everyday and researching 
the lived experiences of urban change are valid intellectual exercises. In 
practice, however, as we have progressed through our data collection we 
have debated and faced challenges with the question of who or what 
characterises the everyday. As outlined above, we commenced with the 
intention of giving voice to varying everyday lives occupying the peripheries, 
no matter what social class or housing form they occupied – our aim was 
to ‘sample’ those who lived there in order to capture multiple experiences 
of the peripheries. Our starting position was to avoid producing a summary 
of poverty on urban fringes and also to avoid overstating ‘niche’ experiences. 
We have used multi-nodal cases (see Figure 2.3) to reach diverse ‘everydays’ 
in most of our case study areas (i.e. a mix of very different housing types 
which largely but not entirely maps onto different classes of residents).
However, a variety of factors worked to contort and subvert these aims 
while other events and decisions simultaneously worked to satisfy and 
extend our aims, in complex and varied ways. Our choice of case study 
locations and their multi-nodal components is an obvious starting point 
for recognising who or what gets included or excluded. Initial decisions 
about what to include were overruled and reconsidered as data collection 
proceeded, as we recognised that our findings were exclusionary or lacking, 
or where we sought parity between data sources. For example, our inclusion 
of Waterworks informal settlement in the Lufhereng case in Gauteng 
occurred relatively late as we recognised its significance within the area, 
particularly in relation to imminent economic investment plans.
Gatekeepers were important too in affecting who we connected with 
and sampled, usually played out along party political lines in the South 
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Figure 2.3 Examples of multi-nodal cases: (a) Northern eThekwini 





















































44 African cities and collaborative futures
elements of gatekeeping by the African National Congress (ANC), perhaps 
in attempts to reclaim their power, given that the formerly ANC-controlled 
ward was now led by the opposition Democratic Alliance party. But 
gatekeeping was also tied to ‘strong-man’ politics in the Ekangala case, 
where implicit ‘prevention’ of access occurred or where engagement with 
participants was highly managed and circumscribed. Language played 
an important role in ex/inclusion and was significant in all case study 
areas. In the Gauteng cases, the variety of languages at times stretched 
beyond the capacity of the immediate research team, requiring the ‘farming 
out’ of transcripts and recordings to translators and reducing the ease of 
communication in face-to-face engagements. In contrast, different language 
skills among the research team meant that particular foreign nationals 
were engaged and included, picking up on quite distinct experiences in 
the peripheries.
The weekday working-hour timings of field research in South Africa 
inevitably shaped patterns of inclusion and exclusion, privileging those 
working at home, unemployed, elderly or young. Efforts were made during 
interviews and surveys to question beyond the individual present, but it 
is important to recognise the ways in which such temporally particular 
engagements tended to yield very specific insights into people, places and 
processes. In contrast, data gathering for the Addis cases commenced 
later than the South African cases and all qualitative data were gathered 
during weekends and work holidays, thereby extending the range of 
residents included in the research. Some of our cases were very periph-
eral and highly spatially fragmented, with Winterveld in Gauteng our 
most extreme example. The dispersed and hard-to-access nature of this 
and other cases really brought home the grind of peripheral living, but 
also directly affected the frequency, duration and timings of researcher 
engagement.
Additionally, some of our cases contained neighbourhoods and areas 
that felt and presented as open and accessible, including Lufhereng in 
Gauteng, Molweni and northern eThekwini – and in the two Addis cases, 
especially the areas of condominium housing. This openness was primarily 
a function of housing type, but also related to social structures, relative 
safety, political calm, street pattern and the daytime presence of residents 
in the area. These nodes within our case study areas were in distinct 
contrast to others which were highly secured, closed and impenetrable, 
including Crestholme and Crestview in eThekwini, and to a lesser extent 
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(in Yeka Abado). As sites of relative and extreme wealth, urban housing 
security in the form of gated access, walls, fencing, intercoms and guards, 
and more importantly a generic sense of mistrust, apprehension and 
‘busyness’, worked to limit researcher access in sometimes small ways. 
These included the complete barring of access and non-engagement: e.g. 
the survey company we employed in South Africa struggled with accessing 
participants in ‘wealthier white/Indian areas’. Similarly we faced challenges 
when trying to recruit for our diary-writing task, as well as in recruiting 
those to undertake interviews in these areas. We obviously took measures 
to overcome these moments of exclusion, in particular through using 
alternate methodologies to reach individuals, including WhatsApp message 
groups, or use of gatekeepers to facilitate access. Nonetheless, overall our 
data is somewhat biased towards less wealthy, more accessible residents 
who through their presence and willingness shared their everyday lives 
with our team.
Finally, the challenges of urban and political unrest and the reality and 
threat of crime both worked to stifle access to some of our cases and 
reduce time spent in the field. In Addis, the ability of our team of researchers 
to visit the farmers’ settlement/informal areas of Yeka Abado, located 
right on the Oromia border, during mid-2018 was significantly undermined 
by ongoing political tensions. Access to various parts of Winterveld in 
Gauteng was reduced by concerns over researcher safety due to significant 
crime levels in the area.
This discussion has inevitably focused on the more restrictive realities 
that undermined data access, but the project has multiple ‘good stories’, 
too, of key individuals in each of the case study areas who extended 
themselves beyond what was expected to assist us in accessing participants 
and learning about their neighbourhoods. As examples, in northern 
eThekwini, two migrants from the Eastern Cape were pivotal in introduc-
ing us to the informal settlements of Canelands and Coniston, and in 
Lufhereng a local community development organisation worked with 
researchers to engage other participants in the area. These various factors 
have all worked together inevitably to emphasise some voices and omit 
others.
Comparability: cases, methods, stories, contexts …
We avoided strictly uniform criteria for case selection, although ultimately 





















































46 African cities and collaborative futures
investment had occurred were key. We aimed to include areas of decline, 
and we deliberately kept our notion of investment or intervention broad 
in order to capture diversity. Our cases are not necessarily comparable 
in size terms, population numbers, etc. As explained above, most are 
multi-nodal as they seek to capture a variety or diversity of lives in the 
periphery, but the characteristics of this multi-nodality varied from case 
to case. These variations shape processes of urban comparison, and we 
utilised multiple practices of comparison to structure analysis, concep-
tualisation and argument building. To support this we are able to use 
comparison to identify ‘base’ analyses, including comparisons of the history, 
rationale and length of settlement, along with the population figures and 
changes in these over the years. Our work compares the varied political 
affiliations and governance structures present within case study areas, 
identifying patterns across cases. These include identification of the generic 
and relative strength of the national governments of South Africa and 
Ethiopia in shaping the urban (in contrast to the kinds of governance 
identified in Sawyers’ (2014) work, for example, in Nigeria) alongside the 
actions of local committees and civic groups; the relative weakness of 
certain municipalities in servicing and supporting particular areas within 
cases; and the presence of problematic strong-men in some cases where 
formal governance appears weak and stretched or even absent. Thus our 
comparisons reveal that governance patterns and structures vary dramati-
cally, with evidence of strong party politics in some, alongside problematic 
clientelistic relationships, power-wielding individuals, effectively functioning 
local democracies and committee structures, and competing traditional 
leadership in others.
Comparisons also reveal the varied significance of city region, municipal 
authority and traditional leadership boundaries in shaping investment 
forms and the financial clout of investments, as well as the relationship 
between state policy (at different scales) and actual practices of implementa-
tion on the ground. Housing types, and investment in state housing in 
particular, prove a significant area of comparison across all cases, throwing 
into sharp relief the viability of different state-subsidised schemes and 
the successes and failings of different architectural forms on everyday 
lives and urban quality. Employment, and most significantly unemployment, 
presents as the single biggest point of comparison across all South African 
cases, providing insights into how joblessness and job seeking are explicitly 
shaped through peripherality or manifest in diverse forms of peripheral 
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transport and affordability all work to undermine livelihood opportunities 
in seemingly very different spatial contexts. In Addis, having employment 
is a more dominant feature (and a prerequisite for access to condominium 
housing), but comparisons with the South African cases over declining 
affordability of new housing and the costs of living generate clear insights 
into the viability of life for many residents, supporting the findings of 
Yntiso (2008).
The role of capital in shaping the peripheries is an important comparative 
theme, but one which has no clear or singular narrative and is differentiated 
across cases depending on the types of investment (e.g. retail versus 
manufacturing), the relationship to residents (e.g. as prospective employee, 
or as customer) and the forms of capital (e.g. Chinese investors, global 
firms, local traders). Our findings do not point to a singular story about 
neoliberalism and the dominance of private capital to the detriment of 
state investment, although this may be important in some cases. Instead 
our material reveals that certain investments by the private sector – 
supermarkets and shopping malls in particular – can play a remarkably 
important role for residents locally, encouraging us to critique and counter 
more singular accounts of the dangers of capital penetration. Nonetheless, 
across our cases the volatility and fickleness of capital and its varying 
relationships (e.g. cosy, dominating, compromised) with different scales 
of the state produces patterns of investment, decline and change which 
directly shape access to work and services, usually revealing substantial 
inequalities in benefits to residents. Finally, we were struck by the sig-
nificance of quality of life indicators across all cases and how influential 
these are to residents’ well-being. Variations on a lack of access to water, 
electricity, services, health care, schools, local shops, the police, etc. are 
common points of comparison (obviously varying in their details) across 
the cases and illustrate the significant needs felt by residents for local 
infrastructural investments in their areas.
Having sketched out some of the initial points of comparison, we 
recognise the need to develop analytical tools, which enable us to conduct 
comparison alongside an appreciation of contextual specificity and beyond 
the intricacies within each case study. There is also a need to further 
compare cases within and across city regions, and across two countries. 
We note that Gauteng, eThekwini and Addis Ababa have different contexts 
but important similarities too and that thorough contextual awareness 
in relation to each case is critical to in-depth understanding, especially 





















































48 African cities and collaborative futures
Methodologically we have worked to ensure that the data collection 
instruments are the same in each case and follow the same analytical 
processes where appropriate, and that we rely on the overall research 
questions to drive comparative analysis. Our capacity for comparison will 
be affected by differentials in data depth and coverage, which relate to 
the variety, volume and depth of multiple data types across and even 
within case study areas. This is partly a function of a significant difference 
in access to information and to existing resources. For instance, the presence 
of the Gauteng City Region Observatory and Gauteng expertise means 
much stronger baseline statistical data and overall level of contextual 
information in some cases. Yet positive surprises have shaped ‘better’ 
data collection than expected, including the positive responses to complet-
ing solicited diaries in Addis Ababa, a method initially assumed to be 
unfeasible in this city region. Our abilities to ensure consistency in depth 
and range of data collection are also a function of differences in access 
and different modes of access to residents in case study areas (detailed 
above in relation to gatekeeping) or because of the sampling of surveys 
or the benefits of social media. Finally, variability may be shaped by the 
ordering of data collection as it rolled out in a different sequence (via 
surveys first or diaries and interviews first) for reasons beyond our control.
Conclusions: the diversity of the peripheries
This chapter has set out various intellectual and methodological realities 
and challenges as we reflect on how we have ‘operationalised peripheries 
research’. We argue that there is no such thing as an urban periphery, 
rather we see multiple peripheries and peripheries within the periphery. 
We have produced an early categorisation of peripheries to illustrate this 
multiplicity, recognising its overlapping nature. The urban peripheries 
are significant and are experienced at multiple scales shaped through 
interventions, investments and other drivers of change, including many 
that are state directed. Importantly, we note how micro interventions, 
such as the building of a school or shop, are critical to everyday life and 
resident well-being. In contrast, we argue that big changes sometimes 
pass some residents by because of their lack of connections (political and/
or physical), skills or social capital to benefit.
Our chapter has considered how a range of very real methodological 
choices and experiences worked to structure the production of knowledge 
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urban peripheries. While this chapter has focused in more detail on 
those that ‘deviated’ from initial plans and intentions, our collaborative 
working experiences have served to illustrate just how productive and 
insightful our research endeavours have been, and our abilities to generate 
arguments and publications which draw on the points of comparison 
briefly sketched out above illustrate this achievement. To conclude, we are 
more convinced than ever that the urban peripheries are a critical site of 
urban transformation which offers insights into a true diversity of urban 
change. We are confident that our methodological choices to examine 
these dynamic peripheries through the lens of the everyday, alongside an 
appreciation of wider structural change, have yielded important insights and 
understandings which will help pave the way for a better understanding 
of urban peripheries.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful for funding from the British ESRC (Project Grant Ref: 
ES/N014111/1) and South African NRF (Project number 101579), which 
made this project possible. We also wish to thank all residents and 
interviewees across our seven case study areas for their participation and 
engagement with this project.
References
Aguilar, A. (2008). ‘Peri-urbanization, illegal settlements and environmental impact 
in Mexico City’. Cities, 25(3): 133–45.
Andreasen, M.H., Agergaard, J. and Møller-Jensen, J. (2017). ‘Suburbanisation, 
homeownership aspirations and urban housing: Exploring urban expansion 
in Dar es Salaam’. Urban Studies, 54(10): 2342–59.
Bank, L. (2011) Home spaces, street styles: Contesting power and identity in a South 
African city. London: Pluto Press and Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Beall, J., Parnell, S. and Albertyn, C. (2015). ‘Elite compacts in Africa: The role of 
area-based management in the new governmentality of the Durban city-region’. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 39(2): 390–406.
Bloch, R. (2011). ‘Africa’s new suburbs: Growth, expansion and governance’. Draft 
paper for the Global Suburbanisms Workshop on Suburban Governance, Leipzig, 
1–2 July.
Buire, C. (2014). ‘The dream and the ordinary: An ethnographic investigation of 





















































50 African cities and collaborative futures
Caldeira, T. (2017). ‘Peripheral urbanization: Autoconstruction, transversal logics, 
and politics in cities of the global south’. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 35(1): 3–20.
Charlton, S. (2013). ‘State ambitions and peoples’ practices: An exploration of 
RDP housing’. PhD thesis, University of Sheffield.
Charlton, S. and Meth, P. (2017). ‘Lived experiences of state housing in South 
Africa’s cities: Johannesburg and Durban’. Transformation, 93: 91–115.
De Boeck, F. and Plissart, M. (2004). Kinshasa: Tales of the invisible city. Ghent: 
Ludion.
Doan, P. and Oduro, C. (2012). ‘Patterns of population growth in peri-urban 
Accra, Ghana’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 36(6): 
1306–25.
Ekers, M., Hamel, P. and Keil, R. (2012). ‘Governing suburbia: Modalities and 
mechanisms of suburban governance’. Regional Studies, 46(3): 405–22.
Fox, S. (2012). ‘Urbanization as a global historical process: Theory and evi-
dence from sub-Saharan Africa’. Population and Development Review, 38(2): 
285–310.
Garreau, J. (1991). Edge city: Life on the frontier. New York: Anchor Books.
Goodfellow, T. (2010). ‘“The bastard child of nobody”? Anti-planning and the 
institutional crisis in contemporary Kampala’. Crisis States Research Centre 
Working Paper, LSE.
Goodfellow, T. (2017). ‘Taxing property in a neo-developmental state: The politics 
of urban land value capture in Rwanda and Ethiopia’. African Affairs, 116(465): 
549–72.
Gore, C.D. and Muwanga, N.K. (2014). ‘Decentralization is dead, long live 
decentralization! Capital city reform and political rights in Kampala, Uganda’. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(6): 2201–16.
Harrison, P. and Todes, A. (2015). ‘Spatial transformation in a “loosening state”: 
South Africa in a comparative perspective’. Geoforum, 61: 148–62.
Jenkins, P. (2013). Urbanization, urbanism and urbanity in an African city: Home 
spaces and house cultures. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Keil, R. (2018). Suburban planet: Making the world urban from the outside in. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Liu, X. and Lefèvre, B. (2012). ‘Chinese influence on urban Africa’. Studies No. 
06/12, Institut du Développement Durable et des Relations Internationales, Paris.
Mabin, A., Butcher, S. and Bloch, R. (2013). ‘Peripheries, suburbanisms and change 
in sub-Saharan African cities’. Social Dynamics, 39(2): 167–90.
Mbiba, B. and Huchzermeyer, M. (2002). ‘Contentious development: Peri-urban 
studies in sub-Saharan Africa’. Progress in Development Studies, 2(2): 113–31.
McKee, D.L. and McKee, Y.A. (2004). ‘Edge cities, urban corridors and beyond’. 





















































 At the city edge 51
Meth, P. (2013) ‘Parenting in informal settlements: an analysis of place, social 
relations and emotions’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
37(2), 537–55.
Meth, P. (2015). ‘The gendered contradictions in South Africa’s state housing: 
Accumulation alongside erosion of assets through housing’. In C. Moser (ed.), 
Gender, asset accumulation and just cities, 100–16. London: Routledge.
Meth, P. and Charlton, C. (2016). ‘Men’s experiences of state sponsored housing 
in South Africa: Emerging issues and key questions’. Housing Studies, 32(4): 
470–90.
Mosoetsa, S. (2011). Eating from one pot: The dynamics of survival in poor South 
African households. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.
Nugent, P. (2018). ‘Africa’s re-enchantment with big infrastructure: White elephants 
dancing in virtuous circles?’. In J. Schubert, U. Engel and E. Macamo (eds), 
Extractive industries and changing state dynamics in Africa: Beyond the resource 
curse, 22–40. Abingdon: Routledge.
Parnell, S. and Pieterse, E.A. (2014). Africa’s urban revolution. Cape Town: UCT 
Press.
Parnell, S. and Robinson, J. (2012). ‘(Re)theorising cities from the global south: 
Looking beyond neoliberalism’. Urban Geography, 33(4): 593–617.
Phelps, N.A. (2012). ‘The growth machine stops? Urban politics and the making 
and remaking of an edge city’. Urban Affairs Review, 48(5): 670–700.
Pieterse, M. (2018). ‘Where is the periphery even? Capturing urban marginality 
in South African human rights law’. Urban Studies, 56(6): 1182–97.
Ross, F. (2010). Raw life, new hope: Decency, housing and everyday life in a post-
apartheid community. Cape Town: UCT Press.
Sawyer, L. (2014). ‘Piecemeal urbanisation at the peripheries of Lagos’. African 
Studies, 73(2): 271–89.
Simone, A. (2014). ‘Infrastructure, real economies and social transformation: 
Assembling the components for regional urban development in Africa’. In S. 
Parnell and E. Pieterse (eds), Africa’s urban revolution, 221–36. Cape Town: 
UCT Press.
Stern, M.A. and Marsh, W.M. (1997). ‘Editors’ introduction: The decentered city: 
Edge cities and the expanding metropolis’. Landscape and Urban Planning, 
36(4): 243–6.
Thuo, D. (2013). ‘Exploring land development dynamics in rural–urban fringes: 
A reflection on why agriculture is being squeezed out by urban land uses in 
the Nairobi rural–urban fringe?’. International Journal of Rural Management, 
9(2): 1045–134.
Todes, A. (2014). ‘New African suburbanisation? Exploring the growth of 






















































52 African cities and collaborative futures
Todes, A. (2017). ‘Shaping peripheral growth? Strategic spatial planning in a South 
African city-region’. Habitat International, 67: 129–36.
Watson, V. (2014). ‘The case for a southern perspective in planning theory’. 
International Journal of E-Planning Research, 3(1): 23–37.
Yntiso, G. (2008). ‘Urban development and displacement in Addis Ababa: The 
impact of resettlement projects on low-income households’. Eastern Africa 






















































Uncertain pasts and risk-sensitive 
futures in sub-Saharan urban 
transformation
Mark Pelling, Alejandro Barcena, Hayley Leck,  
Ibidun Adelekan, David Dodman, Hamadou Issaka, 
Cassidy Johnson, Mtafu Manda, Blessing Mberu, 
Ezebunwa Nwokocha, Emmanuel Osuteye and  
Soumana Boubacar
Introduction
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) challenge urban planners, 
risk professionals, researchers and citizens to extend their focus from 
accounting for the status of risk towards understanding and acting on 
the processes that can enable a transition to more risk-sensitive and 
transformative urban development across all contexts. Risk-sensitive 
development is required to reduce risk that has accumulated in the city 
and to better consider risk when planning new developments (Jones and 
Preston, 2011). This includes building design, construction and land-use 
planning, enhanced infrastructure access and maintenance, risk awareness 
and planning for emergency response and reconstruction, including social 
safety nets and insurance. To deliver a sustainable city for all requires a 
more frank and comprehensive focus on procedure: Who makes decisions, 
under which frameworks, based upon what kind of data, and with what 
degree and direction of accountability?
This chapter explores the status and the scope for transition of risk-
sensitive and transformative urban development in diverse cities of 
sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is important because of its large 
proportions of urban populations with high vulnerability and growing 
exposure to risks (Fraser et al., 2017). High rates of urban growth pose 
increasing risks as we go into the future, yet there is also opportunity 





















































54 African cities and collaborative futures
(Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017). However, this opportunity space is often 
constrained by limited capacities to plan and manage the rapid urbanisation 
process, particularly in informal settlements. Limited capacities to prevent 
processes of risk accumulation pose threats to poverty reduction and 
sustainable development (Dodman et al., 2017). In this context, there is 
an increasingly urgent need for squarely recognising and addressing the 
underlying vulnerabilities of urban populations and their root causes. 
Transitioning towards such sustainable urban pathways will require the 
strengthening of capacities and accountability of city authorities and broader 
governance systems, both formal and informal (Pelling et al., 2018).
Complex relationships between risk (likelihood of future loss and 
damage) and vulnerability (propensity or predisposition to be adversely 
affected) and other elements of development and human well-being require 
detailed analysis and advanced understandings (Thomalla et al., 2018). 
This connects to the SDGs, which integrate risk management throughout, 
specifically in Goal 1: Eradicating Poverty, and Goal 11: Sustainable Cities 
and Communities. Particularly important for the SDGs is understanding 
and addressing the full spectrum of risk, encompassing everyday risks 
(e.g. environmental/public health risk; man-made hazards such as poor 
solid waste management), small and large events, their interlinkages and 
relative changes in their nature, scale and distribution (Fraser et al., 2017).
This chapter draws from a large multi-disciplinary, multi-country 
programme of research and capacity building – Urban Africa: Risk, 
Knowledge (Urban ARK) – focused on understanding risk in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The programme works in nine cities across eight countries and 
aims to address gaps in data, understandings and the capacity to break 
cycles of risk accumulation. This is pursued through a partnership between 
researchers, practitioners and city- and community-level activists. The 
experience and analysis of four cities in particular are considered here: 
Karonga, a small town in northern Malawi; Ibadan, a regional centre in 
Nigeria; Niamey, capital city of Niger; and Nairobi, capital city of Kenya 
and a regional core city. These four cities are chosen for their regional 
coverage across sub-Saharan Africa, the range of sizes, risk vulnerability 
profiles and breadth of illustrative blockages and opportunities for risk-
sensitive development.
The second section presents a common analytical framework to help 
identify blockages and opportunities for a transition towards a risk-sensitive 
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proposed in Pelling et al. (2018) and is further developed and applied 
here through detailed investigations of blockages and opportunities to 
transition based on synthesised empirical research undertaken in the four 
key cities under the Urban ARK programme since 2015. The framework 
is illustrated through each city in turn: Karonga, Ibadan, Niamey and 
Nairobi. A concluding discussion reflects on city observations to draw out 
recommendations for city-level and wider action and research partnerships.
Blockages and opportunities for transition towards a 
risk-sensitive and transformative urban development
Risk management continues to be a policy archipelago, distanced from 
the mainstream of development activity and strategy. How can research 
work in partnership with practitioners and stakeholders at risk to support 
a transition towards a more integrated vision, process and practice of risk 
management? Figure 3.1 identifies three key blockages to this transition 
and three opportunities drawing from recent research under the Urban 
ARK programme in sub-Saharan Africa (Pelling et al., 2018). The figure 
shows that transition is constrained by fragmented governance, donor 
priorities and inadequate monitoring of hazards, impacts and vulnerability.





















































56 African cities and collaborative futures
While there is no formal agreed-upon definition, transformative urban 
development implies a radical change to systems and shifts to new modes 
of urban planning, management and governance, thereby leading to new 
development pathways (Revi et al., 2014; Roberts and O’Donoghue, 2013). 
Building on this, Revi et al. (2014: 13) propose that effective city-based 
disaster risk management and risk reduction provide a strong foundation 
for transformative urban development and adaptation, which also neces-
sarily entails ‘effective multi-level urban risk governance, alignment of 
policies and incentives, strengthened local government and community 
adaptation capacity, synergies with the private sector and appropriate 
financing and institutional development’.
These issues are explored here through the application of our conceptual 
framework presented in Figure 3.1. It investigates key constraints to 
achieving this in practice but also highlights important opportunities 
where pockets of transformative urban development are beginning to 
emerge in practice. Institutional gaps relating to weak capacities, inadequate 
resources, lack of systematic coordination and divisions between formal 
and informal systems are a priority blockage to data collection mechanisms 
and hazard-monitoring capabilities in urban sub-Saharan Africa. The 
frequent absence of systematic loss records, geo-referenced and gender 
disaggregated, constrains the possibility of correlating development drivers 
with risk.
Effective practices and policies in urban planning and governance in 
reducing risk are considerably less well documented than the reasons for 
ineffective planning systems and local governments in postcolonial African 
cities (Adelekan et al., 2015). This chapter responds to Adelekan et al.’s 
call to fill this lacuna through highlighting examples of effective partnerships 
between city governments, local populations and civil society organisations 
(e.g. Nairobi Mukuru SPA, documented later) that address gaps in the 
risk–development nexus. Ajibade et al. (2016) asked, ‘who are the dominant 
actors that can trigger a transition?’ and whether transition windows (e.g. 
political and institutional change) can be utilised to enhance equity and 
future risk reduction.
In this chapter, we show how opportunities for transition arise through 
several channels, notably when organised civil society collaborates with 
the city government and other actors (Pelling et al., 2018). Citizen-led 
approaches for risk-related data collection have been shown to be critical 
for advancing early warning of hazard (Fraser et al., 2017; Pelling et al., 
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and transformation (Kemp et al., 2007; Pelling, 2010). Transitions theory 
strongly recognises that innovations in multi-level governance can offer 
the potential for transition (Ajibade et al., 2016). There is also major 
opportunity for transition through the actions of networked civil society 
in many sub-Saharan African cities (Makau et al., 2012) that are driving 
demand-led and inclusive planning for risk (see below for the Nairobi 
case). There is further scope for transition if development donors partner 
with and provide finance opportunities to such independent actors at 
scale.
However, the interplay between actors and decision-making processes 
are continuously negotiated through unequal power relations and situated 
within broader political economic forces, which can disrupt transitions 
(Ajibade et al., 2016; Solecki et al., 2017). In cases where multi-level 
governance remains fragmented, top-down agendas often shape cities’ 
decisions – with inadequate attention to local risk and development priori-
ties. Fundamental shifts in institutional thinking are also required, from 
predominant disaster-focused, short-term views to longer-term perspectives 
that emphasise vulnerability reduction, addressing root causes and equity 
considerations (Conway and Schipper, 2011; Ziervogel et al., 2017). 
However, as Conway and Schipper’s Ethiopian-based study shows, this 
is challenging to achieve, ‘precisely because many institutions have been 
specifically set up to respond to emergencies, including food aid, whose 
raison d’être is put into question by a new approach’ (Conway and Schipper, 
2011: 235).
Using the above framework as a critical lens, the chapter now considers 
blockages and opportunities for transition towards risk-sensitive and 
transformative urban development through the four case study cities – 
Karonga, Ibadan, Nairobi and Niamey. Dodman et al. (2019) provide a 
detailed overview of the range of methods used across the programme 
for understanding the spectrum of risks in each study city. Here we have 
synthesised findings from studies in each city where multiple data types 
and results from a range of methods are used. These include documentary 
and institutional analysis, community data and participatory approaches 
(e.g. community-led risk assessment and resource mapping), as well as 
surveys and interviews for the four city cases. The city cases introduced 
above are based on the following core questions, guided by the theoretical 
framing in Figure 3.1: How is risk currently managed by the city? What 
are the donor priorities, city governance structures, and data and monitoring 
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particularly related to risk data and forecasting, community networks in 
collaboration with city authorities, and locally accountable leadership?
Transition in the risk–development nexus: city cases
Guided by the theoretical framing summarised in Figure 3.1, the next 
sections explore these findings in detail with illustrative examples for 
each city in turn.
Karonga, Malawi
The small but rapidly growing urban centre of Karonga (Karonga Town) is 
in the north of Malawi. Karonga’s population is projected to increase from 
41,000 inhabitants in 2008 to approximately 63,000 in 2018 (Wanda et al., 
2017). The town is vulnerable to multiple small and large disaster risks 
and has been affected by earthquakes, drought and floods (Manda, 2014; 
Wanda et al., 2017). Everyday risks such as poor-quality and inadequate 
sanitation and unsafe water also pose significant threats for inhabitants 
(Holm et al., 2018). However, the nature and scale of risks in Karonga 
remains poorly understood (Manda and Wanda, 2017). This is partly 
attributable to the lack of political attention to small towns throughout 
Malawi (Wanda et al., 2017).
Disaster risk governance in Karonga Town faces considerable challenges. 
Firstly, the town’s rapid growth has led to an increasing demand for services 
and risk-reducing infrastructure, yet provision is constrained by limited 
capacities and funding within local government (Holm et al., 2018). As 
with other urban centres in Malawi and across sub-Saharan Africa, growth 
in Karonga is largely informal (Manda, 2014). Secondly, the town council 
was dissolved in 2009, resulting in the town being governed by the Karonga 
District Council, a rural local government. The Karonga District Council 
is significantly over-stretched in governing urban development challenges. 
This weak governance structure has resulted in poor planning and project 
implementation, and consequently the accumulation of risk. A further 
major constraint to disaster risk governance is that there are no locally 
held systematic records on urban disasters and losses for Karonga Town. 
The district-level data mainly covers large intensive disaster episodes (e.g. 
earthquakes and large-scale floods). Moreover, when disaster records are 
in place, they are often inadequately taken into account. For example, 
while Karonga Town registered the largest number of disasters in Malawi 
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not been well recognised in planning or policy (Lunduka et al., 2010). 
More systematic disaggregated data at the sub-district level (especially 
from extensive and everyday risks) is necessary for effective policy formula-
tion and planning.
Malawi published its Disaster Risk Management (DRM) policy following 
significant pressure from development partners and donors. Though 
national and international partners committed to assist the country’s 
response strategy during the extensive floods of 2015, their support was 
conditional upon a conducive policy framework being in place. This situ-
ation exemplifies the nature of policy and practice of urban planning in 
Malawi and indeed many cities in sub-Saharan Africa, which are largely 
influenced by external agents. The policy has notable weaknesses limiting 
its effectiveness. Significantly, Malawi’s urban areas are not specifically 
addressed, despite the increasing trend of urban disasters, and resource 
allocation to lower governance levels is highly inadequate (Manda and 
Wanda, 2017). Donors’ priorities play a significant role in shaping DRM 
agendas at all scales. The Malawi government has received major loans 
from multiple international agencies (e.g. the African Development Bank 
and the World Bank) which have mainstreamed disaster risk consideration 
in development initiatives. Yet, these loans have created large-scale debts. 
The implementation of policy in Karonga Town tends to be externally 
driven. The national government acts both to direct policy and to support 
implementation. Policy implementation often focuses on disaster response. 
Very little attempt is made proactively to reduce risks either through 
capacity building or infrastructure upgrading.
The accountability ladder is fragmented, occurring separately between 
state actors on the one hand and community groups and their traditional 
leaders on the other. City officials are mandated to report to national 
policymakers. Accountability at the city level is expected through the 
ward councillors, but there are no such wards in place in the case of 
Karonga Town (Manda, 2014). Instead, ward councillors report to the 
citizens through traditional leaders. NGOs who have presence in the 
community play a bridging role and participate in the local government 
meetings through the District Executive Committees (DEC). Sometimes, 
the DEC meetings are funded by the NGOs: the prominent influence of 
the latter risks the independence of the DECs. The 2015 DRM policy 
provides for interaction between communities and councils through a 
decentralised reporting mechanism – the lowest level is the village DRM 
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the National Platform at the highest level. In practice, the reporting chain 
is not always fully established and the committees do not always have a 
specific urban focus.
Recognising this gap, Urban ARK researchers from Mzuzu University 
sought to facilitate collaboration between the local government and the 
community. This was achieved through the establishment of a DRM 
committee in one of the neighbourhoods of Mzuzu, a small urban centre 
in northern Malawi. The committee is a significant platform for information 
sharing between researchers, local government representatives and com-
munity members. Furthermore, Mzuzu University and the Sierra Leone 
Urban Research Centre established local Community Hubs under Urban 
ARK in Karonga, Malawi and Freetown, Sierra Leone. The hubs are centres 
for learning and coordinating community programmes resulting from 
participatory risk assessments in the two urban centres.
Despite these opportunities, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction 
(DRR) for various hazards and a transition towards risk-sensitive develop-
ment remains a significant challenge in Karonga due to multiple interacting 
factors, including the absence of a functional urban local government, 
inadequate financing, inherent failures to plan and regulate growth and 
silo-based approaches (Manda and Wanda, 2017).
Ibadan, Nigeria
The city of Ibadan, the capital of Oyo State in Nigeria, is the largest 
traditional urban centre in sub-Saharan Africa. It has one of the highest 
population densities in the country, with a considerable annual population 
growth (Adelekan, 2019) that is concentrated largely in informal areas. 
The city is exposed to a range of disaster risks including windstorms, 
flooding, fires, communicable and infectious diseases, road accidents and 
violent crime (Adelekan, 2019).
The management of risk in Ibadan is guided by the 2010 National 
Disaster Management Framework and the 2017 National Policy on Disaster 
Risk Reduction. The policy recommends a government-led approach, 
including multi-agency and development partners. While emphasis is 
given to proactive and multi-scalar risk governance, implementation 
remains fragmented (Ziervogel et al., 2017). Several government bodies 
are involved in the management of everyday and disaster risks in Ibadan, 
with varying degrees of success depending on resources and institutional 
capacity (e.g. the Bureau of Physical Planning and Development Control, 
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and Civil Defence Corps, and the Department of Fire Service). Significantly, 
international donors have funded the Ministry of Health in the implementa-
tion of programmes addressing public health risks (e.g., malaria, tuber-
culosis); however, systematic mainstreaming of DRR is missing. Limited 
coordination and overlapping responsibilities among various government 
ministries and agencies in risk management constrain their collective 
potential.
In practice, institutional attention remains focused on reactive and 
centralised efforts. Whereas the Oyo State Emergency Management Agency 
is mandated by law to address risk management in Ibadan (i.e. preparedness, 
mitigation, response and recovery), the agency has largely focused on 
emergency response, during small and large disaster events, including 
floods (Oyo State Law, 2008). The same law requires eleven Local Govern-
ment Areas in Ibadan to establish Local Emergency Management Com-
mittees, but Olaniyan et al. (2018) found poor compliance due to inadequate 
funding, weak local government and an unstable political system.
Internal and external donors shape risk management priorities due 
to weaknesses in public financing, knowledge gaps and the low capacity 
of government staff. Local governments still depend on the federal and 
state governments for funding. For the most part, funding decisions are 
influenced by complex political motives, including the political affiliations 
of local populations and the loyalty of local government administrators 
to higher-level government functionaries. A significant example can 
be drawn from the 2011 floods in Ibadan, when the state government 
requested a credit facility to address infrastructural challenges related to the 
floods. However, the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery 
recommended the Ibadan Urban Flood Management Project (IUFMP), 
which was shaped by Pillar Two of the World Bank’s Africa Strategy, 
and the World Bank/Nigeria Country Partnership Strategy (2014–17). 
Furthermore, the state government identified forty-eight river canals for 
dredging and widening, of which only thirty-six were approved by the 
World Bank. Forty communities, not benefiting from this programme, 
continue to ask the government for assistance in this regard.
Risk data collection remains poor in Ibadan, as in other Nigerian cities. 
City data (i.e. socio-economic), where available, is mainly provided at 
the level of local government associations. The lack of census data at 
lower levels (i.e. wards and localities) remains a significant challenge for 
city risk assessment. The inventory of risk-related events is poor, incomplete 
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Lack of city-wide risk data covering the whole spectrum of risks is a key 
limitation to informed risk-related decisions, including development 
planning. The Urban ARK Ibadan city programme has contributed to 
narrowing this gap by collecting city-wide data on everyday risks, as well 
as small and large disasters, disaggregated at ward level and using methods 
such as DesInventar, household/community assessments and consultations 
of city officials, household surveys and focus group discussions with 
community members. This information has the potential to inform the 
decision-making of city authorities.
Community organisations have shown a potential for risk-sensitive 
transitions in Ibadan. For instance, Community Development Associations 
(CDAs) are involved in risk-reduction activities (e.g. infrastructural 
development, maintenance of roads, water supply, and flood and erosion 
control) and community members played a significant role in the monitor-
ing and enforcement of risk-related guidelines (e.g. waste disposal and 
construction areas). They are also increasingly engaged in risk-reduction 
decision-making, although their influence remains limited. For example, 
traditional leaders, CDAs and community organisations are engaged in 
risk-reduction meetings such as those of the IUFMP. Urban ARK’s Ibadan 
programme has established a forum of exchange between community 
leaders, trade associations, city officials, NGOs, civil society groups and 
researchers. These spaces have allowed the identification of stresses and 
everyday hazards and the development of a city risk-reduction plan. This 
is a considerable opportunity for a transition in the risk–development 
nexus in Ibadan, but it will require ongoing advocacy and support.
Nairobi, Kenya
Nairobi is a large and rapidly growing city: the second largest in East 
Africa, with considerable regional economic and political significance. 
The majority of Nairobi’s over 3.3 million population live in informal/
unplanned areas, low-lying and flood-prone, with very limited basic services 
and infrastructure. Poverty, food insecurity and other environmental 
vulnerabilities are widespread. These challenges are compounded by 
multiple interacting shocks such as disease outbreaks. Nairobi’s social 
and political environments are characterised by vast inequalities (Myers, 
2016). Rapid and unplanned urbanisation has led to increased flood risk. 
Weak governance and consequent poor service delivery have exacerbated 
man-made hazards such as poor solid waste management, with significant 
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municipal open dumpsite, located close to public institutions, posing a 
range of health risks to an estimated 250,000 people (Kimani, 2007).
Climate risks and vulnerabilities are increasingly well recognised in 
the city, with several recent developments such as the Rockefeller 100 
Resilient City status providing some impetus. There is increasing willingness 
for change among key city actors (i.e. risk managers and urban planners) 
(Pelling et al., 2018). However, as with many other sub-Saharan African 
contexts, risk management remains constrained by weak coordination 
between sectors and scales of governance, and complex policy landscapes 
where implementation is widely lacking. There is also a need to better 
understand interactions and cascading effects between different hazards 
and their potential effect.
The tensions between formal and informal planning systems and 
governance arrangements also require urgent attention. Disaster risk 
management in Nairobi is highly complex, with a lack of clarity in roles 
and responsibilities within the devolved governance structure. The devolved 
system of governance in Kenya came into effect in 2010 when the new 
Constitution of Kenya (ROK, 2010) was adopted. Under the constitution 
there are two overarching levels of governance – national and county 
government. Nairobi City County is further devolved into sub-county, 
ward and village levels. Within this formal structure, the chieftaincy plays 
a key role (albeit informally and contested in many cases) in linking 
communities with the lowest level of government, particularly in informal 
settlements which are often divided according to tribal affiliation (Mitra 
et al., 2017). The devolved system of governance has proved complex with 
ongoing challenges, fragmentation and conflicts across all governance 
scales. The constitution recognises disaster risk management as a devel-
opmental challenge that should be addressed at both county and national 
government levels, as well as local levels (ROK, 2010). A National Policy 
for Disaster Management (ROK, 2009) was formulated in 2009 with the 
intention of clearly identifying institutional mechanisms and responsibilities 
for DRR and unifying existing ad hoc policies relating to DRM in the 
country. However, more than a decade later, this is still awaiting cabinet 
approval and thus coordination challenges remain across all levels.
Transition pathways are evidenced in emergent innovative and inclusive 
approaches to governance, such as collective actions of networked civil 
society, often in collaboration with local government and other actors. 
For example, the Kenyan slum-dweller federation Muungano wa Wanavijiji 
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Mashinani Trust and Slum Dwellers International-Kenya (SDI-K), which 
concluded with the designation of the Mukuru informal settlement as a 
Special Planning Area (SPA). The Nairobi City County designated the 
SPA in August 2017. Interdisciplinary consortia including academic, 
government, private sector and civil society actors have synthesised data 
and generated policy briefs to inform risk-sensitive planning strategies. 
Muungano has adopted innovative approaches to mobilise residents and 
collect data, which have benefited from Urban ARK support. While the 
initiative is still in its early stages, this is a notable transition in state–civil 
society relations in Nairobi and could serve as a catalyst for governance 
reform in other urban centres across sub-Saharan Africa. Based on their 
research on slum upgrading in Kibera, Nairobi for Urban ARK, Mitra et 
al. (2017) explain that such integrative approaches can become important 
tools for strengthening resilience to risks such as flooding, conflict and 
security through building trust between communities, government and 
other actors.
Disaster risk governance in Nairobi is constrained by inadequate 
systematic data on everyday and large-scale disasters. However, findings 
from Urban ARK research in Nairobi and other sub-Saharan African 
cities have highlighted the potential of drawing on detailed risk data 
collected by civil society organisations to identify and act on disaster risk 
(Allen et al., 2017a and 2017b; Satterthwaite and Bartlett, 2017). For 
example, SDI have prepared detailed profiles and maps of informal set-
tlements in Nairobi and use this information to support state engagement. 
This has been a major factor in supporting the development of the SPA. 
There is further opportunity for addressing the disaster risk data challenge 
through drawing on long-standing local data collection initiatives on 
risks, broader urbanisation processes and urban health and well-being 
statistics, especially for informal settlements in the city (Satterthwaite et 
al., 2019). These initiatives have been led by local, national and international 
research institutes such as the African Population and Health Research 
Center (APHRC) through the Nairobi Urban Health and Demographic 
Surveillance System from 2002 to date and the Nairobi cross-sectional 
slum surveys of 2000 and 2012.
In further recognition of the need to address fragmentation in DRM 
there have been recent calls from city actors, particularly the Nairobi City 
County, to develop a shared platform for information sharing and col-
laboration. Significantly, the Nairobi Urban Risk Partnership was proposed 
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APHRC on 10 May 2017. The partnership brings together stakeholders 
leading various urban risk efforts in the city and aims ultimately to inform 
the development of an urban risk management plan, pursuant to the 
2015 Nairobi City County Disaster and Emergency Management Act. The 
partnership is a useful central coordination body and information source 
for external funders and donors undertaking research and development 
interventions in the city. Overall, the partnership holds considerable 
potential for strengthening DRR and DRM in the city and improving 
coordination; however, sustained momentum is constrained by local 
government transition, competing political priorities and budget limitations.
Niamey, Niger
Niamey is the state capital of Niger and has grown from 30,000 inhabitants 
in 1960 to over 1 million in 2012 (Issaka, 2015). It is one of the poorest 
cities in sub-Saharan Africa and is growing rapidly with immigration 
from drought-prone rural districts. The city is facing increasing risks, 
principally flooding, public health issues and disease, and food insecurity 
(Boubacar et al., 2017). These risks are exacerbated by widespread economic 
precariousness, increasing unemployment, delinquency and conflict in 
neighbouring countries.
Poor land-use planning and limited infrastructure, combined with 
mounting population pressure, have resulted in the increased occupation 
of flood-prone areas (Boubacar et al., 2017). The State of Niger has adopted 
a housing policy and sanctions to regulate development in an attempt to 
provide improved and adequate housing and to prohibit construction in 
risky areas (e.g. Law 2017–20 of 12 April 2017). The 1997 liberalisation 
of the land market, combined with a lack of control, has amplified informal 
practices in access to land and building construction. Informal settlements 
have proliferated throughout the city and consequently the risk landscape 
has been strongly exacerbated.
Although urban governance is shared between the state, local and 
regional authorities, traditional rulers, donors and NGOs, there is limited 
coordination between them. Since 2000, Niamey has experienced an 
ongoing political decentralisation process, yet the split of functions and 
responsibilities between local government, chiefs and central government 
remains unclear. The considerable government staff turnover has led to 
weak coordination and implementation of risk-related interventions. 
This fragmentation in governance results in a lack of accountability and 
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all risk and development programmes, it lacks the resources to fulfil this 
responsibility. For instance, the large-scale cadastral survey undertaken by 
the Agence Française de Développement, meant to help support develop-
ment and disaster management, came to an abrupt halt due to the agency’s 
sudden disbandment and thus had very little impact.
In most development programmes, Niger relies heavily on the support 
of donors whose priorities often do not fundamentally align with urban 
dwellers’ concerns. For example, while roads and sanitation are the major 
problems in the city, donors’ principal interventions have been to finance 
the cadastral survey and draw up an urban plan. Similarly, Niamey depends 
on external aid to respond to emergencies. The most relevant example is 
the World Bank-funded Niger Disaster Risk Management and Urban 
Development Project (World Bank, 2018), which includes the construction 
of flood-protection infrastructure and capacity building for urban develop-
ment and disaster risk management. Furthermore, the National Food 
Crisis Prevention and Management System has been created with the 
coordination unit of the early warning system, funded by multiple donors. 
There is poor coordination between these different initiatives, but the 
recent creation of a ministry in charge of disasters and humanitarian 
action signals a possibility for future improvement.
In recent years there has been growing attention on urban risks in 
Niamey. For example, Urban ARK researchers from Abdou Moumouni 
University undertook an adapted household economy baseline study of 
vulnerability to flooding, as well as an inventory of small-scale disasters 
using DesInventar (Issoufou and Lecumberri, 2015). The Network on 
Hydrometeorological Risks in African cities (RHYVA) has also undertaken 
extensive studies on the causes of flooding in Niamey. Research centres 
such as the Agro-Hydrometeorological Centre, the African Centre for 
Applications of Meteorology for Development and the Niger Basin Author-
ity have also carried out work on the risks, leading to the production of 
the very first river flood risk maps in the city of Niamey. Data on disaster 
risks exist, but there is reluctance among many institutions to consolidate 
and make it openly accessible. There is no standardised flood-loss database 
for Niamey, yet multiple studies indicate a dramatic increase in the fre-
quency and intensity of floods observed over the last decade (Casse and 
Gosset, 2015; Issoufou and Lecumberri, 2015). The state has failed to 
ensure coordination and to support open access data.
At the neighbourhood level, communities are increasingly self-organising 
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and risk-related challenges: for example, women’s and young people’s 
groups that are involved in addressing hygiene and sanitation issues. 
These activities are carried out under the patronage of the neighbourhood 
chiefs. However, they are often undertaken on an ad hoc basis, with 
limited influence at other levels. Greater collaboration between the state 
and local communities would help to support disaster risk reduction 
across the city (Sudmeier-Rieux et al., 2015). As Revi et al. (2014: 28) 
emphasise, it is critical to focus on and understand how linkages are 
established between local governments, community organisations, research-
ers and other urban actors in defining and then driving alternative forms 
of risk reduction.
Overall, risk reduction in Niamey is constrained by several key factors: 
donors’ priorities do not align with local priorities; urban governance 
is highly fragmented with unclear and sometimes conflicting roles and 
responsibilities between actors; data sets relating to flooding and other 
risks are fragmented, incomplete and sometimes contradictory, with open 
access remaining a challenge; and monitoring and evaluation of risk-related 
interventions remain weak. These constraints notwithstanding, there is 
opportunity for movement towards transition and transformation in 
risk management and development through recent progressive policies 
and initiatives such as the creation of the Ministry for Disasters and 
Humanitarian Action and the Risk and Disaster Management Programme, 
as well as increasingly active self-organised community groups that are 
addressing key disaster issues at neighbourhood scales and lobbying the 
government.
Concluding discussion
The growing vulnerability of many African towns and cities to disasters has 
been increasingly recognised in recent years (Castán Broto, 2014; Pelling 
and Wisner, 2009). A significant proportion of current and future develop-
ment will be concentrated in the towns and cities of sub-Saharan Africa. 
This offers vast potential but at the same time such development futures 
are intertwined with disaster risks (Fraser et al., 2017). This chapter has 
shown that risk management in the four case study cities are characterised 
by considerable gaps and blockages, yet there are also several significant 
emerging innovative initiatives for overcoming these barriers. These issues 
have been explored through the application of the conceptual framework 





















































68 African cities and collaborative futures
the scale and rate of urbanisation and urban risk development worldwide, 
particularly in Africa. In consonance with the SDGs’ call for integrative 
approaches to risk and development, this chapter has shown that efforts 
to address urban development and governance challenges can support 
risk reduction, as well as question underlying political and power relations 
between diverse urban actors.
Urban risk governance includes all institutions that affect risk, not only 
the formal administering and management of disaster risk (Fraser et al. 
2017), which reflects the increasingly recognised principle of co-production. 
The research has shown that where the state does not have the ability to 
provide all the necessary services to citizens, partnerships with non-state 
actors have proven complementary in a way that enhances accountability 
and legitimacy (Allen et al., 2017b; Mitlin, 2008). This study has under-
scored that, for transition and transformation in risk management to be 
achieved, there is a need for clearer administrative procedures and inclusive 
governance. This will require a transition from fragmented governance 
to more joined-up governance between civil society groups, city govern-
ment, local universities, research institutions and other urban actors. 
Indeed, as previously noted, transitions theory places emphasis on change 
being interconnected with innovation and shifting relationships between 
governance actors (Pelling et al., 2018; Roberts and O’Donoghue, 2013). 
While the case studies have revealed considerable fragmentation and a 
lack of coordination in urban risk governance landscapes, there is also 
clear evidence of increasingly joined-up and demand-led governance, as 
illustrated by the Nairobi Mukuru SPA example. Here, an innovative and 
collaborative governance transition is being driven by communities and 
stakeholders occupying informal settlements. This shows significant 
potential for a transition towards progressive multi-level risk governance 
through collective action.
There appears to be increasing willingness from civil society, NGOs 
and local government to collaborate over resilience building, disaster risk 
reduction efforts and the recognition of the limits of acting alone. As 
Fraser et al. (2017: 108) argue, ‘holism and partnership are necessary to 
bring risk and development together in ways that address multiple everyday 
risks and the linkages across levels and scale that define urban risks for 
people’. However, there is also some concern that risk accumulation could 
be exacerbated by the involvement of external actors, particularly where 
priorities are not aligned, as discussed in the cases of Karonga and Niamey 
regarding recent donor-funded interventions. Similarly, Revi et al. (2014) 
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in supporting alternative forms of risk reduction led by citizen movements 
as ‘this very support can co-opt and destroy the alternative ethos, govern-
ance form and pro-poor adaptation movement’ that is important for 
transformative development.
The examples presented here also illustrate the considerable potential 
for researchers to work in partnership with practitioners and stakeholders 
to support a transition towards more integrated risk management. For 
example, Urban ARK researchers supported the formation of the Nairobi 
Urban Risk Partnership, the formation of DRM committees in Mzuzu 
and the establishment of a city stakeholders’ platform on risk reduction 
in Ibadan, with the aim of developing a city risk reduction action plan. 
Furthermore, gaps in data and monitoring capacities require urgent 
attention and there is considerable potential for community-collected 
and owned data to help narrow this gap (Dodman et al., 2018).
It is well recognised that the diversity of urban sub-Saharan African 
contexts calls for flexible and context-specific approaches to risk manage-
ment (Issaka, 2015). However, through the lens of the transitions framework 
presented, this chapter has demonstrated several key common mechanisms, 
blockages and opportunities for acting on the processes that can enable 
a transition towards more risk-sensitive and transformative urban develop-
ment. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, achieving the SDGs will require a 
transition in the risk–development nexus where risk management is 
mainstreamed with development, and development is seen as a root cause 
of risk and as a focus for change. It also requires that we focus squarely 
on the processes and procedures that can enable a transition towards 
more risk-sensitive and transformative urban development across all scales 
and contexts. Moving forward to achieve this will require more inclusive 
governance, strengthened networked collaboration, locally accountable 
leadership and improved risk data and monitoring.
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Beyond self-help: learning from 
communities in informal settlements 
in Durban, South Africa
Maria Christina Georgiadou and Claudia Loggia
Introduction
In South Africa, over 50 per cent of the population lives in urban centres, 
where more than 2,700 informal settlements exist, accounting for around 
20 per cent of total households (SERI, 2018). Due to rapid urbanisation 
and population growth, informal settlements have become a major challenge 
in the urban landscape, exacerbating issues related to poverty, inadequate 
infrastructure, housing and poor living conditions. Reflections on past 
upgrading efforts in South Africa suggest that top-down policies have 
not been successful to date. By contrast, participatory techniques in the 
design and construction of housing have been used to enhance community 
empowerment and a sense of local ownership. However, participation 
and collaboration can mean various things for informal housing upgrading, 
and often the involvement of local communities is limited to providing 
feedback in already agreed development decisions from local authorities 
and construction companies.
This research lies under the umbrella of sustainable bottom-up urban 
regeneration. As part of a large collaborative project between UK and South 
African research institutions (the ISULabaNtu project), this chapter presents 
findings from Phases 1 (‘Context analysis’) and 4 (‘Project management and 
skills enhancement in construction’) and explores various interpretations of 
‘self-help’ housing. The overall research adopted a postcolonial perspective 
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informal settlement upgrading in the Durban metropolitan area (eThekwini) 
(McEwan, 2009; Pieterse, 2010; Watson, 2014). ISULabaNtu was framed 
around the holistic view that informal settlement upgrading is not about 
physical housing per se but rather a socio-technical approach that delivers 
social capital, livelihood development, empowerment and skills to local 
residents.
The overarching aim of this chapter is to uncover the benefits and 
challenges of moving towards a more participatory, incremental approach 
focusing on construction management and integrated environmental 
management systems, which can enhance quality of life, livelihoods and 
ultimately community self-reliance. The study explores the concept of 
‘self-building’ in the context of community-led upgrading in South Africa. 
Participatory action research methods have been applied to ‘co-produce’ 
knowledge with residents and community researchers in three case studies 
in the Durban metropolitan area: Namibia Stop 8 (Phase 1), Piesang River 
and Havelock. The research seeks to identify critical success factors in 
managing self-build upgrading projects, discussing the crucial roles of 
stakeholder management, procurement and project governance. It also 
explores community-led approaches in informal settlement upgrading in 
Durban, highlighting the drivers and constraints of inclusive participatory 
approaches to design, construction and overall project management.
In particular, the study seeks to uncover the challenges in 1) formal v. 
informal forms of procurement; 2) the need to acquire ‘the right resources 
at the right time’ from local industry and/or construction practice; and 
3) compliance with rigid municipality processes. The findings of this 
study seek to build capacity both for local communities seeking to improve 
their quality of life and for local authorities seeking to enhance their 
upgrading planning programmes, plans and policies.
Background context
Housing has been a key challenge throughout the post-apartheid era in 
South Africa, with the commitment to provide access to adequate housing 
for all (Department of Human Settlements, 2009). Migration and poverty 
are major causes of informal settlements, as dwellers cannot afford to 
build or buy their own houses or to access formal housing schemes (Mutisya 
and Yarime, 2011; Wekesa et al., 2011). Misselhorn (2008: 5) emphasises 
that ‘it is important that any analysis of the current situation is premised 
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they afford to those who reside in them’. Informal settlements are considered 
a major concern for many urban areas as they pose health and environ-
mental risks, both to informal dwellers and also formal residents living 
in the same neighbourhoods. Informal settlements are characterised by 
self-help efforts, often illegal, and considered ‘informal’ as they do not 
align with prevailing regulations. In their self-help efforts, residents make 
use of the limited resources available to them for the purposes of erecting 
shelter on interstitial or marginal land (Dovey and King, 2011), often 
close to places that offer economic, social or survival benefits.
According to the 2011 census, 12 per cent of all households in the 
Durban metropolitan area live in informal settlements, with 29 per cent 
renting their dwellings (Housing Development Agency, 2013). eThekwini’s 
urbanisation has, over time, incorporated low-density urban settlements 
and adjoining farmlands. This structure has been influenced by an extreme 
topography; the city centre is fragmented, and economic opportunities 
are spatially segregated from formal housing and residential spaces 
(eThekwini Municipality, 2016). Post-apartheid consequences have therefore 
led to spatial inequalities, social segregation and various housing typologies 
(Western, 2002; Williams, 2000). These include high-density residential 
developments, such as inner-city flats in abandoned buildings, private 
rental housing schemes in informal settlements and social housing schemes. 
There are also subsidised houses in urban townships, informal backyard 
shacks adjacent to formal housing on both public and privately owned 
land, and rural housing dwellings. Some of the negative consequences of 
spatial fragmentation and low-density include an inefficient public transport 
system with high transport costs per low-income household, inefficient 
infrastructure and overall environmental pollution (eThekwini Municipality, 
2016).
Definitions of informal settlements
Informal settlements are defined by physical, social and legal characteristics; 
hence, it becomes difficult to define the term ‘adequate’ housing in the 
South African context (Housing Development Agency, 2013). Many scholars 
emphasise the dwelling type (shacks with poor-performing building 
materials), while others refer to the issue of land tenure (Housing Develop-
ment Agency, 2015a). A clear departure from the apartheid terminology 
included the term ‘slum’ being replaced by ‘informal settlements’ (Huchz-
ermeyer, 2011). Informal settlements are related mostly to the legal standing 
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and around places of opportunities, without proper planning, building 
regulations or standard construction methods (Khalifa, 2015). Informal 
settlements have been traditionally considered as ‘urban substandard’ 
schemes, providing low-cost housing to the urban poor under poor living 
conditions, health risks and environmental hazards (Sutherland et al., 
2016). However, Roy (2011) suggests a progressive interpretation of informal 
settlements as spaces of habitation, livelihood, self-organisation and politics. 
As stressed by Huchzermeyer (2011), informal settlements are complex, 
popular and spontaneous neighbourhoods offering an immediate response 
to housing needs and with their location critical for the socio-economic 
activities of the involved community. This concept moves away from the 
pathology of informal settlements, envisaging instead their potential as 
dynamic places of living.
History of upgrading models
Physical upgrading of informal settlements takes two general approaches: 
demolition and relocation, or in situ development (Del Mistro and Hensher, 
2009). Demolition and relocation is the process of moving inhabitants 
from their settlements to another ‘greenfield’ site. However, a growing 
body of literature favours in situ upgrading, as this involves the formalisation 
of informal settlements in their original location (Del Mistro and Hensher, 
2009; Huchzermeyer, 2006; Massey, 2014). One of the main critiques of 
demolition and relocation is the macro-economic target of the government 
to meet the physical aspects of housing shortage and infrastructure provi-
sion rather than the improvement of poor living conditions. This has led 
to conflicts and significant socio-economic disruption, with little regard 
given to displacement, poverty, vulnerability and the impact of these 
actions on social inclusion. In situ upgrading is the process undertaken 
to improve the conditions of an informal settlement in its current location 
through the provision of basic services and secure tenure to people. In 
situ models can be wide-ranging, from simply dealing with land tenure 
to incremental housing improvement and/or the provision of site-and-
services associated with formal settlements.
In South Africa, the post-apartheid period offered various top-down 
approaches to low-cost housing provision. Government authorities have 
been responsible for decision-making on behalf of the local inhabitants. 
Top-down models have been criticised as unsustainable in the sense 
that they continue the legacy of segregation in housing delivery, as they 
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understood the social capital required or the nature of the vulnerabilities 
of the affected populations (Huchzermeyer, 2011).
Informal settlement upgrading in Durban
Informal settlement upgrading in South Africa is dominated by the 
work of the South African Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SASDI) 
alliance. The approach of the SASDI and its community partners are 
explored by Bolnick and Bradlow (2010), Bradlow (2015), and Mitlin and 
Mogaladi (2013). Focusing on the Durban metropolitan area, analysis of 
informal settlement upgrading has been presented by van Horen (2000) 
and Charlton (2006), who focus on Besters Camp, a settlement where 
community participation in planning was attempted but with poor tenure 
arrangements. Charlton (2006) and Patel (2013) discuss Ntuthukoville in 
Pietermaritzburg-Msunduzi, Briardene, Cato Crest and Zewlisha case 
studies. These highlight the value of ‘informal continuity’ – i.e. sustained 
activity after formal upgrading – and criticise the lack of capacity at a 
municipality level which reinforces power relations that may not serve or 
be relevant to all community groups and individuals. Cross (2006) and 
Huchzermeyer (2006) emphasise the resistance, reluctance and/or inaction 
of local government, despite national policy and legislation promoting 
community-led upgrading (e.g. the government housing strategy ‘Breaking 
New Ground’).
Community participation
Community participation can be viewed as ‘an instrument of empowerment’ 
(Samuel, 1987: 3). A growing body of literature promotes participatory 
techniques as a key method to enhance a sense of local ownership within 
an upgrading project (Aron et al., 2009; Botes and van Rensburg, 2000; 
El-Masri and Kellett, 2001; Frischmann, 2012). Self-reliance is also a 
relevant term associated with community participation and self-help 
activities. It refers to communities defining and making their own choices 
through shared knowledge, skills enhancement and planning activism. 
However, even though ‘bottom-up’, participatory methods for community 
upgrading are often discussed theoretically in international development 
discourses, in practice the tools, methodologies and processes needed to 
ensure a successful upgrade on the ground have not seen widespread 
dissemination or uptake, particularly in the Durban metropolitan area.
Self-help housing involves practices in which low-income groups resolve 





















































78 African cities and collaborative futures
and finance topping up government subsidies (Marais et al., 2008). Self-help 
activities are interrelated to community self-reliance and are not new to 
South Africa, as since the 1950s an incremental, step-by-step, self-building 
approach on serviced sites was considered the cheapest and most efficient 
solution to slum upgrading (Landman and Napier, 2010). Community 
participation derives from self-help activities and refers to grassroots 
planning processes where the local populations themselves decide the 
future of their own settlement (Lizarralde and Massyn, 2008). In reality, 
however, community participation often remains ‘formal, legalised and 
politicised’ (Jordhus-Lier and de Wet, 2013: 2). In informal settlements, 
key conceptual and practical challenges hinder active community participa-
tion. Residents value nine factors in informal settlements: comfort, cost, 
environment, facilities, local economy, safety, security, social value and 
space (Jay and Bowen, 2011). In practice, there is often a lack of social 
and physical resources, as well as conflicting interests in individual and 
community expectations from involvement in development projects 
(Emmett, 2000). In addition, these nine factors need to be viewed in 
relation to livelihood creation and employment opportunities, particularly 
in the case of relocation (Hunter and Posel, 2012). Muchadenyika (2015) 
discusses the problematic relationship between local communities and 
local authorities and governments, whereby issues of legislation, politics, 
power and identity play a major role in resource management, distribution 
and implementation of the upgrading project. Patel (2015) describes the 
effect of devolved housing allocation leading to exclusion of non-favoured 
groups in Durban, thus negatively affecting community engagement. 
Devolved housing increases competition between residents around ethnicity, 
nationality and/or political party views.
Community-led upgrading in the Durban metropolitan area
Methodology
This study adopted a participatory action research method, utilising 
‘co-production of knowledge’ as the process through which residents in 
selected case study areas have an active role in research (Mitlin, 2008; 
Ostrom, 1996). Fieldwork in three case studies, Namibia Stop 8 (Phase 
1), Piesang River and Havelock was conducted between May 2016 and 
February 2018 to assess the level of ‘good available practice’ in community-
led upgrading of informal settlements in the Durban metropolitan area. 
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of an active support organisation, community self-organisation practices 
(e.g. saving groups), good documentation of historical development and 
upgrading models used in the past. Empirical data was gathered by means 
of twenty-five household interviews in each case study, ten focus group 
discussions with community members and twelve focus groups with 
external stakeholders from eThekwini municipality and the construction 
industry in Durban.
Self-build houses in Namibia Stop 8
Located on Haffajee’s Land in Inanda, a northern outskirt of Durban in 
the KwaZulu-Natal province, the first case study refers to Phase 1 of 
Namibia Stop 8, built between 2010 and 2014. Namibia Stop 8 has been 
a greenfield project, to which residents were largely moved from two 
neighbouring areas (Namibia and Stop 8) as part of a re-blocking exercise 
for services and housing. The housing that was built was a mixture of 
government-provided Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) housing and a small number of houses built through the Federation 
of the Urban and Rural Poor (FEDUP). uTshani Fund, a support organisa-
tion partner of the SASDI alliance, provided the finance facilities to FEDUP, 
who acted as community contractors and led the provision of self-build 
housing. The site has piped water, electricity lines, access roads (although 
these do not reach all properties) and a sewage system. The area suffers 
from water shortages and intermittent electricity supply.
At the project preparation stage, the community undertook detailed 
profiling. Three women-led savings groups established an ‘Urban Poor 
Fund’ to finance the delivery of housing. A culture of continuous saving 
was developed so FEDUP households could provide funds for larger 
structures, tiles, ceiling board and/or furniture compared to the RDP 
houses. One FEDUP member mentioned that:
with group savings we want to make sure that everything is going according 
to the plan … You are building your own thing and you make sure it is 
done properly … We are also able to hire more people to help with construc-
tion and ensure hardware stores deliver the building materials that we need. 
(Namibia Stop 8 focus group)
The project involved ninety-six houses using the participatory People’s 
Housing Process model that is predicated on a community-driven participa-
tory approach. FEDUP construction was slower but this collaborative 





















































80 African cities and collaborative futures
and better-sized houses than those constructed under the government-
driven RDP model (40 square metres). FEDUP households developed a 
sense of ownership and control and invested in self-building through 
helping community contractors and builders. Some of the respondents 
said that they learned how to collaborate and tolerate each another, and 
this process created new social ties within the community, thus enhancing 
social cohesion. Moreover, many have become financially literate and 
have developed habits of saving for household needs and personal goals. 
On the practical side, respondents said that some of the beneficiaries 
have acquired new skills and experience in construction. This made the 
process quicker and reduced labour costs. Initially, FEDUP leaders built 
a demonstration house and asked community members to give feedback 
on the foundation, structure and material selection. People that were 
offered RDP houses, on the other hand, had little input on those discussions 
and the overall self-building process.
In terms of materials and construction techniques, the FEDUP houses 
were built with concrete blocks, wooden roof trusses, tiles, plastering inside 
and out and floor screeding. By contrast, RDP houses were unplastered, 
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with smaller windows, and residents argued that the foundations were 
poor. RDP households also required additional waterproof paint on walls 
and doors for rain protection, which was done privately if the residents 
could afford this extra cost. As a community leader stated, ‘the majority 
of people continued to live in the houses after the upgrading, while the 
comparative figures for the municipality houses are about 50 per cent. 
This is because paying someone to do it is more expensive than doing it 
yourself.’ In effect, the high costs incurred mean that residents may end 
up renting out the property and then move elsewhere: sometimes back 
to the informal settlements, where living is cheaper. The construction 
method of FEDUP entails delivery by community contractors and the 
establishment of community construction management teams (CCMTs), 
supervised by uTshani Fund and approved professional contractors, who 
ensured technical support. In terms of procurement, CCMTs and uTshani 
Fund compared three local hardware stores in Kwabester, Mtshebheni 
and KwaMashu and chose the supplier (who was the sole provider of all 
building materials) based on a cost–benefit assessment of quality and cost. 
According to the CCMT members, the community faced some problems 
during the construction (for example, negotiations with the municipality 
on the dimensions of the slab and the theft of construction materials), but 
the project was successful since all ninety-six houses were completed on 
time and all the listed beneficiaries received their houses according to plan.
FEDUP households pointed out a number of challenges and lessons 
learned. Residents are still awaiting their title deeds from the municipality. 
Consequently, they are reluctant to rent their homes as they do not trust 
potential tenants without formal tenure recognition. From a technical 
perspective, FEDUP foundations replicated the RDP module, which proved 
rather small and needed to be extended during construction. There was 
also no guttering for rainwater collection or a ventilation strategy: for 
example, trees could provide thermal comfort and prevent overheating 
in the house. Other non-technical challenges involved the lack of wider 
community trust. Building materials were stolen during the construction 
process, particularly single units, such as doors and windows. Residents 
had to move back to their old homes until this was fixed, thus increasing 
frustration. Moreover, not all FEDUP members contributed to the self-
building approach and some were controlling with others, leading to 
conflict and/or trust issues. There was also the question of access and 
connectivity to the main road and the lack of spatial integration. Households 





















































82 African cities and collaborative futures
thus hindering community development. In terms of construction, technical 
support would enable a better redesign of the roof and therefore save 
resources (such as timber) that could be used elsewhere. The community 
emphasised the need for training or hiring skilled workers for future 
upgrading projects. Lastly, it was noted that the youth were not engaged 
in group savings after the project ended. This inevitably meant that the 
knowledge and skills that CCMTs developed were lost.
Project management in Piesang River
Piesang River is a historical informal settlement, similar to Namibia Stop 
8, which pioneered strong elements of community leadership and negotia-
tions with the South African government around housing delivery. Piesang 
River is located near the townships of Inanda and KwaMashu, twenty-five 
kilometres north-west of Durban. The settlement was established through 
the purchase of land and its subdivision, followed by the gradual settling 
of adjacent land in the 1970s and 1980s. Civic structures were formed in 
the late 1980s by the United Democratic Front, eventually leading to land 
regularisation and the extension of infrastructure into the settlement 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004).
Since the early 1990s, Piesang River has undergone a gradual process 
of formal development involving multiple actors. In the early 1990s until 
1995 the civic organisation in Piesang River was supported by the Built 
Environment Support Group (a local NGO) acting as project manager 
for the development of infrastructure and site allocation. The Homeless 
People’s Federation (and its supporting NGO, People’s Dialogue) later 
rose to prominence in Piesang River, prioritising the construction of 
individual houses for its members. At around the same time the NGO 
Habitat for Humanity established itself in the settlement, offering loan 
funding for housing construction. The local authority eventually organised 
the election of a representative committee to resolve some of the tensions 
and differences between the priorities of these organisations and to resolve 
the question of which households would have to be relocated.
The aim of community-led building was to improve the living conditions 
in mud houses and issues with water shortage. Women in Piesang River 
are empowered in this process: they initiated group savings and are 
responsible for book keeping and fund management. Group saving was 
initiated by women asking residents to contribute from 50 cents per person 
per day, and demonstrated to the government that Piesang River was an 
organised community worth supporting. Subsidies were then received 
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FEDUP to support housing construction through a process of pre-financing 
(bridging finance) by making a loan to assist ‘sweat equity’ (time and 
labour), allowing beneficiaries to repay the loan at a later stage. Thereafter, 
the community undertook the actual construction of the houses. As a 
community leader argued: ‘FEDUP did not wait for the government to 
deliver housing, we put effort and we succeeded. Also, we decided not 
to pay the construction professionals and therefore we were able to save 
and build larger houses.’
FEDUP leaders built a cardboard module of the ‘ideal house’ with four 
rooms. This caused conflict with RDP residents, who only had two rooms 
(40 square metres). A Steering Committee was established which divided 
semi-skilled inhabitants into seven groups of four to ten members (which 
was easier to manage), and each according to their specific skills, namely:
●	 technical (design and construction): bricklaying, foundation, plumbing;
●	 management: supporting labour, finance (book keeping), quantity 
surveying and costing;
●	 social facilitation: mobilisation, negotiation and communication around 
a ‘shared’ vision.





















































84 African cities and collaborative futures
The Steering Committee managed the whole building project, but the 
skills learned from individual FEDUP members involved mostly bricklaying 
and group savings. As a FEDUP member stated: ‘We were taught to do 
things that are difficult to achieve when working alone … We were taught 
to negotiate about land, electricity, water and construction. FEDUP houses 
do not have cracks and are of better quality compared to the RDP ones.’
Piesang River also showcases the role played by women in project 
management and construction: for instance, women were trained how 
to lay out the foundation of the houses. FEDUP brought professional 
builders on site to provide assistance and training to the individual groups. 
The community felt that training members would save money compared 
to hiring professional builders throughout the construction. The community 
was open to learning new skills (such as bricklaying), and this process 
facilitated formal skills transfer. In contrast to Namibia Stop 8, FEDUP 
members engaged in training youth groups and managed to pass on the 
culture of saving to the next generation. In terms of the construction 
method and selection of building materials, the houses are quite similar 
to Namibia Stop 8. FEDUP community leaders commented that criteria 
for the procurement strategy included price, quality, durability, cost 
(affordability) and safety when visiting different hardware stores for a 
quote. Respondents mentioned that they gained communication skills 
and links to the municipal officials. Overall, the process created better 
social interactions and interrelations within the community, reducing 
many social tensions amongst them. Also, the upgrading created job 
opportunities for the youth and resulted in a reduction of crime.
Nevertheless, households pointed out a number of challenges and lessons 
learned. FEDUP households still have not received their title deeds, which 
has caused some issues when installing water meters: the community had 
to hire a private company to connect them to the mains water pipe. 
Piesang River features double-storey buildings; however, their construction 
was not successful. A community member mentioned that accepting 
customs and culture in the upgrading process is key, as ‘people prefer to 
live in their own houses and the double-storey construction caused issues 
with older and disabled people’. Another challenge was the need for further 
reinforcing metal to support the structure, which increased total costs in 
addition to a suspended concrete floor. In term of community engagement 
and participation, residents pointed out that it was challenging to carry 
on investing in group savings and labour when an individual house was 
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house was built. Finally, some respondents pointed out that one of the 
major issues was that the project had started during the apartheid era 
and so the change of administration hindered the full completion of the 
project. As a result, services like water and electricity were not properly 
connected and still, some twenty years on, they lacked meters.
Socio-economic challenges in Havelock
Havelock is an informal settlement located eight kilometres from Durban 
city centre, with an estimated 200 dwellings and approximately 400 people 
living in the settlement (SASDI, 2012). The informal settlement dates 
back to 1986 when a jobseeker in the area decided to build a house on 
the site in the absence of other places to stay. The land, a steep incline 
with a river at the bottom, had been overgrown by trees and bushes prior 
to the construction of the settlement. Havelock sits on both private and 
municipal land, with various hazards including illegal electrical connections, 
dangerous electrical cables sprawled across paths, fire hazards and flooding. 
The municipality have installed ablution blocks and a detailed assessment 
has been conducted for the proposed re-blocking of the settlement. 
However, the abundance of water from the river, which overflows during 
heavy rains, has discouraged private owners from reclaiming the land 
and carrying out the demolition.
Unlike Piesang River and Namibia Stop 8, Havelock has not undergone 
an upgrading process (at the time of the writing of this chapter) despite 
ongoing negotiations. The previously established saving schemes have 
not been successful due to a lack of long-term commitment among residents 
and the additional pressures of high unemployment and temporary work. 
According to community leaders, prioritisation of immediate needs ahead 
of savings for future upgrading has added to the set of obstacles. Fur-
thermore, many inhabitants still have homes in rural areas elsewhere and 
view Havelock as temporary accommodation to access employment, 
meaning they have little interest in the long-term upgrading of the set-
tlement. Besides weak social cohesion and the public–private ownership 
of the land, the settlement also faces other challenges, including a lack 
of skills and training in construction, particularly in the passing on of 
this knowledge to the younger generation. The situation is complicated 
further by the settlement’s conflictual relationship with nearby formal 
neighbourhoods who do not support improvement and upgrading efforts, 
arguing that this would turn Havelock into a permanent settlement and 
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Notwithstanding these issues, there is a clearly articulated need to 
improve living conditions in the settlement, which is prone to flooding, 
fire hazards and other accidents caused by uneven pathways, lack of 
places for children to play (with the road being the only alternative) 
and the overall density of housing. With the presence of professional 





















































 Beyond self-help 87
bricklayers and people with construction skills, residents believe there 
is some existing capacity in the settlement to enable them to carry out 
upgrading in situ themselves. However, without any formal opportunities 
to get involved, people become discouraged and such potential remains 
unused.
Even if help was to become immediately available to the households, 
lack of space to build houses is also perceived as a barrier. Services like 
roads with speed bumps, public spaces (such as a playground for children), 
paved pathways and a way of separating the settlement from the overflowing 
river were seen as highly important. Potential building materials for the 
houses, as expressed by focus group participants, would have to be fireproof 
to protect from the fire hazards stemming mostly from the wires of illegal 
electrical connections in the settlement and the use of paraffin stoves. 
Strong foundations able to withstand flooding were also a critical necessity 
highlighted in the discussions. A preference for more expensive materials 
was expressed in order to ensure the long-term quality and durability of 
the improved houses, rather than cheap materials which would need to 
be replaced frequently or added to. This long-term thinking about building 
materials and ways of improving the physical conditions of the houses 
was in contrast to the feeling that the settlement was only a temporary 
place to live, one where ‘we know that we will not be here for the rest of 
our lives’ – a sentiment expressed by one of the respondents and shared 
by many others in the settlement. To date, however, only cheap, reclaimed 
materials from dumps and from networks of contacts have been used for 
building the houses and making any improvements.
Besides affordability, what is also preventing residents from seeking 
more expensive and solid materials is the fear of fire and the potential 
loss of those materials. Hence, only temporary and low-cost fixes are 
applied to the houses. After a fire incident, the municipality claimed to 
have provided some relief to two houses. However, one of these households 
reported that they did not receive the materials in time and sourced their 
own materials to rebuild, while the other house did not manage to secure 
any materials from the municipality as the supply ran out and it had to 
obtain materials later independently. Although eThekwini officials stated 
that in the event of an emergency ‘the disaster teams are the first to 
respond [followed by] a quick enumeration [that] will be done to see 
who has been affected’, in the case of Havelock the system did not deliver 
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A new approach to informal settlement upgrading
The importance of leadership in local government was outlined during 
a focus group with the Community Organisation Resource Centre (CORC) 
and uTshani Fund, who stated that ‘you have a local government and a 
state, they are mandated to provide services and to respond’. However, 
their approaches are in contrast to that pursued by NGOs.
The municipality are again feeling challenged by others. They offer support 
but our processes [CORC/FEDUP], bottom-up community led is immediately 
an issue. The municipality want to come and deliver the emergency materials. 
As where we would have processes, re-blocking in the case of a disaster, if 
it was a fire which destroyed dwellings to rethink their space and how they 
can lay it out more effectively, and that would undermine our processes if 
the municipality just come and deliver materials and people haphazardly 
do their own thing again, and you lose that opportunity to do that re-blocking. 
(Focus group with CORCP and FEDUP representatives)
Furthermore, it was made evident in most household interviews and 
focus groups with CORC and FEDUP that there is a need for enhanced 
interaction by the municipality with the community and vice versa. This 
is fundamental for the improved delivery of housing, services and further 
clarity of all parties’ plans, management of expectations and alignment 
of agendas.
The importance of local government leadership leads to the need for 
effective communication in upgrading negotiations. Regarding the 
shortcomings of the delivery of housing, in an interview the municipality 
argued, ‘we have the silo mentality of working, where we are not connected, 
and it is killing the end product and there is no kind of bond’. The focus 
group discussion also revealed that there is no alignment between individual 
departments and complex political agendas that need to be navigated, 
along with long bureaucratic processes. Departmental communication 
issues are then magnified by the time they reach the communities due 
to the extended timescales and increased tension.
In addition, the municipal tendering process for public works ensures 
that there are various further requirements measured against the tendered 
price submitted. These are: Black Economic Empowerment, the percentage 
of women in the workforce, the number of young adults and evidence of 
how the company will transfer benefits to the local community. An example 
of this would be skills development and mentorship. The municipality 
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for future contracts. This is a very beneficial practice that could help 
develop necessary skills for community members and allow for the retention 
of labour in the communities, creating a more reliable network of local 
construction workers.
Current estimates in eThekwini municipality indicate that there are 
about 327,615 households in 476 informal settlements, without any clear 
plans for upgrading or signs of a participatory process (eThekwini 
Municipality, 2015). An innovative participatory action planning approach 
has been proposed by the Housing Development Agency and was endorsed 
during the focus group discussions with external stakeholders. This is 
because full upgrading with services and subsidised housing is not a 
viable option for South Africa in general, and the Durban metropolitan 
area in particular. This approach also underlines the fact that the challenge 
to upgrading is not just housing, but a manifestation of structural social 
change and political endurance. In this context, a new approach to informal 
settlement upgrading should adopt the following key principles, to be:
●	 city-wide: inclusive of all the informal settlements;
●	 incremental: with a range of different improvement as opposed to 
traditional housing delivery;
●	 in situ: considering relocation as a last resort;
●	 partnership-based: instead of purely state service oriented;
●	 participatory and more community-driven: collaborative informal 
settlement action and co-management to develop acceptable 
solutions;
●	 programmatic and area-based: instead of project delivery-focused;
●	 context related: differentiated, situationally responsive (as opposed 
to ‘one-size-fits-all’);
●	 statutorily and regulatorily flexible: working with and not against 
informality (Housing Development Agency, 2015b).
The above approach has been consolidated and adopted in the form of a 
strategy (eThekwini Municipality, 2017) by the 100 Resilient Cities 
Programme (100RC) for the city of Durban. The 100RC team has recognised 
the need to rethink new perspectives on informality and accepting it as 
part of the city. Informal settlement is a dynamic space that changes 
continuously and requires appropriate planning strategies that meaningfully 
involve residents themselves. Currently, the housing targets (performance 
goals) are reducing the approach to informal settlements to a mere set 





















































90 African cities and collaborative futures
is represented by collaboration and partnership between local government 
and the other main stakeholders. There is a lack of understanding about 
the dynamics of informal settlements and a need to coordinate all the 
interventions from the different departments of the municipality. Moreover, 
the involvement of settlement dwellers in planning processes is generally 
poor and reflects a high level of mistrust between communities and the 
municipality. The contexts in different settlements vary significantly, too, 
and so responses need to be diversified and move beyond a narrow focus 
on targets. Finally, long-term funding is a major challenge.
Concluding remarks
South Africa has a strategy for slum management and response, particularly 
under the post-2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (e.g. SDG11) 
and the Habitat III New Urban Agenda. This chapter sought to provide 
recommendations on how the above experiences and lessons learned 
from ‘good available practice’ in community-led approaches could be 
effectively incorporated into existing upgrading programmes, such as the 
new Integrated Urban Development Framework and the city-wide participa-
tory upgrading of informal settlements that are part of the 100 Resilient 
Cities initiative in Durban.
eThekwini municipality’s targets are at present difficult to achieve due 
to an increasing backlog on housing delivery. Focus group participants 
claimed that there were currently about 535 informal settlements, compris-
ing around 25 per cent of the population of KwaZulu-Natal province. 
Most informal settlements are upgradable and are already part of the 
urban fabric. The government view on informal settlements suggests that 
conventional upgrading (i.e. state-funded housing and a full package of 
services) with tenure security and formal town planning is an unviable 
solution due to the increasing backlog, the costs involved, complex land 
schemes, higher density and the long timescales. This is why an incremental, 
city-wide, partnership-based participatory upgrading approach is proposed 
with lessons learned from communities that have undertaken (even 
partially) aspects of community-led upgrading.
The research undertaken in this chapter has broadly highlighted some 
of the major shortcomings which were also brought out within the literature 
review. Further investigation is necessary to enumerate the possible long-
term impacts of these issues, but it is clear that the internal communication 
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a new dynamic to align work between departments. It is also important 
to strengthen external municipal communication with NGOs, the private 
sector and residents.
All three case studies pioneered strong elements of community leadership 
due to a set of participatory methods embedded in project preparation 
and implementation. These include: community profiling and assessments, 
savings groups, community-driven project management and the ‘sweat 
equity’ (time and labour) of beneficiaries. The above processes created a 
legacy for local residents in terms of income generation, skills upgrading 
and sense of local ownership from the early planning stages. A key factor 
in their success has to do with skills enhancement and ‘learning by doing’. 
Continuous improvement enabled community organisations (e.g. FEDUP) 
to ensure lower costs and better quality in the construction of the houses. 
However, the case study research revealed that there is a need for further 
training and skills development on best practice relating to construction 
and procurement of materials and services. FEDUP and CORC have 
provided a foundation of knowledge for many residents through savings 
groups and training sessions. The continuation of such training in line 
with further support offered by the municipality could facilitate improve-
ments in the processes adopted, enhancing the time, cost and quality 
of self-building. There are also many inefficiencies within the current 
municipal tendering and procurement processes, despite good intentions 
and policies which have been implemented. Shortcomings were found in 
the tendering process, internal and external communication, stakeholder 
management and training and development of communities. NGOs such 
as uTshani, CORC and FEDUP have filled these gaps through bottom-up 
approaches to the delivery of housing.
Finally, it is important to note that the level of a successful upgrading 
project is measured differently between local authorities and communities. 
This is potentially why the government-led upgrading of informal settle-
ments is not providing the results intended. For eThekwini municipality, 
it refers mainly to successful delivery of infrastructure and services. 
Empirical data from the three communities, on the other hand, revealed 
that a successful project is about full ownership of the upgrading, social 
cohesion, livelihood development and tenure security (ultimately by 
obtaining the title deeds). This means that upgrading is not just housing 
delivery but also consideration and development of the social fabric, such 
as access to job opportunities, health facilities, schools and public transport. 
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and currently acts as a mere housing provider, rather than being an enabler. 
It is therefore essential to build capacity and invest in further training in 
both communities and local authorities by understanding the minimum 
preconditions that unlock community participation in an upgrading 
project.
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Turning livelihood to rubbish? The 
politics of value and valuation in 
South Africa’s urban waste sector
Henrik Ernstson, Mary Lawhon, Anesu Makina,  
Nate Millington, Kathleen Stokes and Erik Swyngedouw
Introduction
Urban waste is increasingly garnering attention for multiple reasons. Cities 
are responsible for producing – and thus managing – a growing proportion 
of global waste flows, now about 80 per cent of the world’s waste (Myers, 
2005). Waste produces a variety of negative socio-ecological externalities, 
and these are exacerbated by the high densities of population and waste 
in cities. Concerns over the health impacts of proximity to decomposing 
materials and the plastics that clog waterways have recently been com-
plemented by worries over the greenhouse gas emissions that arise from 
waste and its management.
But in many cities across the global south, the positive potential of 
waste has long been recognised. Actors, particularly in the informal sector, 
harness the value of this waste: waste makes essential contributions to 
the precarious livelihoods of millions of poor urban dwellers through 
waste-picking for use, recycling, recuperation and sale, and through 
practices, markets and production processes associated with urban waste 
circulation processes (Miraftab, 2004; Samson, 2010a and 2010b). More 
recently, public policies and discourses in the north and south (often 
promoted by the state, environmentalists and international donors) are 
seeking to reframe waste as a resource and to promote a more regular 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that urban sustainability and socio-
ecological transition policies consider the urban waste metabolic cycle 
as a key leverage point for securing more ecologically benign, economically 
viable and socially inclusive waste management technologies, procedures, 
policies and mechanisms. While attention is paid to reducing or avoiding 
waste, significant effort has been focused on how to move from waste as 
useless and dangerous ‘excrement’ or as ‘matter out of place’ (Douglas, 
2004 [1966]) to incorporating (part of) the waste cycle within a value 
chain (Crang et al., 2013; Lepawsky and Billah, 2011). The idea here is 
to render waste ‘valuable’ in economic terms as well as ecologically more 
‘sustainable’, while also generating positive social outcomes.
And yet, as we argue through our examination of recent efforts to 
intervene in the South African wastescape, it is extremely difficult to 
address this triad of objectives. Competing interests, dynamic economies 
and the very real materiality and thus heterogeneity of waste shape the 
ability of various actors to make either cents or sense of what is and ought 
to be. Instead of a well-ordered, efficient system of waste management 
(in the sense of the modern infrastructure ideal as defined by Graham 
and Marvin (2001)), we see in practice a diverse, highly politicised, multi-
scalar set of interventions seeking to push waste management towards 
an implausible set of countervailing goals.
This chapter is a summary of research into different types of waste 
interventions in South Africa. In a context of growing global and local 
inequality and deteriorating socio-ecological conditions, the case of 
South Africa is particularly instructive. The neoliberalisation of the South 
African state, the widening socio-ecological polarisation and the discursive 
emphasis on pursuing a more socially inclusive and ecologically benign 
development trajectory turn the South African case into an emblematic 
example of urban waste transition. The examination of interventions 
in the urban metabolic waste stream provides a lens through which to 
capture some of the key processes, contradictions and transformations. 
We chose these interventions as being indicative of wider trends in waste 
management, particularly in southern cities seeking to harness global 
finance, create more ‘modern’, uniform and universal (and therefore 
legible and countable) economies, generate employment opportunities 
and demonstrate due diligence towards responsible ecological governance. 
We are ultimately interested in how change happens and how the impact 






















































98 African cities and collaborative futures
The chapter therefore describes the dynamic institutional, technical, 
social and political ecological landscape of waste management in South 
Africa and how this in turn is shaping the practices by which waste is 
transformed into economic and social value, who is allowed to claim such 
benefits, and what makes for successful claims. We call attention to the 
competing mandates of government – to manage waste, support social 
development and increase employment while limiting the cost of both 
and nurturing a green sustainable transition model – and the ways in 
which various actors respond to these often countervailing mandates. 
The empirical work is based on investigations into: 1) the technologisation 
of waste management; 2) the differential impacts of the internationalisation 
of waste management finance; and 3) initiatives that emphasise collaborative 
governance and community participation and awareness as means of 
improving waste management. Before we examine this triad, we provide 
a conceptual and theoretical entry into the problem.
An urban political ecology of waste metabolism
We mobilise theoretical and empirical insights from urban political ecology 
(UPE) (Heynen et al., 2006; Swyngedouw, 1996) while extending and 
reformulating this perspective through the inclusion of theoretical and 
empirical insights from the global south (Ernstson et al., 2014; Robinson, 
2011; Roy, 2009). Urban scholars have increasingly demonstrated that 
research on ‘ordinary’ cities is necessary for understanding future urbanisa-
tion, particularly as urbanisation is happening most rapidly in cities of 
the south (Robinson, 2011; Simone, 2011). This demands a reconsideration 
of the universality of aspects of urban theory, and the development of 
new theory from new locations. Importantly, this argument is not a rejection 
of the ability of theory to travel; it is an argument for a more careful and 
grounded consideration of which aspects of theory can and ought to 
travel (Ernstson and Sörlin, 2019; Lawhon and Truelove, 2020; Lawhon 
et al., 2020; Parnell and Oldfield, 2014). Specifically, therefore, we seek 
to develop a situated urban political ecological analysis that is grounded 
in the challenges of cities in the global south and that has the potential 
to inform practice that is based on this context, while still inform wider 
circulations of theory (Lawhon et al., 2014).
We use this as an entry point for further developing the range of theoreti-
cal innovations and interventions in the field of urban political ecology. 
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electricity or waste) produce cities and their ‘hinterlands’ and influence 
their socio-physical environments. Such studies forefront the ways in 
which these socio-material flows shape and are shaped by ecological, 
social, political and economic relations and the associated distribution 
of use values and exchange values. Viewing waste as a socio-material flow 
that can be reworked by social actors to extract value through the mobilisa-
tion of specific knowledges, technologies and infrastructures provides a 
lens through which to unpack social, cultural, economic and political 
relations, winners and losers, and to understand how urbanisation structures 
society and the environment (Heynen et al., 2006). This chapter combines 
insights from southern cities with UPE to understand everyday environ-
mental injustices in the context of political economic forces and everyday 
micropolitics (Ernstson and Sörlin, 2019; Lawhon et al., 2014 and 2020; 
Loftus, 2012; Rademacher and Sivaramakrishnan, 2013). We build on 
and inform such theoretical frameworks by simultaneously exploring the 
impact of international capital, decision-making strategies and expectations 
about modernity, employment and the moral value of work on local 
contestations over waste beneficiation.
Much of the existing literature on contestations over waste manage-
ment draws from cases in the global north (for example, Bulkeley et al., 
2007). As argued in urban studies more generally, this provides limited 
grounding through which to study cases where informality and poverty 
significantly shape waste practices. A large part of the current research 
on waste in the global south focuses on the practices of informal waste 
collectors (Gutberlet, 2012; Millar, 2014; Millington and Lawhon, 2019; 
Mitchell, 2008; Samson 2010a; Schenck and Blaauw, 2011; Thieme, 2013) 
and broader patterns of neoliberalisation, privatisation and enclosure 
(Fredericks, 2014; Gidwani, 2015; Gidwani and Reddy, 2011; Gutberlet, 
2012; Holifield, 2004; Millington and Lawhon, 2019; Miraftab, 2004; Njeru, 
2006; Rosaldo, 2016; Samson, 2015). Our work draws from these analyses 
in order to develop understandings of the links between policy, technol-
ogy, poverty, power and waste itself, particularly in light of the changing 
political economy of waste internationally, regionally and nationally and 
associated political and technological interventions. This is to say, we 
argue that the possibilities for making a decent livelihood from waste 
are shaped by factors as diverse as global carbon finance, the roll-out of 
kerbside collection of recyclables and the amount of food a household 
is willing to throw away. As a study of urban political ecology, therefore, 





















































100 African cities and collaborative futures
their social, technical and economic impacts – and frame questions of 
power within a wider, multi-scalar set of impacts.
Waste interventions: the perverse social ecologies of 
‘greening’ waste
Waste management in the global south is a growing concern, although 
data and trends are difficult to obtain (Idris et al., 2004). While uncontrolled 
landfilling remains the dominant strategy in many places – for example, 
estimates in India suggest 90 per cent of household waste goes to uncon-
trolled sites (Talyan et al., 2008) – in the global north, regulations are 
reducing the overall use of landfilling, replacing it with recycling as well 
as more technologically intensive alternatives (Giusti, 2009). In the global 
south, development agencies often support small-scale activities such as 
enabling and organising informal recycling or increased governance 
capacity. International capital, however, has also demonstrated interest 
in large-scale projects such as waste-for-energy incineration and harnessing 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) for international finance 
(Plöchl et al., 2008).
South Africa has undergone significant changes since the end of apartheid 
in 1994, yet poverty remains widespread and inequality has increased 
(Bhorat and van der Westhuizen, 2010; Sulla and Zikhali, 2018), with 
continuing deep differences between the rural countryside and the city, 
and within cities (Sinclair-Smith and Turok, 2012; Swilling, 2006; Turok, 
2001). While the economy has grown, much of this is considered ‘jobless’ 
growth or even ‘job-shedding’. Inequality has provocative consequences 
for waste: high-income lifestyles produce much waste, and the precarious 
conditions of the urban poor result in ‘willing’ labourers. While ethically 
problematic, the juxtaposition of rich and poor creates opportunities such 
as economically viable, labour-intensive recycling, and extensive recircula-
tion of used goods. The ability to capitalise on the demand for waste, 
however, is limited for various reasons, including a complex, unclear and 
inconsistent political and institutional context (Godfrey and Oelofse, 
2008).
Nevertheless, the growing dissatisfaction with the economy has led the 
state – across national, regional and municipal levels – to create campaigns 
and initiatives encouraging volunteerism and community-led projects 
more vigorously as well as workfare and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
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stages of the metabolic value chain) is increasingly being recast as both 
a speculative process for financial gain and a civic obligation. Legislatively, 
waste has increasingly been identified in policy documents and practices 
as a resource from which to generate wealth and create jobs, including 
in the 2010 New Growth Path and the 2008 National Environmental 
Management Waste Act (Republic of South Africa, 2008; South Africa, 
2010). As a sector that is seen to possess low barriers to entry, waste has 
been framed as a means of generating low-income jobs throughout the 
nation. In the remainder of this chapter, we critically evaluate these efforts 
by the state and multiple other actors to rework the wastescape, highlighting 
South Africa’s capacity to shed light on similar dynamics in other developing 
countries.
Technology and labour
High rates of unemployment mean that the relationship between technology 
and labour is critical to contemporary conversations about waste manage-
ment throughout the global south, and has particular salience in South 
Africa (Lawhon at al., 2018). Contemporary recycling and waste manage-
ment facilities are marked by the complex interplay between the manual 
and the technical in the management of waste (Zapata Campos and Hall, 
2013). While ‘technical’ may evoke images of expensive automated systems 
of waste sorting, manual recycling and waste collection by salary-paid 
workers within a formalised industry, it also encompasses a series of 
small-scale technological interventions outside the more formalised industry 
that intersect with existing infrastructures of waste collection and process-
ing, such as trolleys and bicycles. Waste management in the global south 
is often a labour-intensive and largely manual operation, given the low 
cost of labour. Nevertheless, the small margins associated with the industry, 
as well as pressures to innovate, compel the technological advancement 
of productivity through technologies such as conveyors, sorting assemblages, 
sophisticated trucks, compressors and mechanisms for tracking global 
and local price fluctuations. (For a textured illustration of the diversity 
of the waste industry, see the online film by Kruger et al., 2019).
In spite of these dynamics, the increasingly sophisticated nature of 
recycling and waste management in the global north has put pressures 
on countries of the global south to keep up with trends (see also analyses 
of the quest for modernity: Ferguson, 1999; Graham and Marvin, 2001; 
Mitchell, 2002). This is occurring at the same time that waste is increas-





















































102 African cities and collaborative futures
Moore, 2015; Samson, 2019), one whose profitability is dependent on 
new technologies of extraction and material remaking. These include 
the value that can be found in waste objects through recycling, but also 
through more sophisticated mechanisms of using waste to generate 
energy through processes such as anaerobic digestion and incineration. 
As detailed in other work (Lawhon at al., 2018), the possibility of automat-
ing waste collection in South Africa is appealing to waste managers and 
professionals. The low cost of labour coupled with state pressures for job 
creation, however, limit the development of automated waste management 
systems. Waste remains a largely manual operation throughout much of 
the country, partly at the level of collection, and at the level of sorting. 
Efforts to develop separation-at-source initiatives throughout the country 
are ongoing. However, they remain complicated by the cost dynamics 
associated with recycling, especially the high costs of transport and fuel, 
in part an effect of the apartheid legacies of South Africa’s cities with 
long distances between different segregated areas (Turok, 2001). These 
dynamics in turn intersect with the fluctuating national and, in particular, 
international prices of recyclables and can render collection financially 
unviable.
Given financial costs and continued reliance on manual sorting and 
collecting, technologies such as incineration, waste-to-energy and landfill 
gas extraction have played a limited, albeit symbolically important role 
within waste initiatives in Africa. Nevertheless, energy professionals and 
other actors are increasingly marketing them as win-win solutions that 
can reduce the externalities of waste while generating other benefits, 
especially energy. Such technologies are being promoted in the global 
south as private capital seeks new outlets given the increasing regulatory 
control and stringent regulation in the north (Gandy, 2004; Platt, 2004). 
For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s municipal governments in São 
Paulo and Buenos Aires had contemplated the expansion of incinerators 
for household waste. However, at that time social mobilisation and the 
high cost of this technology prevented its establishment. Waste incineration 
has now re-emerged in many places around the global south as waste-
to-energy plants, and typically involves processes of anaerobic digestion 
of organic wastes (Demaria and Schindler, 2016; Gutberlet, 2012; Platt, 
2004). Unlike incineration more broadly, which involves complex conflicts 
with local recyclers due to the shared material feedstock, anaerobic digestion 
mainly involves organic waste and is subsequently somewhat disconnected 
from the politics surrounding recycling and waste-picking. In South Africa’s 
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sector, while the state has primarily pitched job creation in the waste 
sector at the level of collection. These imply very different numbers and 
types of jobs that can be created, from low-wage collecting and sorting 
jobs, to higher-skill engineering jobs at the management level.
Small-scale renewable energy generation
Commonly referred to as waste-to-energy, anaerobic digestion and biogas 
production are positioned as a source of waste minimisation that furthers 
sustainability through the production of energy and reducing methane 
emissions. A nascent biogas industry exists in South Africa, largely financed 
through international development agencies as well as private financing 
more generally. In 2017, a large-scale anaerobic digestion plant was built 
in Cape Town, designed to handle roughly 10 per cent of the city’s organic 
waste. Developed by New Horizons Energy, a ‘disruptive waste-to-energy 
company’ that offers ‘revolutionary waste management and cost-effective 
green energy’, the project was entirely funded by private financiers and 
development banks in spite of some late attention from Cape Town’s 
municipal government (Cloete, 2017; New Horizons Energy, n.d.). The 
stated reason for the plant’s applicability to the Western Cape context was 
the combination of high landfill and gas prices, which rendered anaerobic 
digestion more cost effective than in other provinces or cities. Without 
these effective subsidies, the project would have not been viable (Ernstson 
and Swyngedouw, 2018). While efforts to link waste-to-energy projects 
to global climate finance marked the South African waste sector in periodic 
moments over the last decade, the collapse of the global carbon price has 
meant that carbon finance has played a minimal role in environmental 
projects throughout the country since 2012, despite the fact that both 
international organisations and the private sector considered them the 
key in the process of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Ernstson and 
Swyngedouw, 2018).
Turning the city’s organic waste into energy has proved difficult, however, 
as waste compositions have not matched existing calculations and plans. 
When discussing the development of the project, a South African energy 
professional noted that the project needed to be reworked once it was 
established due to changing compositions of organic waste materials being 
produced by urban residents; increasing composting rates for wealthy 
households were matched by decreased amounts of waste materials in 
increasingly poor households (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 2018). The 
statistics used to provide the economic rationale to build the plant were 
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management in the country. The designed and existing operational 
arrangement in the new plant had to be reconfigured in order for it to 
remain financially viable for the foreseeable future. While intimately linked 
to the specificities of Cape Town’s social, physical and energy landscape, 
not least the steep inequality between its households, the city’s attempts 
at turning waste into energy were complicated by the specific materialities 
of organic waste in the city. Given shifts in the nature of waste itself, its 
changing quantity and its highly heterogeneous character as a commodity, 
these efforts intersected with the infrastructures of waste collection and 
processing to create a situation where existing frameworks were inadequate. 
These shifts in waste are intimately linked to historically persistent and 
deepening inequality, and the broadening degree to which consumption 
patterns and waste practices are connected to class and its racialised 
geographies.
Anaerobic digestion, as with the broader biogas industry, is dependent 
on infrastructural and institutional dynamics related to existing grids and 
accessibility. In South Africa currently, energy producers do not have the 
right to sell back electricity to the grid except in very specific arrangements 
or agreements between certain public and private actors. This produces 
a situation where the governance dynamics yield situations in which 
renewable energy (via waste or otherwise) is only possible in very particular 
circumstances. In the case of South Africa, ongoing dynamics at the federal 
level are working to curtail the nascent renewable energy industry. Waste, 
in this permutation, again comes in and out of focus depending on the 
forms into which it is inserted. Its relationality is crucial to its ability to 
be rendered profitable or productive, but in its materialised form – exhibit-
ing a high degree of heterogeneity, in contrast to water and electricity, 
for instance – it seems a quite undisciplined and uncooperative commodity 
that makes profits and the building of an industrial sector for job creation 
around it difficult. As such, rendering value from waste through the 
development of energy is by no means an intuitive process, even though 
it can be presented as such in design sketches and spreadsheets, but rather 
one that entails complex negotiations with existing inequalities and their 
materialisations in infrastructure.
Wasting climate finance
The internationalisation of waste financing
The formal adoption of the CDM through the 1997 Kyoto Protocol has 
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finance capital in the global north to be invested in plants and technologies 
in the global south to reduce the global amount of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Its implications for sustainable development and poverty reduction remain 
unclear (Olsen, 2007), however, particularly as the international markets 
for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) collapsed after 2012, dropping 
from an initial high at over €20 per ton of carbon dioxide equivalents 
(tCO2e) in June 2008, to €6 in the financial crash in September 2008, to 
only around €0.30 from 2013 to today (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 2018). 
The most notorious of these CDM waste-to-landfill projects is the Durban 
Bisasar Road Landfill project (Bond, 2007; Couth et al., 2011), but nine 
other projects have been approved by the South African Designated 
Authority as of April 2017 (SADNA, 2017). Eight were eventually registered 
with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the institutional linchpin for managing the CDM architecture. 
Thus, a first observation is that while South Africa initially seemed to 
look like a perfect country for the rolling-out of CDM projects, as it has 
a considerably well-developed high-tech industry with know-how and 
management capacity while still holding low- to middle-income status 
and dynamics, there has been in retrospect a fairly small output in realised 
CDM projects in the country.
Urban waste has been considered as an important quilting point in 
the process of transforming the urban socio-ecological imprint. As a 2010 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report stated, ‘the waste 
sector is in a unique position to move from being a minor source of 
global emissions to becoming a major saver of emissions’ (UNEP, 2010). 
Silver, based on his case study of a contested CDM-initiated waste project 
in Uganda, concurs that this is also how waste and CDM finance have 
been portrayed: ‘alongside the potentials bound up in capturing its material 
value (and in addressing under-funded waste system operations through 
new circulations of finance) it is likely [international and local actors have 
argued] that waste infrastructure will become a crucial site of urban carbon 
governance’ (Silver, 2017: 1481).
From its very inception in the aftermath of the Kyoto Protocol, advocates 
of the CDM portrayed the system as potentially generating financial flows 
to the developing world, mitigating climate gas emissions and nurturing 
employment and economic growth. The relationship between urban 
ecological modernisation policies, financialisation of urban socio-ecological 
infrastructure and internationally agreed climate mitigation instruments 
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investigations into its chequered history, the complexity of its institutional 
arrangement, the pseudo-commodification of (part of) the atmosphere 
and the speculative nature of turning non-human material like CO2 into 
financialised assets to be traded on an uncertain, volatile and now basically 
defunct market (Lane and Newell, 2016; Newell, 2012; Stephan and Lane, 
2014). In addition, the uneven socio-ecological consequences are also 
widely acknowledged, while the contribution to greenhouse gas reductions 
is negligible, as confirmed by leading climate scientists (Anderson, 2012). 
Nonetheless, despite these critical accounts of the mechanism and the 
fact that it has basically stopped performing since the price of CERs 
collapsed after the financial crisis, we maintain that the CDM nonetheless 
played a critical role in sustaining and nurturing the assetisation and 
financialisation of nature, while nudging investments in the direction of 
techno-managerial ecological modernisation (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 
2018). In this aspect, South Africa, perhaps in particular because of its 
high-tech industrial sector, became an important testing ground to roll 
out CDM; albeit not producing effective greenhouse gas emission ‘sinks’, 
South Africa served to showcase the realisation of CDM and was useful 
to produce examples that could be deemed ‘successful’ regardless of whether 
they fulfilled the grand goals of the scheme. With this double goal, discursive 
window-dressing and producing concrete examples, the huge landfills 
found in and outside South Africa’s major cities were prime sites.
Landfill gas projects in South Africa were considered an easy option 
to obtain a large number of tradable carbon credits: ‘From the outset of 
CDM projects, landfill gas projects may have been viewed as the most 
viable and easiest to implement, offering a perception of quick access to 
realising emission reduction credits. An omnipresent description phrase 
to landfill gas CDM projects has been “low hanging fruit”’ (Strachan et al., 
2005).
The production of a tradable permit, however, is a complex, time-
consuming, expensive and highly bureaucratic process that involves a 
wide range of actors, institutions, companies and bureaucracies in many 
different places and operating at diverse geographical scales. These include 
local project developers, local governments, the host national authority, 
the CDM executive board, project operators, private or state funders, the 
ever-present row of ‘expert’ consultancy companies that generate their 
own profits from this process through their technical, legal and accounting 
services, and on top of that a string of spreadsheets, reports and calculations 
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is at heart an institutional arrangement that produces a tradable ‘permit 
to pollute’. The average cost of a project to go through an uncertain valida-
tion process is on average between US$20,000 and US$35,000 (Ernstson 
and Swyngedouw, 2018; Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005) and generates all 
manner of profits for participating private actors, consultants and beyond. 
The price of CERs has to be sufficiently high to merit the risk of initiating 
a validation process.
The production of CERs as potential new assets resides precisely in 
their ability to generate capital that would co-produce investment in 
a process deemed to both save on carbon emissions and support the 
profitability of the overall investment (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 2018). 
CERs are therefore a linchpin for legitimising the financial viability of 
waste-to-value projects. This markedly undermines local and national 
governmental policies to increase the number of jobs that are hoped to 
be gained from formalising the waste value chain. CDM works to cut job 
creation from the supposed economic values that lie in waste. From the 
viewpoint of a CDM-initiated gas-to-energy project, the economic value 
of large landfills lies in the biochemical process of methane production 
that unfolds in the deeper layers of anaerobic waste metabolism, which 
starts some 2 to 3 metres below the surface. Digging down vertical and 
horizontal pipes leads the methane gas produced in these deeper layers 
out of the landfill to be flared, producing heat and water – but also CO2. 
The heat can, in turn, power a turbine to produce energy and electricity 
that could be sold to further enhance the financial viability of the project. 
As methane is officially accounted as twenty-three times more potent as 
a greenhouse gas than CO2, the flaring of methane thus saves on total 
carbon emissions (while still producing it). However, what makes this 
value capture possible, as argued by Gidwani (2013), lies in enclosing 
and privatising the commons of waste. CDM thus translates the waste 
commons into the material base that permits the institutional-regulatory 
construction of CERs as a private asset.
We examined ten South African waste-flaring or waste-to-energy projects 
that were submitted to the UN authority on CDM, the UNFCCC (Ernstson 
and Swyngedouw, 2018). Of a total of 358 CDM projects submitted to 
the South African Designated National Authority as of 21 April 2017, 
only eighty-six had passed the first pole and been registered by the CDM 
Executive Board in Geneva (SADNA, 2017). Only twelve of the eighty-six 
had received CERs after verification and validation. Of the ten waste-to-gas 





















































108 African cities and collaborative futures
two had chosen to, and successfully generated electricity. Five projects 
went through a CER validation process during their first official crediting 
period and obtained a specified and verified amount of CERs (Bhailall, 
2015). Of these, only three projects renewed their application for the 
second crediting period. All registered projects that issued CERs (except 
one) had been able to sell most of their CERs, but not always at the 
anticipated price. There was also notable discrepancy between the ex ante 
predicted emission savings and the actual amounts eventually certified 
(Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 2018).
CDM: financially legitimising waste-to-value projects
The CDM insisted on the additionality principle in order to approve a 
project. This conditionality, combined with assuring the economic viability 
of the project, nurtured a general tendency among South African projects 
to inflate the anticipated greenhouse emission avoidance in the project 
formulation stage. While waste-to-electricity projects based their profit-
ability calculation on the combination of the sale of electricity (whose 
price and corporate structure is highly monopolised and regulated in the 
South African context), the economic feasibility of methane flaring 
depended crucially on the income generated through the offsetting market.
In sum, and confirmed in our interviews (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 
2018), in all cases the promise of generated tradable CERs, with an 
anticipated price level commensurate with the market conditions and 
expected trends at the time of preparation of the project, was crucial to 
get the project off the ground. This is also confirmed in other studies:
As such, the sale of the CERs is often considered to be a critical part of the 
project design. Without the sale of the CERs the projects are often not 
economically viable for project developers. ‘You know it is not at all uncom-
mon for a project to become viable and unviable several times while you’re 
going through the development stages just because of the carbon price 
changing.’ (South African CDM project developer, quoted in Varughese, 
2012: 27–8)
All interviewees (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 2018) confirmed that the 
initial project financing plans included a significant input from climate 
finance as the financial planning rested fundamentally on two income 
streams: the sale of electricity to the state electricity company (accounting 
for around 70 per cent of anticipated revenue) and carbon finance. It is 
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for the project’s implementation, while the environmental benefits, in 
particular the ‘avoidance of emitting’ greenhouse gases, sustained the 
political rationale for supporting the project as part of a supposedly 
emergent ‘green economy’.
The promise, therefore, of significant transfers of ecological rents from 
the global north to the global south, articulated within an overall discursive 
framework of climate mitigation policies that conform to market rule, was 
a recurrent theme at the project preparation stage. The hugely inflated 
ex ante calculations of anticipated CERs permitted the production of a 
rosy financial calculation of the project’s economic viability, and therefore 
assisted greatly in the efforts to privatise, commodify and enclose the 
commons of waste. Of course, the financial architecture of the project 
would also assure that the local project would become embedded in 
global or transnational flows of capital, which, as noted above, had little 
concern for generating jobs. Of the five projects that had CERs issued, they 
initially all entered into Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements with 
international financiers of a variety of kinds (Ernstson and Swyngedouw, 
2018). Tracing these from landfill to purchaser reveals a network from 
anaerobic methane production, institutional-legal processes of enclosing 
methane as a privatisable commodity, socio-technical transformations of 
methane into H2O, CO2 and, in two cases, electricity, on to national and 
international climate institutions and investors elsewhere who agreed to 
purchase the CERs.
While the architecture of the CDM was built around the transfer of 
capital from the global north to the global south, thereby further nurturing 
the transnational flows of capital in the financing of local development 
projects as a means to contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals, 
the case of CDM in South Africa speaks to the nexus of capital, technology, 
policy, consultancy and poverty, including the scalar implications of 
international carbon finance. This elucidates the impacts of the interna-
tionalisation of waste finance, the commodification of carbon and whether 
the redistribution of climate finance to waste projects primarily enables 
established elites to benefit from the reframing of waste as a resource. 
The enclosure of the landfill sites to permit gas extraction and flaring is 
confronted with significant social protest and contestation as different 
social groups hold different claims to waste. From the more established 
literature on ‘informal’ waste-pickers, in particular in South Africa (Samson, 
2015 and 2019), we know how more formally established (as through 





















































110 African cities and collaborative futures
(as in landfills) open up a space of contestation. Waste-pickers, who eke 
out a precarious albeit crucial livelihood, are negatively affected by enclosing 
the commons of waste, as they build their livelihoods on sorting through 
and selectively appropriating discarded items for their own use, for resale 
and/or entry into a recycling process. Their practice of value generation 
from waste is blocked by the process of enclosing waste, often manifested 
in gates, fences and security guards that physically shut off the landfill 
and turn it into a gated space with triaged access. The promised economic 
return of such projects in terms of economic growth and employment 
generation overlooks the value creation and actually existing employment 
already invested in the landfill.
When drawing on our South African study of CDM projects, it seems 
clear that at the national level the CDM architecture, because of its 
international and financialised structure, risks disconnecting from local 
and national governmental policies that aim to generate jobs in relation 
to a reconfigured waste value chain. And in spite of the quite meagre 
results of selling CERs and ‘avoiding’ greenhouse gas emissions through 
them, these projects have still served the purpose of advancing a techno-
managerial and ecological modernisation architecture (Ernstson and 
Swyngedouw, 2018). However, since CDM also leads to direct labour 
displacement when landfill sites and waste streams are enclosed for private 
gains, there has been significant social unrest and mobilisation that 
demonstrate more clearly just how contentious the production of CERs 
is (Bond, 2007; Ground Work South Africa, 2013).
Community waste management
In recent years, waste has been increasingly recognised as a multi-sectoral 
issue which can be responded to by diverse actors, including government, 
business, civil society and individual citizens within a regime of participa-
tory environmental governance (Davies, 2008). Governance often strives 
to translate that which is politically contestable into the managerial and 
apolitical (Ernstson and Sörlin, 2013; Swyngedouw, 2009). This has been 
true for waste in many African cities, evident in Myers’ (2005) analysis 
of the Sustainable Cities Programme in Africa. In South Africa, following 
the Waste Act (Republic of South Africa, 2008), cities have made coor-
dinated efforts to reduce waste through ongoing educational and awareness 
campaigns and community-focused waste and recycling initiatives which 
seek to establish partnerships for improved waste governance (Stokes, 
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‘formal’ waste management with livelihoods have resulted in a proliferation 
of monthly clean-ups, media campaigns, work opportunity initiatives and 
community procurement schemes. In a context where risks of automation 
and surplus labour forces are met with challenges of municipal capacity 
(Palmer et al., 2017), community waste management efforts are an 
important tool within the commodification of waste and the devolution 
of state service provision, particularly in marginalised communities.
Although national clean-up days and recycling weeks long occurred in 
South Africa, municipalities in recent years have begun to organise monthly 
clean-up days where political officials come out and join residents to clean 
up their local areas (Stokes, 2020). At the launch of Johannesburg’s ‘A Re 
Sebetseng’ campaign in August 2017, Mayor Herman Mashaba joined 
local waste workers, community members and even Miss Earth South 
Africa to clean up the inner-city neighbourhood of Yeoville. Translating 
as ‘Let’s Work’, A Re Sebetseng invokes environmental hazards, civic 
duty and community pride in the bid to get residents to do their part, 
suggesting the city will become cleaner as a result (City of Johannesburg, 
2018). Through mixed media announcements and by offering bags and 
gloves to participating communities, the campaign attempts to encour-
age public participation in community clean-ups on the third Saturday 
of each month. A similar campaign has been run in the neighbouring 
metro of Ekurhuleni, under the banner ‘Clean Neighbourhood Fridays’. 
These clean-ups have inspired similar initiatives in Rwanda and Nigeria 
(Umuganda and Environmental Sanitation Day, respectively), where 
public cleaning was deemed mandatory for able-bodied adult residents on 
set days.
State efforts are not limited to nurturing voluntary work. Indeed, other 
community labour arrangements are being incorporated into waste 
management service provision. In particular, state programmes target 
waste for job creation through public employment schemes run by all 
spheres of government. These schemes have a dual purpose of providing 
social protection for working-age adults while contributing towards 
necessary public works and services (Stokes, 2020). National public schemes 
like the Expanded Public Works Programme and Community Works 
Programme fund temporary and part-time work opportunities for 
unemployed or underemployed community members, with an increasing 
emphasis on youth, given their disproportionately high unemployment 
rates: 38.8 per cent of 16–34-year-olds in the second quarter of 2018 





















































112 African cities and collaborative futures
South Africa, 2018). Municipalities are not supposed to use public works 
schemes to replace existing work. However, tracking this can be difficult 
– if a service is insufficiently provided, permanent jobs might not be 
displaced, but they also might not be created.
In recent efforts to transform waste management services, the mayor 
of Ekurhuleni launched another programme, Clean City/Keep Ekurhuleni 
Clean, which was promoted as a mass employment opportunity through 
the formation of community cleaning brigades. While ambitious, it also 
encountered significant challenges in operations at the start, leading to 
the contracting of an external service provider to oversee the programme 
in the early stages of the pilot. In its second iteration, the programme has 
been significantly delayed, purportedly due to internal political difficulties 
and the inability to pay service providers. Despite officially launching and 
recruiting participants in October 2017, the programme had difficulties 
getting off the ground, with talk of the project being delayed indefinitely 
or abandoned altogether (as of end of fieldwork in May 2018; Stokes, 
2020).
Alongside local works schemes, waste management services have also 
been outsourced to community-based small, medium and macro enterprises 
(SMMEs) and cooperatives, particularly in low-income areas (Stokes, 
2020). In 2014, the mayor of Johannesburg launched Jozi@Work, a landmark 
procurement scheme which offered service contracts for community-based 
SMMEs and cooperatives. Municipal departments were required to use 
20 per cent of their budget for the initiative. However, the programme 
abruptly stopped following the 2016 municipal elections, amidst claims 
of clientelism surrounding procurement and capacity agents. Despite this, 
the programme’s legacy is still in question. The current Democratic 
Alliance-led municipal government promised that an equivalent community 
uplift programme would replace Jozi@Work in due course. Yet regular 
protests by ex-Jozi@Work participants resulted in the mayor announcing 
the insourcing of approximately one-third of eligible Jozi@Work employees. 
This shift-change means insourced workers will be formally recognised 
as municipal employees, raising their wages from approximately 2,200 
rand to 6,000 rand per month (Dludla, 2018).
In Cape Town, the municipal campaign WasteWise ran from 2001 
until 2014, promoting community-led initiatives through partnerships 
with local government, schools/communities and businesses to establish 
partnerships (for an evaluation of WasteWise, see Armien-Ally, 2013; 
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to littering and dumping, a broader environmental imperative led to 
recycling, cleaning, composting, crafts and gardening projects. The framing 
used in this programme suggests that win-win solutions can be obtained 
through empowerment, cooperation, education, recycling, training com-
munity facilitators and developing tripartite business models. While 
community participants recognise the potential of such initiatives, they 
equally challenge the power relations and outcomes of such partnerships, 
questioning how expectations of community empowerment and cooperative 
governance in waste relate to wider socio-political concerns such as crime, 
poverty, service delivery and a neighbourhood sense of place.
As decentralised infrastructures and devolved governance are promoted 
across global policy imperatives and institutions like the New Urban 
Agenda and World Bank, institutional consensus appears to suggest 
that localising services, political participation and material concerns are 
the most effective means of addressing residents’ needs and improving 
livelihoods. While not necessarily incorrect, critiques of this perspective 
caution against embedded inequalities that can be exacerbated through 
devolving finance, political capacity and representation. Such instances 
are highlighted by literature considering splintering urbanism and incre-
mental infrastructures, where agency and empowerment is present, yet 
reinforce, depoliticise or exacerbate existing inequalities (Graham and 
Marvin, 2001; Kooy and Bakker, 2008; Silver, 2014). However, in most 
community-focused waste initiatives, labour is framed as an opportunity 
to find more secure work in the future, one’s responsibility, or simply a 
civic duty for collective social reproduction (Stokes, 2020). Depoliticised 
and devalued, community waste efforts do provide immediate economic 
benefits to some participants in the form of stipends or payment for 
materials recovered. For many participants, getting to work and contribute 
towards a state service is a point of pride and dignity. And with increasing 
numbers of people participating in such programmes, we cannot help but 
wonder if this is the basis for a civic workforce who can make greater 
claims on the basis that they contribute towards the functioning of state 
services.
Conclusion
In line with broader development goals, waste is increasingly being seen 
as a resource for state actors, community groups and urban citizens 





















































114 African cities and collaborative futures
generate jobs, to harness international development financing and to create 
more sustainable communities.
This chapter considered how waste is narrated as a resource at the state 
level in South Africa and the material politics of waste at the community, 
urban and global scale. We analysed the contemporary waste economy 
in South Africa in light of broader processes that mark (waste) governance 
in the global south, in particular the technologisation, formalisation and 
financialisation of waste materials.
These three ‘lenses’ are clearly intertwined. The labour–technology nexus 
proves to be intractable as the (capital-intensive) lure of fully automated 
and ‘green’ technology meets the extreme low cost of labour. The trade-off 
between labour-substituting technology and the mass availability of cheap 
labour produces a conundrum that slows down both more technologically 
efficient waste technologies and the provision of stable and well-paid jobs. 
Furthermore, as we demonstrated, the move towards ‘green’ technologisa-
tion is further nurtured by the climate change agenda. While legitimised 
on its green credentials, the way in which the CDM articulated with 
new waste management practices and technologies did indeed nurture 
a socio-technical shift, but one that intensified conflicts over waste while 
hardly – if at all – contributing to mitigating climate change.
Given the extraordinary number of people securing a livelihood from 
working in and with waste, there is increasing emphasis on community-
focused waste initiatives. While offering the possibility of securing work, 
they often lead to a shift in responsibility from the state to civil society, 
and re-enforce a process of de-politicisation.
Taken together, the socio-ecological metabolic flow of urban waste 
demonstrates the contradictory and conflicting mechanisms that infuse 
processes of transforming urban waste circulation in the direction of a 
more ecological sensible and socially equitable manner. In sum, in this 
chapter we asked about who benefits from the reframing of waste as a 
resource and in what ways.
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Introduction: from voices to energy transformations
The gangsters can rob us because there is no electricity and no one can see 
them coming. (SEA, 2016)
There is not sufficient light for our children to study at night – candles are 
not bright enough. (SEA, 2016)
These statements were made by people living in shacks in informal settle-
ments in Cape Town, South Africa. These settlements are not serviced by 
the city authorities, with limited, unaffordable or in some cases no access 
to electricity or running water in each shack. A few shared toilets were 
provided, located a short distance away. Although the city authorities were 
seeking to rehouse some of these communities, the ever-present insecurity 
of potential relocation to new formal accommodation on the outskirts 
of the city, far from economic opportunities and serviced infrastructure 
(SEA, 2010), created a very precarious day-to-day existence.
Amid this context of marked and enduring socio-spatial and 
environmental-economic inequalities (explored more fully in the next 
section), there have been calls for a national transition away from carbon-
intensive and inefficient energy practices. This call is due, in part, to the 
broader global policy-making context of concern about the impact of 
climate change, as well as worldwide development trends, such as those 
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Urban Agenda (Caprotti et al., 2017) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. In part, there have been calls to reconfigure the national 
energy landscape in South Africa, including energy supply, energy mix 
and the legal and jurisdictional framework through which energy currently 
flows. This context leads us to argue that the move towards a new energy 
landscape cannot simply be described as a transition, but more accurately 
– in light of the need to involve multiple scales and actors, and to manage 
complex development outcomes – as a societal transformation.
However, while a low-carbon and energy-efficient transformation is 
crucial for the country, and many policies and strategies support a climate-
friendly future, it is particularly important in the South African context 
to consider how such a transformation can be made inclusive. Many cities 
have developed climate and energy strategies, but many municipalities 
face significant financial, technical and socio-economic challenges in terms 
of mainstreaming climate responses into their planning and operations. 
The primary mandate of local government is to provide basic services 
for their citizens and, in particular, the poor. At the same time, the notion 
of a ‘just’ energy transition has been gaining increasing prominence in 
national climate and energy discourse in South Africa (Swilling et al., 
2016), including as part of its nationally determined contribution on 
climate change (Government of South Africa, 2016). The concept of a 
‘just’ transition points towards a sustainable future that places the needs 
of the poor and their communities as paramount to the attainment of 
such a future.
In light of these emerging and challenging agendas, this chapter first 
presents a brief overview of the electricity landscape in South Africa, 
followed by a discussion of the key issue of how to define and think about 
a just, fair and equitable energy transformation. The discussion then moves 
on to consider the theme of decentralisation in South Africa’s energy 
landscape, before offering some concluding reflections, including a brief 
vision of how we might hope a just and energy-efficient city might look 
in South Africa in 2030. The chapter was co-written by scholars with 
multiple theoretical perspectives and backgrounds, and by practitioners 
at Sustainable Energy Africa (SEA), a Cape Town-based organisation 
centrally involved in promoting urban energy transformations that are 
both low carbon and equitable.
The quotes above encapsulate the experience of urbanisation in South 
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in 2017, according to the World Bank (2018). This proportion is growing, 
as poor people move from rural areas to cities in search of employment 
and better opportunities. At least 10 per cent of South Africa’s population 
(4.7 million people) reside in urban informal settlements, comprising 
more than 1.3 million households (Misselhorn, 2010). South Africa’s nine 
largest cities alone are estimated to be home to 23 per cent of households 
deemed to be without adequate shelter. Nearly 50 per cent of South 
Africa’s population are considered energy poor, on the basis that the 
poor spend more than 10 per cent of their household income on energy 
compared to 2–3 per cent for mid- to high-income households (DoE, 
2012). Moreover, the poor spend a disproportionately high share of their 
income on transport relative to mid- and high-income households. Thus, 
inequality and poverty have become entrenched in South Africa, despite 
redistributive policies that include free basic electricity and a system of social 
grants.
At the end of apartheid in 1994 only 36 per cent of the population 
had access to electricity. While the newly elected democratic govern-
ment in South Africa implemented a national housing and electrification 
programme, as a result of which the domestic household connection rate 
has risen to 88 per cent (DoE, 2014), the national commitment to provide 
universal and affordable access to electricity has not yet been achieved. 
Approximately 3 million houses have been built and delivered to the 
poor since 1994. In an attempt to address the massive housing backlog 
(a legacy of the previous oppressive apartheid regime), the decision of 
the new government was to build as many houses as swiftly as possible 
in a cost-effective manner. As a consequence, while many houses were 
built, they lacked important thermal insulation: many even lacked ceilings 
(Naicker et al., 2017; SEA, 2017). These homes were predominantly located 
in the urban periphery, where land was cheap. In turn, this house-building 
programme resulted in resource-inefficient cities, with the poor being 
located on the margins of cities far from economic opportunities and 
social resources (Reddy and Wolpe, 2014). This population continues 
to be burdened with high transport costs to access economic and social 
opportunities, which further deepens the poverty cycle. This situation has 
served to perpetuate the spatial inequality of apartheid, characterised by 
the sprawl of low-density ‘white’ suburbs in contrast to the concentrations 
of high-density ‘black’ areas (Wolpe et al., 2012). It is in this context 
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sticking points that a sustainable energy transformation is seen as a 
necessity.
Energy transformations and South African cities
Realising low-carbon urban energy transformations is dependent upon 
a range of factors and preconditions beyond the availability and imple-
mentation of new technology and innovations. The generation and supply 
of energy is essential to continued economic growth, while the associated 
emissions lie at the core of debates about climate change. The associated 
aspiration for the transformation to be inclusive and ‘just’ within society 
adds another layer of complexity and tension to the process. In South 
Africa, the historical legacy of apartheid, political governance structures 
and capacity, the form and structure of urban areas, rural-to-urban in-
migration and societal attitudes have a fundamental influence on the path 
that a low-carbon energy transformation might take.
Historically, South Africa’s industrial policy has been dominated by 
the availability of cheap electricity, which was generated using the country’s 
cheap and plentiful coal reserves to power the expansion of the mining 
and minerals-beneficiation industry. As a result, the country’s ‘minerals-
energy complex’ became dominant in protecting the requirement for, and 
monopoly of, cheap power coupled with cheap labour (Fine and Rustomjee, 
1997). These interests became institutionalised by the state with the 1922 
establishment of the state-owned electricity utility Escom (now Eskom). 
Eskom is ‘the fulcrum on which the input of coal and outputs of cheap 
electricity turned’, with large mining houses providing coal at one end 
and receiving electricity for the extraction and refining of commodities 
at the other (Baker et al., 2015).
Despite attempts to reform Eskom in line with global trends in electricity 
liberalisation in the 1990s and 2000s, Eskom continues to own the cen-
tralised transmission grid and holds majority control over the country’s 
generation capacity, overseeing approximately 60 per cent of electricity 
distribution, with municipalities responsible for the rest. In 2005, as part 
of the continued focus on cheap coal-fired electricity for industry, Eskom’s 
capacity expansion programme included two coal-fired power stations, 
Medupi and Kusile, which at 4,800 MW each will be the largest on the 
continent. Renewable energy had a minimal role in this programme, 
consisting only of the 1,352 MW Ingula pumped storage programme and 
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Following important legislative changes to allow for the procurement 
of privately generated power, the Renewable Energy Independent Producer 
Procurement Programme was introduced in 2011. By the end of 2018, 
6,422 MW had been procured from ninety-two utility-scale independent 
power producers (IPPs) and 99 MW from twenty small-scale IPPs (1–5 
MW) under five bidding rounds. However, the programme’s initial success 
in its early years was undermined by severe delays between 2015 and 
2018, in large part due to strong political and ideological resistance by 
Eskom. Notably, Eskom refused to sign outstanding power purchase 
agreements (PPAs) from Round 4, arguing that it would make a loss from 
having to purchase energy from IPPs. It wasn’t until April 2018, following 
the inauguration of President Cyril Ramaphosa, that the outstanding PPAs 
were signed. It is apparent that the institutional strength and accompanying 
inertia signified by Eskom represents a considerable barrier to the emer-
gence of a low-carbon energy transformation in South Africa. By 2019, 
the failure to control mounting debts at Eskom raised the prospect of 
imminent restructuring and a redistribution of responsibilities among 
the national institutions that govern energy. How this process is directed 
and controlled will be highly significant in opening up or closing down 
pathways of energy transformation.
A further constraint on the emergence of a low-carbon energy trans-
formation in South Africa is the way in which electricity is distributed. 
Municipalities are responsible for just over 40 per cent of electricity distribu-
tion in South Africa and supply about two-thirds of the country’s customers, 
buying electricity in bulk from Eskom at wholesale prices, which they 
then mark up and sell on to the end user. Municipal distributors are 
dominated by the country’s eight large metropolitan distributors, who 
reap significant profits from their on-selling of electricity, which they use 
to cross-subsidise electricity for the poor and municipal rates for services 
such as waste collection and roads (Baker et al., 2015).
This arrangement originated from the end of apartheid in 1994, when 
municipalities were given a role as ‘developmental local government’. The 
vision of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), was to 
rebuild the country’s economy while bridging the gap between the rich 
and poor (Mohlakoana, 2014). Electricity was central to this vision because 
it was perceived as a convenient, modern networked infrastructure with 
the potential to create business opportunities as well as reduce the negative 
health effects of indoor air pollution from traditional energy sources. 
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so was considered to be best placed to implement subsidised rights-based 
service access. After some political ‘horse-trading’ in establishing the 
post-apartheid state, municipalities secured an electricity distribution 
function (Palmer et al., 2017: 30–3). According to the National Treasury 
(2016, cited in Palmer et al., 2017: 200), surpluses on electricity distribution 
are typically about 5–10 per cent of the budgets of the large metropolitan 
distributors. At the end of 2018, municipalities were not yet permitted 
to procure their own electricity, with the exception of generation for own 
consumption in their own buildings or on their estate.
To achieve universal access to modern energy services in South Africa, 
two key pro-poor measures were introduced. First, the state’s Free Basic 
Electricity Tariff of 50 KWh per month was introduced in 2003. The 
scheme is partly funded by the Local Government Equitable Share Grant 
from the National Treasury and, in the case of shortfalls, partly by surpluses 
generated by the municipalities’ sale of electricity (including for Eskom 
service areas within urban centres, who refuse to provide these pro-poor 
subsidies). Second, the distribution of electricity to low-income households 
by municipalities is also subsidised through an ‘Inclining Block Tariff 
System’, whereby charges increase with consumption. This system means 
that users with higher consumption rates are charged at a higher rate and 
in turn facilitate cross-subsidisation for low-income consumers who are 
charged at the lower rates. The higher charges for high consumption are 
also intended to promote energy conservation. Although the adequacy 
of these schemes is heavily criticised, they are only made possible by 
cross-subsidisation from the resale of Eskom electricity generation.
Therefore, any challenge to this funding model, such as reduced con-
sumption because of higher electricity prices, energy efficiency initiatives 
or distributed renewable energy generation by private residential customers 
(small-scale embedded generation), increases the financial vulnerability 
of municipalities and their ability to deliver pro-poor programmes. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the promotion of some policies to reduce energy 
demand threaten the potential of municipalities to fund redistributive 
policies and remain as viable concerns. This situation places municipalities 
in an awkward role as drivers of low-carbon energy transformations, 
irrespective of their variable capacity to delivery low-carbon initiatives 
(Baker and Phillips, 2019). Thus, reform at the municipal level, as well as 
the enablement of spaces of innovation and practice around sustainability 
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Another important barrier to the implementation of a low-carbon 
energy transformation is the structure of most South African cities. As 
mentioned above, the spatial structure of cities was inherited from the 
apartheid era. Many South Africans were displaced during apartheid based 
on the racial composition defined for every residential area by the Group 
Areas Act of 1950 (Field, 2001). This legislation resulted in racially seg-
regated neighbourhoods, designated as ‘White, Black, Indian and Coloured’ 
(Crankshaw et al., 2000; Lemanski, 2009; Turok, 2014). Apart from the 
White areas, neighbourhoods were usually located at the urban periphery 
in so-called ‘townships’ or, for rural areas, ‘homelands’. These settlements 
were characterised by little or no service provision by municipalities, 
were generally outside areas with economic opportunities and were poorly 
connected by public transport (Knox et al., 2017). While electrification 
has extended access to modern energy services, some areas remain uncon-
nected or inhabitants do not have the ability to pay for the electricity 
supplied. In these cases, illegal connections and/or the continued use of 
traditional fuels thwart universal energy access, let alone a managed 
low-carbon energy transformation.
The expansion of informal settlements at the edge of most South African 
cities represents an additional significant challenge. In Cape Town, over 
39 per cent of the population growth between 2001 and 2011 comprised 
new arrivals from outside the Western Cape (City of Cape Town, 2014). 
The provision of public services for such migrants on private land is 
problematic because of property ownership and because the land has 
usually not been zoned for such uses in terms of the city’s spatial planning 
framework. The unpredictability of in-migration flows and locations for 
informal settlements makes forward planning almost impossible. Neverthe-
less, informal settlements have become a permanent feature of South 
African cities, which points to the need to integrate energy planning with 
spatial planning to achieve any low-carbon energy transformation.
Distributed generation is, theoretically at least, well suited to the 
sprawling and informal nature of much of South Africa’s urbanisation. 
Renewable energy technologies have the potential to generate electrical 
power for households which are often located in informal settlements or 
rural areas. Indeed, international donor-funded schemes for the generation 
of renewable energy in informal areas have had some (small-scale) impact. 
There are, nevertheless, considerable limitations to the decentralised use 
of renewables on a larger scale. Buildings in informal settlements, often 
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not capable of bearing the weight of a solar panel of sufficient size to 
generate a worthwhile amount of electricity. Solar home systems, for 
example, consist of a compact solar panel which can be installed on the 
roof, but small systems are only sufficient to power a light, television and 
heater for a few hours per day. Larger panels can also be mounted on 
poles, but these are subject to the risks of theft and wind damage. However, 
the infrastructural development required for energy access to ‘temporary’ 
informal settlements on undeclared land is not legally permitted, because 
ultimately informal settlements can be cleared by the municipality.
The transformation of urban form is being attempted in some South 
African cities to facilitate a low-carbon transformation through applying 
the principles of the compact city, densification and transit-oriented 
development. The reconstruction and remodelling of townships and 
informal settlements creates opportunities for energy efficiency. In Cape 
Town, the city’s 2012 Spatial Development Framework and its 2013 
Integrated Transport Plan have provided a coordinated approach to 
densification along the main transport corridors. For example, the densifica-
tion of the Voortrekker Road Corridor – from a residential density of 
fifteen to twenty dwelling units per hectare at present to seventy-five 
dwelling units per hectare by 2034 – might achieve a 50 per cent reduction 
in energy and carbon emissions compared with the continued sprawling 
scenario (SEA, 2014). However, high-density housing options are not 
desirable within South African society as they are typically associated 
with public housing and the hostels provided for black South Africans 
during apartheid. Freestanding houses with their ‘own’ plot represent 
both a traditional and contemporary cultural living aspiration, which 
people had been denied during the apartheid era (Mbatha and Mchunu, 
2016). The ‘one house, one plot’ approach of government housing schemes 
is at odds with the development objectives of accessibility and compact 
cities (Rode et al., 2014), increases the cost of energy provision and 
infrastructure, and can contribute to energy vulnerability in these areas 
of mobility (Knox et al., 2017). At the same time, private development 
applications have been received for new satellite towns, such as WesCape 
in Cape Town, which offer a utopian, but inequitable, alternative for those 
who can afford the exclusive nature of these new urban forms (Cirolia, 
2014). These new models of urban form present a challenge to entrenched 
societal attitudes, aspirations and expectations.
While the contextual discussion above has outlined some of the key 
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inequitable ways, there have been calls to make certain that any societal 
transformation is just and equitable, and to ensure positive outcomes for 
the poor and socio-economically marginalised. The next section turns to 
examine what a ‘just’ transformation may mean in this context, and 
highlights some of the main complexities and issues involved in thinking 
about, and planning for, a ‘just’ transformation.
Conceptual considerations
In recent years, ‘just transition’ has emerged as one of the key conceptual 
framings with which to capture the relationship between energy sector 
reconfigurations and social justice. Originally a term used to discuss the 
job losses associated with the movement away from fossil fuels (McCauley 
and Heffron, 2018), there has recently been an effort to employ it as a 
wider explanatory approach to unravel the systemic mechanisms via which 
social inequalities are reproduced (or transformed) as a result of sustainable 
development objectives. A key departure point for just transition debates 
has been the burgeoning body of energy justice scholarship, with its 
multi-faceted treatment of issues of affordability, access, security and 
reliability of supply, and the integration of democratic and representative 
processes, as well as its emphasis on the recognition of vulnerable popula-
tions (Goddard and Farrelly, 2018). Some of these tenets are also contained 
in the ‘transitions management’ approach which argues that socio-technical 
change and innovation in the energy sector can be steered and governed 
by acknowledging the roles of relevant actors in system transformations, 
and by paying attention to the pathways of knowledge and learning 
implicated in these processes (Avelino and Grin, 2017; Frantzeskaki et 
al., 2012; Markard et al., 2012).
Transition management and energy justice have, however, been criticised 
for failing to incorporate the power dynamics and political processes 
associated with socio-technical shifts. Starting from the need to overcome 
these lacunae, Goddard and Farrelly (2018) have developed the just 
transitions debate in the direction of articulating the ‘political sensitivity 
of the energy justice field’ and overcoming the traditional ‘jobs v. environ-
ment’ dilemma. A case study of Queensland’s effort to move towards 
renewable systems of energy production identifies structural challenges 
such as the lack of bipartisan support in governing transitions, the absence 
of clear management approaches guided by long-term visions, as well as 
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of change. The embodiment of principles of energy justice in addressing 
these barriers, argue Goddard and Farrelly (2018), can provide ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ to efforts to bring about accelerated change in the energy 
sector, and turn adversarial actors into advocates.
McCauley and Heffron (2018) define ‘just transitions’ as a way of moving 
towards post-carbon scenarios in ways that are both fair and equitable. 
Moving the debate beyond traditional concerns around jobs and resources, 
they develop an explicit focus on inequality-inducing dynamics throughout 
the energy chain. In this line of thinking, a three-pronged approach towards 
justice (focusing on its distributional, procedural and restorative aspects) 
allows for understanding how individuals and communities are affected 
by shifts in how energy is consumed and transported, where energy 
infrastructure is cited, and the kinds of compensation mechanisms that 
can help ameliorate and restore the ‘harms’ resulting from energy-related 
shifts. In this approach, they position the just transition concept ‘beyond 
its original strategic purpose’ so as to unite ‘climate, energy and environ-
mental justice scholarships’ (McCaulay and Hefron, 2018: 5) through a 
global ethic of care.
Affecting an ‘energy transition with due attention to social justice in 
an unequal world’ (Jasanoff, 2018: 11) is a central concern in a recent 
exploration of the ethical conundrums associated with imaginations and 
enactments of energy futures. Jasanoff argues in favour of a proactive and 
reflective environmental policy to create a more robust base of knowledge 
and technologies for transformative action. This response is predicated 
upon an ‘inclusive politics’ of technological transformation, attentive to 
‘issues of local capacity, whether in the form of social institutions, technical 
know-how or more material supports’ (Jasanoff, 2018: 12). This calls for 
the development of new ‘technologies of humility’ (Jasanoff, 2018: 14) in 
science and policy, recognising the importance of communal practices 
and norms, the influence of history and culture, normative concerns to 
energy policy deliberations, and the design of new participatory strategies.
A further point highlighted by several scholars (Jaglin and Verdeil, 
2017; Rutherford and Coutard, 2014) is that infrastructural formations 
are capable of driving processes of exclusion and marginalisation, often 
as a result of liberalisation and privatisation policies. In this context, 
Bouzarovski et al. (2017: 37) highlight how ‘transitions create displacements 
that are reflected within multiple spatial scales, temporal horizons and 
thematic areas of activity’. The corollary is that any resultant vulnerabilities 
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‘energy chain’ (Chapman, 1989) as opposed to being concentrated in 
particular aspects of production or consumption. Furthermore, it becomes 
necessary to ‘re-think the conceptual assumptions that inform sustainability 
transitions frameworks, by considering the material and infrastructural 
characteristics of place and space as contingencies that deserve customised 
conceptual attention’ (Bouzarovski et al., 2017: 37). The next section tackles 
these questions by attempting to ground debates around just energy 
transitions in the specific context of the South African urban and energy 
landscapes.
Technological decentralisation in South Africa: (some) 
people’s power?
In academic and policy debates, visions of inclusive or ‘just’ energy 
transitions often invoke principles of technological and political decen-
tralisation (Bulkeley et al., 2013). If technological transformation is to 
become more attuned to local capacities – as Jasanoff (2018) suggests – then 
some form of decentralisation would seem to be necessary and desirable 
for a just energy transformation. Technological decentralisation can imply 
reorganisation of the highly centralised infrastructure by which energy 
is produced, distributed and consumed, while calls for political decentralisa-
tion typically seek to ensure a meaningful voice for citizens or local 
institutions in decision-making. For many urban policymakers and 
practitioners, the ‘trilemma’ of energy security, equity and environmental 
sustainability (Heffron et al., 2015) demands a greater role for local govern-
ments that are hampered by restrictive national policies and centralised 
infrastructures that limit the scope for responsive energy policy. In many 
ways, South Africa’s metropolitan municipalities fit the popular narrative 
of cities driving climate change action and energy innovation ‘from below’ 
(Moloney and Horne, 2015). However, where residents, businesses and 
municipalities have embraced renewable energy, questions of justice arise 
between low-carbon and equitable energy transformations that require 
explicit attention to the politics of producing and resolving the injustices 
of energy transformation (cf. Goddard and Farrelly, 2018).To explore the 
complexities of what an inclusive energy transformation looks like, it is 
instructive to consider the relationship between technological and political 
decentralisation.
In recent years, the centralised infrastructure and governance of electric-
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case of South Africa, the term ‘embedded generation’ generally refers to 
rooftop or ground-mounted solar panels that connect directly to the 
distribution grid. It may involve a shopping mall reducing its electricity 
bills by installing solar panels, or a household motivated by power outages 
to install solar power as a backup for an unreliable grid supply. The 
technologies and processes involved in decentralisation are often celebrated 
as disruptive innovations, notwithstanding prominent failures (Caprotti, 
2017; Knuth, 2018). In South Africa, this kind of technological disruption 
could indeed be cause for celebration: a bottom-up, demand-driven, 
consumer push for decentralised renewable energy that challenges the 
monopoly of Eskom, the vertically integrated electricity utility that is 
heavily invested in coal power and has proved resistant to renewable 
energy policies and procurement (Baker and Phillips, 2019). Where it is 
explicitly sanctioned by municipal governments, embedded generation 
might also provide a case of local government making in-roads against 
national government inertia.
Yet, as explored by Baker and Phillips (2019), embedded generation 
has the potential to entrench racial and socio-economic inequalities in 
South Africa. As introduced above, distributed solar power reduces the 
electricity revenue that municipalities collect from high-income consumers, 
revenues which are used to cross-subsidise energy for the poor and fund 
public services. During the transition from apartheid to democracy, South 
Africa underwent a significant process of political decentralisation, in 
which local governments were given the constitutional responsibility for 
delivering basic services such as water and electricity. However, changes 
to the financing of municipal service provision saw the reduction of revenue 
transfers from national to local government and the adoption of principles 
of full cost-recovery in the financing of basic services (Wolpe and Reddy, 
2016: 19). While the generation of electricity and the planning of energy 
policy remained highly centralised, municipalities became more reliant 
on revenues from the sale of electricity to fund their budgets. As such, 
rooftop solar panel installations by commercial and industrial consumers 
and to a lesser extent, wealthy residents, may threaten the very financial 
survival of local government.
Embedded generation provides a characteristic example of trade-
offs between low-carbon and equitable energy transformation. Since 
embedded generation threatens municipal revenue, it has provoked a 
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of electricity in South Africa’s largest cities, it requires nothing short of 
reformulating the ‘business model’ of municipal government to ensure 
that they are able to survive and thrive through a coming transforma-
tion. In the case of South Africa, the relationship between technological 
and political decentralisation raises a series of important questions for 
an inclusive energy transformation. These include how ‘the generation 
of renewable energy by and for the wealthy does not take place at the 
cost of service provision for the poor’ (Baker and Phillips, 2019: 179) 
and how public institutions should operate policy levers and manage 
incentives. It also reiterates the importance of analytical principles, such 
as the myopia of studying (energy) poverty in isolation from (energy) 
abundance.
Yet this framing of technological decentralisation provides a partial 
picture of an urban energy transformation, framed by the view from 
municipal finance. A brief example demonstrates the silences that are 
generated from this inevitably partial view. When expanding upon the 
details of a policy document during an interview in 2018, a representative 
of local government explained the democratisation of energy in terms of 
citizens co-owning assets and scaling up community involvement in energy 
generation. It is a vision of energy transformation with significant social 
and political changes, but in which democratisation is conflated with 
liberalisation and market participation:
Democratisation is linked to customer centricity. For example, a customer 
should have the liberty to generate their own electricity for their own use, 
in the way that they want, and they should have the ability to sell whatever 
they are not using to the grid. So it’s mainly about opening up the market. 
Everyone has a role to play. There is no use in keeping people imprisoned 
by legislation, and stifling innovation. So when we focus on democratisation 
we are focusing on opening up the entire market. (Interview with representative 
of local government, 2018: emphasis added)
In contrast, some activists locate the potential for democratic control 
of energy squarely at the local scale by arguing for participatory democracy 
and community management of energy infrastructure, which arguably 
promotes a similarly liberal (if not individualised) vision of an inclusive 
energy transformation and those responsible for realising it. Alongside 
analysis of who wins and who loses from technological changes such as 





















































134 African cities and collaborative futures
energy looks like (including the relationships between infrastructural and 
political decentralisation, or between state and citizen) has profound 
implications for how plural energy futures unfold, or do not.
Discussion and conclusion: identifying and moving towards 
inclusive energy transformations
We want to offer, here, concluding reflections on what an inclusive energy 
transformation might look like. Based on our discussion above, the fol-
lowing tackles this topic through three interrelated angles. First, we offer 
some thoughts on a conceptual and theoretical approach to just energy 
transformations. Following that, we offer a brief snapshot of what this 
may mean in reality for the South African city. Finally, we discuss what 
the just and energy-efficient city may actually mean in terms of the 
transformations needed in South Africa.
Theoretical perspectives
How might we approach (from a theoretical standpoint) the normative 
question of building a socially inclusive energy transformation? First, the 
literature on the subject emphasises the importance of including all relevant 
actors in decision-making processes through appropriate dynamics of 
recognition and consultation. As argued by Bouzarovski (2014), this process 
brings to the fore the kinds of populations that are recognised as worthy 
of support, and the procedures through which households and communities 
can access assistance. Of no less importance in this context is the mobilisa-
tion of planning frameworks so as to ensure that some of the broader 
injustices around energy restructuring processes can be dealt with in a 
systematic and comprehensive manner, alongside fiscal policies to support 
the low-carbon transformation. This more equitable approach can entail 
measures such as supporting neighbourhoods, cities and regions to address 
energy injustices via the development of affordable and locally sourced 
low-carbon energy, ensuring the pooling of household resources via various 
informal or formal networks so as to reduce individual energy needs, 
formulating regulatory processes and practices that can support fuel/
supplier switching and facilitate energy efficiency investment and the 
implementing of information campaigns and area-based policies (while 
building the capacity of community organisations and local authorities) 
in order to address retrofits in ‘hard-to-treat’ properties. Nonetheless, it 
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hurdles encountered (in both less affluent and affluent countries) in 
attempting to stimulate this kind of transformation.
Second, the distributional aspects of energy use are central to any to 
efforts to move towards a low-carbon future. As argued by Bouzarovski 
(2014), the broad consensus in the literature is that taxes on carbon (and 
energy) are generally regressive – as are, in principle, all fiscal instruments 
of this type targeting consumption. The fact that lower-income households 
have greater energy expenditure burdens than those with higher incomes 
means that a carbon tax is expected to have a negative impact on the 
distribution of income (despite the issue above, with energy burdens 
being lower among the poorest households). Overall, however, the dis-
tributional impacts of carbon levies are highly dependent on issues such 
as household size, location and the nature of consumption, rather than 
income (Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Gough, 2013). Depending on the method 
used, a carbon tax may be shown to have almost no regressive impacts 
at all (Tiezzi, 2005).
Third, it is important to think beyond conventional approaches of 
transitions and justice, because they may suffer from the limitations of 
transition and justice framings themselves (Bridge et al., 2013; Newell 
and Mulvaney, 2013; Velicu and Kaika, 2017). As a partial alternative, 
energy precarity thinking (Petrova, 2018a) offers novel insights into the 
political and spatial dynamics upon which vulnerabilities are predicated 
and performed. It is also evident that the nexus of justice and energy 
transitions needs to incorporate inequalities arising throughout the 
pathways involved in delivering a variety of socio-technical services to 
households (Petrova, 2018b; Walker and Cass, 2007). This perspective 
necessarily extends the field of inquiry beyond traditional north–south 
divides, and on to a wider variety of energy use and production modalities, 
as well as enlarging the area of inquiry to include themes such as geopolitics 
(Caprotti, 2015), gender (Pearl-Martinez and Stephens, 2016), intergen-
erational aspects of transition, and other important issues.
Fourth, it is key to interrogate critically the ways in which concepts 
of justice and equity are used in advocating specific transformational 
trajectories. This analysis is key in the context of South Africa, where 
societal transformation has been an enduring reality: the complex and 
shifting post-apartheid socio-political landscape is an example of trans-
formation in process. For example, Farmbry (2014: 528) points out how 
a key transformational moment was the development and application 
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constitution, with a goal of building the nation as one with opposing norms 
than its predecessor and with a set of articulated goals around how a new 
South Africa might be better than the old’. Ensuring a transformation 
towards a ‘just’ energy landscape therefore means not simply establishing 
technical and political aims and (at times vague) recourse to simplistic 
notions of justice and fairness, but engagement with the realities of how 
specific visions of justice can be reified (Farmbry, 2014) throughout civil 
society in South Africa.
2030 snapshot: a just and energy-efficient city?
Conceptualising energy transformations is a foundational requirement 
for identifying transformational pathways and for elaborating political 
and economic strategies. Nonetheless, we have found that it is also key 
to think about the grounded, material question of what the characteristics 
of such a transformation may actually look like.
Looking ahead to 2030, what would we imagine an inclusive energy 
transformation to manifest as, in the South African context? We offer 
this brief snapshot, which is not meant to be exhaustive:
●	 Everyone will have access to a reliable, affordable and safe supply of 
electricity.
●	 Everyone will have access to an energy-efficient, reliable and affordable 
public transport system.
●	 People will live in thermally efficient homes close to the job opportuni-
ties and social resources that cities have to offer.
●	 People will be actively engaged in decision-making around important 
social developments in the communities in which they live.
●	 There will be true, affordable, universal basic service coverage for all 
urban dwellers.
We recognise that these points represent one articulation of an ideal 
destination for transformational pathways. We also recognise that they 
raise more questions than can be answered here. For example, when 
considering the need for public transport, it is key to define ‘public’ 
transport in a 2030 South African city as compared to understandings 
of public transport systems in the country today. Questions about whose 
visions are included in transformational plans and pathways, and whose are 
crowded out or silenced, also need to be answered – and nowhere more so 
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Nonetheless, we list these points as markers, or broad performance aims, of 
transformational strategies. The reality may be one of underperformance, 
but without a transformational ambition, any desire for social, technical 
and political change is likely to be vague and short-lived.
Challenges to inclusive energy transformations
Before the above snapshot can be achieved, several key challenges need 
to be addressed. These are summarised below, and may be usefully thought 
of as pointing towards the establishment of a broad ‘roadmap’ that is 
essential for thinking about transformational trajectories and realms of 
possibility and practicality.
Firstly, cities, as well as the different spheres of government, will need 
to work cohesively and in unison. Multi-level governance, strong leadership, 
cooperation and innovation will need to be at the core of this endeavour. 
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa stated very clearly that the three 
spheres of government (national, provincial and local government), while 
having their own independent mandates, should work together in coopera-
tion and align their functions. This cooperation has not happened (for 
many reasons), as is clearly demonstrated when examining case studies 
within cities. There are overlaps in mandates, and regulations do not 
always make desired transformations possible.
Secondly, an inclusive energy transformation requires a radical change 
in current practices and thinking if the intended levels of transformation 
by 2030 (as imagined above) are to be reached. South Africa would need 
to consider a new picture and new ways of understanding and approaching 
development. To some extent, a change towards sustainable energy is 
happening. However, to achieve the desired scale of change, it is clear 
that this needs to be undertaken in a manner that addresses poverty, 
unemployment and inequality: the triple challenges facing South Africa. 
Many of the systems currently in place (such as procurement processes, 
regulations, vested interests and institutional support) have tended to 
resist the level of change needed. Planning and investment decisions made 
today will shape South African communities, and the economy, well into 
the next several decades.
Some municipalities have already been able to work towards transforma-
tions from the bottom up, signifying pioneering change from the local 
level, with national government taking heed and direction from the local 





















































138 African cities and collaborative futures
implemented a small electricity levy that helped to finance the installation 
of over 80,000 solar water heaters for low-income houses, thus providing 
these houses with affordable access to hot water. Some cities have embarked 
on widespread electrification of informal settlements using the maypole 
method of electrification, which has been very successful.1 The city of 
Cape Town, in considering the best way to achieve its climate objectives 
and address poverty, has developed a system that attempts to align its 
various departments. While many officials trying to tackle climate change 
as well as service delivery claim that there is need for greater political 
support and decision-making, the examples of implementation taking 
place are already leveraging influence in this arena.
In conclusion, while challenges to an inclusive energy transformation 
persist, there is clear evidence of good work happening within cities, 
and communities themselves are increasingly demanding that their voice 
be heard. Much still needs to change at different scales of governance, 
including, for example, in how mandates and regulations are interpreted 
and perceived, how finances flow to the local sphere, how investment 
can be enhanced, how decisions are made and how information is made 
available. Engaging with communities and learning by doing are key to 
successful transformations in South Africa. This collaborative approach 
will pave the way for coordinated urban development and good urban 
governance, and ultimately to an inclusive and equitable energy future. 
This is the outcome that the communities want: candle-lit dinners for a 
special occasion, safe lighting for all their energy needs and, above all, 
better-quality lives.
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Note
1 The ‘maypole’ method of connecting an informal house to electricity is amongst 
the most cost-efficient technology choices, as service connections to households 
are simple and effective. Maypoles provide enough elevation to connect up to 
twenty-seven households, as they can accommodate up to three pole boxes 
with nine connection points each, but one or two nine-way boxes are usually 
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Risky urban futures: the bridge, the 
fund and insurance in Dar es Salaam
Irmelin Joelsson
It was spring 2016. Mzunguko wa pesa umekatika, ‘money’s stopped circulat-
ing’, was an expression on everybody’s lips. It put the current hardship 
of life in Dar es Salaam into words and, reiterated in daily conversations, 
it took the form of a contemporary proverb. Cash flow was low. Maisha 
magumu, ‘life’s hard’. The austerity narrative had many expressions. Informal 
greetings would be met with a shrug and a casual tunapambana na hali 
hii, ‘we’re struggling with this situation’. After all, life went on but vyuma 
vimekaza, ‘it’s tight’.
During a meeting in Dodoma, Tanzania’s capital, the country’s president, 
John Pombe Magufuli, coined a new phrase that soon went viral, both 
in approval and ridicule: watu wanasema vyuma wimekaza – weka grisi, 
‘people say the steel is tight – use grease to lubricate it’. The meaning risks 
being lost in translation, but the message was clear. It called for patience, 
endurance and self-reliance in the face of austerity. More than half a 
century after independence, the phrase seemed to echo the moral legacy 
of baba wa taifa, the father of the nation and the mastermind behind a 
prominent strand of African socialism, Ujamaa (a Swahili word that 
translates as ‘familyhood’ or ‘extended family’): the late Julius Kambarage 
Nyerere.
While Nyerere’s idea of self-reliance, kujitegemea, was based on agrarian 
socialism (Nyerere, 1967), the concept translated well into an increasingly 
urban Tanzania. Money might be short, and formal work out of reach 
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customers in the busy Morocco intersection in Dar es Salaam, ‘If you’re 
unemployed or without money in the regions it’ll be trouble. But here …
there’s mishemishe [a phrase loosely understood as “hustle”]. You can 
survive a month on ten thousand shilling [£3.50].’ Mishemishe … there 
is always some hustling keeping you afloat.
This depicts a general argument one can make about urban life in 
Tanzania in that it entails a lot of ‘making do’ with very tight resources 
at hand and uncertainty over whether living conditions will ever change 
for the better; perhaps the only certainty is that the future will always be 
uncertain. It requires intricate skills, ujanja, a Swahili concept cleverly 
describing a sort of trickster intelligence, an ability to turn things around. 
But urban life is also formed, as my ethnography would soon reveal, by 
the negotiation of connections and of anticipation. Before long, a theme 
would surface that cut through my initial engagements and let the study 
diverge unexpectedly.
‘I’m doing it for the connections,’ Yahya, a teacher, asserted.1 ‘We don’t 
have insurance here, you see, we make connections and friendships, it’s our 
insurance.’ After graduating with a BA in public relations, Yahya had not 
secured a job in the marketing sector but instead ventured into teaching. 
By teaching Swahili to foreigners, the idea was that the proximity to foreign 
revenue, potential investors and people with extensive networks would 
draw the teachers into the same circles, generating opportunities and 
opening doors. Securing those elusive connections by forming professional 
friendships was insurance that money could not buy and that a university 
degree could not grant. It was a practice that had to be learned and then 
refined, with daily posts on social media depicting business-like situations, 
surrounded by laptops and smartphones in the exclusive environments 
his job lent access to. The imagery invokes the idea that the display of a 
successful lifestyle, albeit ‘staged’, would also attract success; proximity 
to money would attract money in turn. However, the excessive display of 
wealth in that setting, working as a sort of backdrop, did not necessarily 
reflect his everyday calibration of relationships, which on the other hand 
were discrete and kept out of the public eye. The connections were, after 
all, leverage and Yahya was careful not to put his insurance at risk.
Some time later I was walking home after watching the World Cup 
Finals at a makeshift cinema together with a young artist known as ‘Smart’. 
He was on the verge of a breakthrough in his career and had an elaborate 
set of strategies for keeping luck, bahati, on his side. ‘They are not con-
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was a practice of ‘levelling up’, of forging connections, knowing what and 
whom to hold on to and when to let go, detaching oneself when the 
connections were no longer viable or ‘out of the league’, to not put luck 
at risk. Sometimes it included occult rituals. As a prospective star there 
were many dangers along the road, and Smart had often described the 
risks of forming friendships, of having too many connections to maintain 
at the same time, as betrayal and jealousy often accompanied them. ‘Irmelin, 
I’m a.k.a “Wires” now because I’m working even when connections are 
lost. You lose the network [on the mobile phone] but I’m still connected. 
I’m connected, like wires,’ he said as we were wandering the narrow streets 
between the one-storey buildings in the uswahilini (dense, informal 
neighbourhood). Later he would sing a song describing how maisha ni 
digitali, ‘life is digital’, wanawake ni digitali, ‘women are digital’ and upendo 
ni digitali, ‘love is digital’. Dar es Salaam and its residents had levelled up 
from manual to digital, entered a new era which Smart called unruly, 
mtundu (a word often used to describe naughty children) and ever-
changing. An era that called for improved ways of how to cope with an 
increasingly unpredictable city.
In another part of town, ‘smart city’ discourse was live. Whether Dar 
es Salaam would become ‘smart’ was fervently discussed. Ironically the 
city was already known as Bongo (‘brain’). It was already a deeply embedded 
‘fact’ that you have to have brains to operate in Dar es Salaam. The smart 
city was more than just semantics. Bongo, in contrast, epitomised the 
smart city quite literally, a fact repeated in the urban vernacular describing 
the types of intelligence the residents of the city needed (such as ujanja 
and akili, trickster-ness and wit) to navigate urban life successfully. The 
smartness of the smart city was already running in the veins of Bongo’s 
citizenry, who were no longer operating at a manual level, but as Smart 
had it, were digitali.
The three protagonists – the boda boda driver, teacher and artist – came 
from different walks of life, were heading in different directions and had 
different strategies for how to work with connections (uhusiano), when 
the network (mtandao) is shaky, in order to seize opportunities (fursa) 
and carve out space (nafasi)2 for future actions. However, their stories 
shared a strong emphasis on anticipating future scenarios and the ways 
these could be controlled, which Yahya in the vignette above described 
as ‘insurance strategies’, Smart as ‘practised luck’ and the boda boda driver 
as ‘clever hustling’. The interpretation of ‘insurance’ as a means of negotiating 
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word for formal insurance, bima, which connotes private insurance schemes, 
nor with the word for social security, hifadhi ya jamii, connoting large-scale 
welfare programmes. The way in which ‘insurance’ surfaces is rather 
through a series of practices and manifestations, as a set of skills and 
assets that often, but not always, include networking, speculation, building 
(and burning) bridges, hedging and hinging, plotting and scheming, 
making investments and sometimes withdrawing from those investments. 
As such, ‘insurance’ is a form of infrastructure that draws social and 
material life together in order to hedge against risk in times of 
uncertainty.
But for me it begins with a material connection, in the form of a bridge.
The bridge, the fund and insurance
Drawing upon eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork between 2016 
and 2018, this chapter gives an ethnographic account of how we might 
make sense of urban futures in cities like Dar es Salaam. The fieldwork 
on which the chapter is based was mainly conducted in close proximity 
to two ‘field sites’ – the Nyerere Bridge (popularly known as the Kigamboni 
Bridge) and one of East Africa’s largest parastatal pension funds,3 a key 
institution for Tanzania’s nascent welfare state, having financed the bridge 
together with the Tanzanian Ministry of Works in a 60/40 per cent split. 
The chapter begins by setting out on a short journey some 680 metres 
across the Kurasini Creek, the tidal creek stretching through central Dar 
es Salaam, dividing the dense downtown neighbourhoods from the lofty 
Kigamboni district in the south. As we venture over the Nyerere Bridge 
we are, however, embarking on a much longer journey. From the journey 
a story of various insurance practices unfolds, based on participant 
observation, mapping and archival work, extended interviews and conversa-
tions with operators, civil servants, managers, politicians, worker, engineers 
and residents, all implicated in ‘city-making’.
In this chapter I illustrate how the infrastructural investment in the 
bridge cannot be understood on its own – it is not freestanding. The 
bridge’s connections reconfigure the cartography of the city, but its arrival 
was also meant to generate through tolled crossings an infinite supply of 
funds into the emerging ‘modern’ urban welfare system. This system in 
turn was tied to the ways in which citizens of Dar es Salaam might create 
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associated social insurance schemes that were meant to flow from the 
bridge as cars flowed across it. The agency of the infrastructure, however, 
interferes with other city systems, rewrites its legacy and reconfigures the 
DNA of Dar es Salaam.
The inception of the Nyerere Bridge – named after Julius Nyerere – on 
19 April 2016 came with bold promises that Tanzania was to move from 
the fringes of the global economy to a more prominent place, as claimed 
by the president in the opening speech. The bridge was, after all, funded 
independently of foreign aid, in a south–south as well as south–east 
partnership, involving the same Chinese engineering company that in 
the 1970s built the famous TAZARA railway (connecting Tanzania with 
Zambia) and a consultant engineering firm from Egypt. More than eight 
decades earlier, plans for a bridge had been included in the 1933 colonial 
administration’s maps of Dar es Salaam, and every consecutive master 
plan thereafter had depicted a bridge crossing the Kurasini Creek. For 
three-quarters of a century colonial experts and Dar es Salaam’s urban 
planners alike saw the bridge as central to the symbolic future of the city 
and infrastructural drivers of urban economic development. The bridge 
plan had traversed colonial, postcolonial, socialist, liberalising and 
developmentalist governments, finally to arrive in a globalised Tanzania 
in the twenty-first century. It was implicated in an extensive political 
planning strategy, given that the city could now access by road a part of 
town that was relatively little developed, where once the utopian ‘Kigamboni 
New City’ (Lindell et al., 2016; Møldrup Wolff, forthcoming) plans were 
rolled out, and where the largest oil terminal in the country sat. The 
bridge is, in the long run, supposed to connect to a large-scale roads 
initiative that would take much of the cargo from the harbour over the 
bridge (instead of through the city) and flow from the city to the regions 
and the neighbouring land-locked East African countries, while efficiently 
collecting tolls on every crossing. The state pension fund had a number 
of housing investments in the southern district, a district that had become 
a popular place for the wealthy to invest in large tracts of land, and the 
city had plans for industrialising its fringes. With the bridge, connections 
were now secured between people, places and plans.
In principle the tolls on the bridge would allow the infrastructure to 
pay for itself in the long term and also then to be added to the parastatal 
pension funds. However, the money – the pension savings invested by 





















































148 African cities and collaborative futures
against market volatility – seemed highly restricted. Previous invest-
ments by the fund had not paid out as planned, and a majority of the 
individual members’ instalments were being withdrawn prematurely, prior 
to reaching retirement age, which put a strain on cash flow. As a result, 
the pension fund was rumoured to be struggling to maintain its long-term 
liquidity. To tackle the risk of insufficient funds, new disclaimers were 
introduced or discussed, making it harder to make untimely withdraw-
als. The pension fund had traditionally been used as a sort of bank by 
people on the ground, a pay-as-you-go scheme where the members had 
the right to withdraw at any point, take their savings and pursue their 
plans elsewhere. Now, however, this practice has become increasingly 
difficult, to the great distress of the insurance collective – the members 
themselves.
Nyerere Bridge was just about to open officially when I arrived in Dar 
es Salaam, yet I was met with disbelief – ‘I don’t believe it before I see 
it’ – when asking about its status, as if the busy news reporting, and the 
fact that you actually could see the structure almost complete if you went 
down to Kurasini, was nothing but ‘fake news’. But the bridge was there, 
ironically epitomising the obscene inequalities of urban life: a behemoth 
with a six-lane highway leading to a narrow dirt road that was forced to 
close during the rainy season when it turned into a stretch of mud. Yet if 
the bridge’s appearance was meant to be a symbol of growth and stability, 
it also assumed an agency of its own, acting on the DNA of the metropolis: 
soon it was featuring as a backdrop in music videos, wedding photos, 
WhatsApp profile pictures, even as the logo for the city’s new Kigamboni 
district. Besides the everyday practices and plans it facilitated – its primary 
function as a bridge, connecting people and places – it impacted on 
things in and beyond the city, generating future-oriented responses at 
another level. This could, perhaps, be understood in parallel to the pension 
fund itself: smooth in appearance but not yet in operations and reach. 
The bridge is highly aspirational and globally generic in its aesthetic, a 
symbol of what could be achieved but was not yet accessible to the larger 
public, with many who struggled to pay the vehicle toll or regarded the 
bridge’s location as inaccessible choosing alternative crossings instead. 
As Larkin notes, the significance of infrastructure projects sometimes is 
more about gaining access to certain clientele or government networks 
than it is about their technical function, and ‘this is why roads disappear, 
factories are built but never operated, and bridges go to nowhere’ (Larkin, 
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exactly sure where, I began to enquire into its workings, and my study set 
course.
Tanzania hosts some of Africa’s oldest and most extensive social 
insurance schemes, which together with a growing private sector as 
well as community-based savings and insurance schemes make up an 
important, yet overlooked, arena for inquiry. Although the insurance 
sector is certainly not new, the scope and scale of its operations in Africa 
are. In the northern hemisphere, cities are rising vertically due to the 
influx of insurance companies establishing new urban bases, but little is 
known of the workings of insurance capital in Africa (Bähre, 2020), in 
particular the materialisation of national social insurance, or localised 
forms, in the continent’s urban metropolises.
In sub-Saharan Africa an important aim of social insurance schemes 
has been – apart from the expansion of social security – to accumulate 
finance for socio-economic development (Charlton and McKinnon, 2000; 
Kpessa and Béland, 2012). Traditionally, the insurance schemes have 
anchored their assets in private equity and government bonds, but increas-
ingly have come to include long-term investments in infrastructure. Such 
investments are of diverse nature, including public projects (such as schools 
and hospitals) and economic infrastructure (such as roads, bridges and 
electricity) and involving different forms of financing (debt, equity, 
public–private partnerships, etc.). In search of diversification of investment 
risk and new sources of return, institutional investors are spreading their 
investments across a wider spectrum, enlarging their portfolios, in contrast 
to what investment strategies previously have prescribed (Inderst, 2009; 
Sy, 2017; Wentworth, 2013).
Historically the preserve of governments and local authorities, infra-
structure has become an asset in its own right for investors in the public 
as well as the private sector. The long-term liability associated with social 
security schemes corresponds with the temporal aspects of infrastructure 
and connotes a socially responsible investment – a long-term commit-
ment of welfare as a promise from the state to its citizenry (Rankin, 
2009). Despite the longer investment horizon, the financial hedging of 
Tanzanian insurance schemes is speculative, measuring investment risk 
against future returns, yet sometimes – paradoxically – with an increased 
risk as the outcome. As such, the promises infrastructure brings does not 
necessarily hold, and while performing stability, infrastructure might, on the 
contrary, operate through dissimulation, concealing the inherent provisional 
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(Archambault, 2013; Cooper and Pratten, 2014; Myers, 2011; Simone,  
2004).
Looking at the historical circumstances in which modern insurance 
emerges, a number of scholars have emphasised its colonial legacy (Baucom, 
2001 and 2005; Borscheid, 2012; Rupprecht, 2007), connected to forms 
of financial governance beyond the state (Baker, 2010; Defert, 1991; Ericson 
and Doyle, 2004; Ewald, 1991 and 2019), and its development as a technol-
ogy of managed risk (Knight, 1912; Lazzarato, 2015; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011 
and 2016). Others have emphasised the particular imaginaries insurance 
is contingent on, inciting self-conscious attitudes of the self-insured subject 
towards risk, reserve funding and management for potential losses (Baker 
and Simon, 2002: 8). While insurance as a financial system has roots deep 
in the violent history of slavery, which arguably could be interpreted as 
an example par excellence of Foucauldian biopower (Baucom, 2005; Defert, 
1991; Ewald, 1991 and 2019; Lobo-Guerrero, 2011), the more recent forms 
of practice effected by the independent Tanzanian nascent welfare state, 
in the form of social insurance (and particular pension savings), could 
also be understood as the localised continuation of the same governmen-
talising apparatus.
While insurance as a technology of risk management and financial 
governance has become embedded in life in the ‘global north’, life in 
Africa is often lived uninsured, within crumbling formal infrastructure 
systems, where only a small percentage is enrolled in a social security 
scheme (van Ginneken, 1999). State-supported social insurance is often 
aimed at the formal private sector and for public and civil servants, but 
the insurance market is slowly expanding to include also the informally 
employed majority.
Yet when formal institutions do not hold, were never in place or perhaps 
‘failed’ to eclipse the totality of life, its double stepped in. The ‘absent 
presence’ of formal physical and bureaucratic infrastructures gives life to 
various ‘instructures’ (De Boeck and Baloji, 2016: 109) that become 
operational in the inoperability of its formal twin. ‘Doing it for the con-
nections’, then, as Yahya put it, is what that absent presence of infrastructure 
incites when the connections that should be ‘in place’ prove inoperative 
and people search for ‘insurance’ elsewhere.
When this study set out, in spring 2016, the money, the pension savings 
invested – allegedly in order to hedge against market volatility and to 
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were not always paid out to the members in a timely manner. Together 
with a general downturn in the Tanzanian economy, money seemed to 
be unusually short in Dar es Salaam.
Infrastructure’s tripartite structure
I have so far introduced some of the key concepts central to my study 
that illustrates how insurance is a practised infrastructure enacted by 
different actors in the city, where the notion of risk might have multiple 
meanings and be negotiated on different levels and timescales. In the 
following section I will outline the general methodological question this 
chapter asks: On what terms is it possible to study simultaneously how 
the city connects a financial infrastructure (the fund), a material form 
(bridge) and the social life of insurance?
Studying risky futures in Dar es Salaam requires a different theoretical 
lens and methodology from that used to study the enclosed community 
residential quarter. My work is located in a ‘relational force field’ (Simone 
and Pieterse, 2017: xii) between a bridge, a social security fund and the 
notion of ‘insurance’, embedded within the legacy of anthropological 
research, which allows for the making-sense of data of different kinds. 
Attending to ‘relational ontologies’ (Benjamin, 2015; Pieterse, 2014) and 
‘urbane scholarships’ (Macamo, 2018) as ways of understanding contempo-
rary urban practices, however, is not a theoretical imposition but the very 
condition for being attuned to the field and surrendering to the world of 
empirical knowledge. Though admittedly everything is potentially relational, 
contingent and interactive, urban environments are also indisputably volatile 
and unequal, spatially and socially set within a history of colonial subjuga-
tion and resistance, still often governed by documents and declarations 
that proliferate historical inequalities. This chapter neither understates 
these structural inequalities nor champions endless chains of association, 
but argues instead for taking serious social, financial, temporal and spatial 
relations.
Given the complexity of the field, it can be both a methodological 
frustration and a conceptual difficulty to, in the words of Marilyn Strathern 
(1996), ‘cut the network’ – to delineate where the field begins and where 
it ends, and further, to decide and argue for what information is important 
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Ethnography reveals modes of reflection and reasoning that are embed-
ded in everyday practices and are inextricable from material forms of 
existence (Da Col and Graeber, 2011). While local articulations and 
concepts are a source of theoretical inspiration in their own right, I 
have strived to develop theoretical terms that arise from ethnographic 
engagement, are grounded in local historical legacies, but resonate with 
certain established theoretical currents. Motivated by empirical findings 
from the field, a tripartite structure crystallised where I put the bridge, 
the fund and insurance to action as a heuristic device in order to con-
ceptualise the themes of my work but also as a tool through which to 
make connections and uncover relational bonds. Each of the three has 
agency in its own right, but they also act on each other as well as work 
as an ensemble. By studying a material urban form (the bridge) and a 
providential organisation (the fund), I address a set of strategies and 
financial cultures/hedging repertoires that those engender (insurance) and 
engage in different aspects of risk and risk calculation, consequently making 
visible risky futures – how risks are envisioned, anticipated, remembered, 
acted upon and/or ignored. Here insurance is understood as a generator 
of the bridge and fund and not simply the linear consequence of the 
same, hence their interdependence. Rather than the traditional dialectical 
triad, I establish three ‘platforms’ (Guyer, 2016) from where to make 
connections.
As part of my work, I also conducted a three-month internship with 
the pension fund that funded the bridge. By attending to the ‘lifeworld’ 
of financial infrastructures, I lent myself to the conditions of working 
with and for the Tanzanian emerging welfare state. However, the ethno-
graphic literature accounts for the administration (Bennet, 2001; Blundo, 
2009; Das and Poole, 2004; Gupta, 1995), bureaucracy (Bear and Mathur, 
2015; Ferguson, 1994; Strathern, 2000), financialisation (Bähre, 2012 and 
2020) and organisation (Moeran, 2005; Wright, 1994) of forms of social 
insurance, but gave few hands-on clues how methodologically to approach 
an African social security fund and understand its emergent practices as 
set in the urban crucible. While anthropologists have explored the full 
spectrum from the insurance of life (Dao and Mulligan, 2016; Golomski, 
2015) to the non-insured bare life (Duffield, 2008), the concept engages 
a much longer tradition of anthropological inquiry. As such, insurance 
could be placed in the motley crew of diviners, magicians, prophets, 
sheiks and other cultural brokers who trade with speculation to mediate 
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have of course also been mediated through gifts, friendships and other 
reciprocal practices, involving human and non-human actors. And it is 
partly, but not only, within this tradition I locate the tripartite structure: 
the bridge, the fund and insurance.
The bridge is the material infrastructure putting places, people and 
things in connection. It constitutes a physical orientation point, an identifi-
able place in Dar es Salaam connecting two different parts of the city. 
Architecturally generic in its aesthetics, the bridge becomes universally 
recognisable and performs on the same scale as other large-scale projects 
in other global cities, a ‘point of orientation’ that structures urban imaginar-
ies of which Dar es Salaam is intrinsically part (Weiss, 2004: 201). By 
generating circulation, spanning spaces and inciting global imaginaries, 
it holds a promise of future investments, in Dar es Salaam and in Tanzania. 
Its temporality is so vast that it came to life in urban plans decades prior 
to its inception and long had a life beyond the city not only in various 
documents, but also in popular culture and mythology. A focus on the 
bridge as a public infrastructure/public good (Bear and Mathur, 2015) 
reveals how the economic governance of Tanzanian social insurance 
schemes produces a tension between the collective hedging against various 
contingencies and the extractive aspects of investments and the returns 
on capital. Here the bridge, rather than hedging, protecting and securing, 
instead might institutionalise new architectures of risk through unexpected 
(material, political and ethical) effects.
The fund is understood as a social security infrastructure. It operates 
as a policy assemblage performing a number of bureaucratic tasks. Its 
operations aim to encourage a particular new financial behaviour among 
members of the public, based on providential planning. The fund is also 
a financial epicentre, holding large sums of capital, managing investments 
and safeguarding retirement savings against financial risks. It operates as 
an economic reserve where revenues might be channelled into alternative 
streams, financial ‘secondary circuits’ (Goodfellow, 2018), to places where 
access to finance is otherwise constrained. As such it is used as an economic 
reservoir by the government and by its members alike. Beyond the 
conceptual form, as an institution for social insurance, it sits in a particular 
historical place as one of Africa’s oldest pension funds. While the fund 
conceals much of its governing documents and bureaucracy from the 
public, it reveals itself in investments that (often) take physical forms 






















































154 African cities and collaborative futures
Insurance is in one sense a conceptual spin-off from the bridge and 
the fund. Insurance could be understood as a practice of a certain kind 
of rational governance, with complex historical underpinnings, which 
take localised forms when hitting the ground in Tanzania and Dar es 
Salaam. It is a set of institutional and popular arrangements to provide 
a guarantee for compensation against loss, working through a number 
of co-existing economic and financial regimes. Formally, insurance is 
a technology of risk management operating through documents and 
bureaucracy. In one form it is integral to the formal policy assemblage, 
performing as conventional social insurance (such as the pensions scheme). 
It also performs in investments made to allocate money in the expectation 
of future benefits (returns). With respect to the private and public (and 
parastatal) infrastructures that promise to hold social security in place, 
I provisionally hold ‘popular insurance’ as the social practices of insur-
ance that have been built up over long-term experience with everyday 
uncertainties, risks and hedging, and the marginal role of the formal 
sector in many people’s lives. Insurance in its popular instance ‘shadows’ 
or ‘doubles’ the insurance schemes at times when policies ‘fail’ its formal 
workings. It implies a speculative mode of managing the future, generat-
ing speculative practices of calculation and anticipation, and emerging 
collective forms of financial rationality. As a concept it invokes urgent 
questions of how self-reliance, collective responsibilities and depend-
ence are negotiated in one of the world’s fastest-growing cities, Dar es 
Salaam.
The tripartite structure has an infrastructural logic, all being particular 
sites for infrastructural operations, whether they are material, bureaucratic 
or social. They are tightly interrelated, where formal functions are contingent 
on the informal. In an economy on the fringes of global finance, Tanzania 
is aiming at, but not fully achieving, the financialisation of everyday life. 
In the absence of a national context that permits the premises of a global 
financial market, a shadow market is maintained in its absence, both 
from below and from within. I provisionally conceptualise these financial 
strategies of market performativity as ‘popular insurance’.
By looking at how two institutionalised infrastructures (the bridge and 
the fund) operate both in ‘generic’ economic systems (neoliberal/
financialisation) and in the ‘popular economy’ (Gago, 2017), I try to 
understand the co-existence of different development models and how 
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and self-reliance (kujitegemea) through notions of insurance in a con-
temporary urban context.
Studying ‘risky futures’ in Dar es Salaam entails a flexible and mobile 
methodology, ready to follow urban operation systems, but also to diverge 
and explore its ‘leakages’ (Simone and Pieterse, 2017: 96). The tripartite 
structure does not only reflect but is also defined by the engagement with 
these social and material operation systems, and from the viewpoint of 
the bridge, the fund and insurance, the constant shifting of the cityscape 
is conveyed.
Speculations
‘I need “world-class insurance”,’ a jovial gentleman dressed in kanzu 
and kofia told the officer at the registration desk at third floor at Mafao 
House (‘Benefits House’), the local pension fund office. ‘I want the very 
best, full coverage, I don’t care about the cost, just give me your best 
package. World-class, top-notch … Enrol me!’ Bupe, the officer who was 
sitting behind the glass, carefully pencilled down his details on a yellow 
registration form and then transferred the information to a digital tablet, 
collecting biometric data. ‘Give me your finger,’ Bupe ordered. The man 
pressed his right thumb, and then his left, against the touch sensor for 
the tablet to register his fingerprints. He was instructed to move to a 
chair in front of a blue screen for his picture to be taken. Bupe tilted the 
tablet and took a headshot. Before the registration procedure was over, 
she presented an inkpad and asked the prospective member to sign the 
yellow form and mark it with his fingerprint, pressed against the yellow in 
blue ink. He laughed and rubbed the remaining ink off against his white 
kanzu. ‘Wait!’ Bupe said and turned on the printer that was standing 
on the desk behind the glass in her registration booth. Before long the 
printer spat out a plastic ID card, complete with the member’s picture, 
number and the fund’s familiar logo. Just like a credit card, it contained 
a small golden chip. ‘It holds all your account details and biometric data, 
so you can use it at every pension fund office, even out in the regions. 
You can check your balance everywhere,’ Bupe continued. ‘This is how it 
works … First you have to make three consecutive instalments of at least 
10,000 shilling per month. After those three months you can register for 
health insurance benefits and enrol with a hospital close to your home for 





















































156 African cities and collaborative futures
WIFE and only three children.’ They both laughed. ‘After fifteen years 
you are eligible for pension benefits.’ The man already looked close to 
retirement age.
* * *
In my work in Dar es Salaam, insurance works as hedging in contexts 
where institutionalised insurance programmes are being reformed or 
implemented but are not (yet?) comprehensive. Further, ethnographic 
fieldwork demonstrated how future-oriented expectations and idealisations, 
as well as past- and present-grounded critiques of these programmes and 
their effects, structure everyday life. Urban futures thus constructed, 
envisioned and narrated become involved in wider politics and economics. 
This provokes questions of what kinds of ‘risk’ are articulated and assigned 
in urban research, what forms of ‘infrastructure’ are assumed and assembled, 
what communities define, take up, redefine and broker concepts and 
practices such as ‘investment’, ‘insurance’ and ‘hedge’. To the extent that 
social insurance programmes are directed towards reform and/or develop-
ment, who and what are being ‘reformed’? What kind of actors, institutions 
and social forms? As new forms of insurance backed by international 
financial institutions and development organisations are implemented 
throughout the world, how are the roles and practices of different organisa-
tions and communities – acting as international, national and local actors 
– reinforced or redefined?
With the global expansion of insurance – whether it is state or corporate, 
private, financed by development aid or in its popular form – are we also 
experiencing an ontological shift of temporality in relation to the concept 
of crisis? While crisis has been perceived as a short-term episode of 
hardship, now hedging is often against an imminent risk. Does insurance, 
then, engender an altogether different restructuring of individual financial 
behaviour against a new time horizon where the proliferation of risks is 
a mode of state, corporate and self-governance? Or did the residents in 
cities like Dar es Salaam always operate on multiple timescales concurrently, 
navigating an array of financial and economic modes?
The Tanzanian pension funds build upon generations of insurance, of 
hedging future uncertainties into the present as a means of acting upon 
them. Consistently, old and prospective members are to be convinced 
into taking these particular uncertainties that the fund can insure very 
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to potential members by making the future relevant through the depiction 
of certain risk scenarios communicated by the fund through its outreach 
and education programmes. The modern city subject of Dar es Salaam 
needs to believe in insurance and be attracted to the idea that there are 
very considerable benefits to being insured. Members pay for the guarantee 
of protection, yet the conditions that promise this protection do not always 
arrive, so they might have been paying for certainty in a situation of 
absolute uncertainty. This is of course not only true for Tanzania but 
seems to be the global irony of the insurance market: it often does not 
pay out when things are actually at stake. The future of pension funds 
globally in the wake of the 2008 global crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic 
is one where assumed certainties generated by pension promises melt 
into air in the face of market crashes.
But the bridge, then, becomes the tangible representation that guarantees 
that the fund will keep on giving, and that there is a prospect for com-
prehensive welfare – a concrete welfare utopia. And the insurance becomes 
something material, spanning time as the bridge spans the creek. But 
how can the traffic be guaranteed, a flow that secures income at the bridge, 
and by extension secures insurance from the fund? And what happens 
if, or when, the members become indifferent to the insurance process 
altogether – if the futures at hand simply stop mattering? What does this 
mean for intergenerational ethics with an ageing older generation and a 
rapidly expanding population of urban youth? Many young people are 
outside formal employment. Formal social insurance may seem utterly 
inaccessible or simply irrelevant to them because their starting point is 
based on other imaginaries and other risk scenarios that the insurance 
will never cover. The fact that many youth are occupied in the large 
informal domestic sector as servants (so-called dadas) or ‘house boys’, 
security guards (walinzi), ambulating street traders (wamachinga), female 
food hawkers (mama lishe) or self-employed in the urban transport sector, 
driving boda boda or bajaji (three-wheeled taxis), makes them unlikely 
recipients of insurance packages, due to the inherent precarity and 
informality of the respective sector. To accept even a small cut in monthly 
earnings, contributing to the membership fees of a pension fund, might 
be a price too high to pay for those who already live hand-to-mouth. The 
‘flow’ of people constituting the very basis of the fund risks drying up if 
the idea of formal insurance is not believed in by those that need to buy 
in. Only 3.6 per cent of the working-age population – 4.3 per cent of the 
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funds in 2015 (ILO, 2017: 357), the overwhelming majority of whom 
were employed in the formal sector.
The residents of Dar es Salaam are involved in a lot of ‘spanning’ and 
‘speculation’, perhaps similarly to the bridge, living in a certain temporality 
where things cannot be spanned, however, and the gap between formal 
and informal life will perhaps never be crossed, but where a lot of bridging 
nevertheless takes place.
Conclusion
It was a regular day interning with the pension fund. I was posted with 
one of the compliance officers, afisa utumishi, to participate on an inspection 
round, leaving the office in Illala by car. We were to perform a number 
of routine visits, checking whether business owners and employers enrolled 
in the pension scheme followed the procedures, contributed to their 
employees’ monthly pension savings and kept up the correct paperwork. 
To avoid the traffic jam, we took the shortcut from Kigogo roundabout, 
leading through Jangwani valley, ending up in Msimbazi, at the back of 
Kariakoo, the beginning of my colleague Jalala’s sector. Tekno’s super-hit 
‘Pana’ played on the USB stick, connected to the stereo: ‘We go drive 
around for my Porsche, oh, Baby, Pana, They say you like wahala, oh.’ 
We parked deep into the Kariakoo grids outside a small tyre shop on a 
corner of one of those streets, trading with everything automobile. Dunlops, 
Continental, Bridgestone, mixed with anonymous brands from India and 
China in stacks, balancing on the landing in front of the mechanics. The 
owner immediately showed up, greeting us with oily hands. Blue-collar 
hand shaking white-collar hand, smearing the white shirtsleeve slightly, 
while white-collar hand firmly grabbed its counterpart, ignoring the stains. 
Compliance visit behaviours often involved a calibration on both parts: 
for the employer, balancing the ducking and diving, sometimes escaping 
thorough inspection and excessive transparency, perhaps delaying contribu-
tions, while not being perceived as too difficult, risking reprimands; for 
the compliance officer, artfully extracting information, articulating convinc-
ing arguments for cheques to be signed, policies to be adhered to, while 
avoiding reaching an impasse or being rude. Customer service (huduma 
kwa mteja) was, after all, part of the pension fund’s mission.
The members in each sector were few enough for officers and employers 
to develop a relationship, to have some knowledge of each other. Today 
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– i.e. new potential members to the pension fund collective – and whether 
they complied with the minimum wage as stipulated by Tanzanian law. 
And yes, there were more mechanics employed now than last time, as 
Jalala pointed out, but, bahati mbaya, unfortunately, they were not in at 
the moment, the owner said, so it was impossible to have them fill in the 
registration forms and pay the statutory fees. Labda kesho au kesho kutwa, 
maybe tomorrow or the day after. And then the paperwork, showing the 
payrolls, might be ready too. Maybe. Karibu tena, welcome back. We took 
off, it was still early.
We slowly worked our way through the day’s schedule: a regular update 
with the human resources manager at one of the city’s luxury hotels, 
greeting their new sushi chef; a surprise visit to a local bank whose manager 
had mysteriously gone missing; a scheduled meeting with the regional 
administrative director of a well-known international airline to confirm 
the registration of new employees; and finally a drop-in at a small 
accountancy service, tucked away behind another office – nothing more 
than a crammed room – deep in a courtyard, which took so long to 
penetrate that the owner had fled through a second back door before we 
arrived.
* * *
In daily conversations in Dar es Salaam, there is constant repetition of 
the importance of meeting new people, to be in new situations, experiencing 
new things, to get exposure and acquire new ideas and alternative world-
views, to circulate in extensive networks. What accounts as exposure is 
roughly anything unexpected and novel, although it does not necessarily 
have to last very long. Quite the opposite, in fact: exposures are sometimes 
better kept short, before they become complicated and create annoying 
implications or raise expectations higher than the relationship merits. 
Exposure presents opportunities for the speculative potentialities together-
ness brings: of multiplying the chances for valuable experiences, for new 
things to happen, ‘things’ to add to the life narrative, as the author of 
one’s own life, and make those new insights part of one’s ‘background’ 
(Simone, 2019). This background gives a sense of the propensity of 
infrastructure, forming a social context for something to happen in the 
future that potentially could bridge previous gaps or prepare for new 
unexpected situations. Being exposed to something – whatever that may 
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arrives the exposure will play out in a favourable way for the exposed. 
Curated, long-term exposures might eventually materialise in solid con-
nections, yet only repeated experience with exposure can determine 
whether a relationship should be allowed to linger, as Smart in the 
introductory vignette claimed: too tight connections might indeed be a 
disadvantage.
Working for the pension fund constituted a serial cycle of exposures, 
not only to local situations but also to the lifeworld of other professionals, 
of aspirational lifestyles. During the inspection rounds I participated in 
during the internship, the compliance officers made connections with 
disparate social groups and individuals that enabled a kind of continuous 
education, a social grooming, that graduated in a scholarship, in savvy 
communication and how to navigate the world. Of course, it was just a 
job too, but it came with perks that transcended the routine tasks, and 
that did not necessarily come through formal education. It was, however, 
not just the compliance officers that accumulated exposure in their profes-
sional life. Yahya, Smart and the boda boda driver featuring in the beginning 
of the chapter all had their separate tactics for how to acquire a sort of 
life insurance, a background against which the exposures could be made 
sense of.
Dunia ni kijiji, ‘the world is a village’, is a popular expression, too, 
repeated in daily conversations across the city. Beyond the familiar cliché, 
it suggests that Dar es Salaam is an immanent part of the world, a cos-
mopolitanism not necessarily ‘claimed’, but rather taken for granted, as 
part of life as lived in the twenty-first century. While it perhaps could be 
recognised as a travelling trope widely popularised due to increased 
interconnectedness and digitalisation, it might also be understood as an 
expression of urban ‘worldliness’ (mondialité), of an urban citizenry 
belonging to the whole-world (tout-monde) (Britton, 2009; Glissant, 1997). 
It implies being residents of the global city, or the urban global village, 
on other terms than the financialised or contractual relationship with 
certain national or international policies or institutions, or restricted by 
physical borders – regardless of whether those same institutions or border-
ing regimes recognise Bongo as either a global or a ‘smart’ city. The extensive 
‘exposure’ accumulated in life is the passport to urban citizenship, a 
guarantor that one is not a mshamba, a hick, or a nobody in the periphery, 
but an eligible member of the whole-world, a protagonist central to where 
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The taxonomy of world cities embraces places like Dar es Salaam, 
making them the ‘background’ for national as well global dramas to be 
acted out, through universally recognised phenomena: here a bridge, the 
providential institution, and insurance, in localised forms and shapes, 
but nevertheless part of the whole-world. As such, Dar es Salaam is 
constructed in everyday practices and articulations through affective 
associations with the larger world map as a node in a global, urban network 
on no less equal terms than other global cities. The infrastructures of the 
bridge interface with the financial infrastructures of the ‘modernising’ 
state but are mediated by the cultural calculus of risk. Risky futures in 
Dar es Salaam demand an understanding of this triple interface.
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Notes
1 All names in the chapter are anonymised.
2 Nafasi is a multi-faceted term in Swahili that could be translated as ‘space’, 
‘opportunity’, ‘place’ or ‘chance’.
3 Before the harmonisation reform in 2017 and 2018 – where five of the country’s 
pension funds were reduced to two – Tanzania hosted a number of pension 
schemes, directed at different sectors.
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Conclusion: from an ‘infrastructural 
turn’ to the platform logics of 
logistics
Michael Keith with Andreza Aruska de Souza Santos
The history of modernity is not so much about the progress of reason as 
it is about the history of reason’s unreason. (Mbembe, 2017: 208)
When we started this volume with a research council-funded set of projects, 
we invited successful members of a collective endeavour to share their 
results across diverse teams and research interests. The collection reflects 
the equally diverse answers to the sorts of questions we were trying to 
address. Many chapters also implicitly or explicitly ask what it means to 
invoke a notion of the ‘African city’. Some of the reasoning that informed 
this curation of work we explored in the introduction. In the conclusion 
of the volume we want instead to suggest, if tentatively, routes out of the 
collection that point to different sorts of scholarship on urban futures. 
These might also be understood as different dispositions that emerge 
logically from the chapters collected here.
In the nature of academic production times we finished the volume 
(and rewrote this conclusion) some time after the research was completed, 
at a moment when the COVID-19 global pandemic in the space of three 
months rewrote the script of normality. What had been normal in daily 
life, work life, state actions and economic governance was up for grabs. 
As the pandemic made global connections at a speed rarely anticipated, 
what happened in Wuhan suddenly became profoundly relevant in Tehran, 
in Madrid, in Lombardy, London, New York and New Orleans as much 






















































In spite of media rhetoric that COVID-19 democratised death globally, 
the reality was quickly seen to be very different. New demographics of 
vulnerability built the foundations of new social divisions. They legitimised 
equally new demographics of future surveillance. The elderly were most 
affected, the youngest and women less so, but other categories of morbidity 
and vulnerability were identified and at times subject to specific controls 
through new measures such as social distancing. But most significantly 
it was – as always – the poorest and the stigmatised that were most at 
risk. In New York City black residents were twice as likely to die of the 
virus.
In cities without sophisticated public health infrastructures, these 
disparities manifest disproportions across different demographic dividing 
lines. Cities coped with varying degrees of success, some with inventive 
solutions. There were major differences in death rates at the scale of the 
nation state. Counterintuitive geographies challenged conventional 
understandings of public health outcomes. Successful South African city 
organisation of community-based networks of tracking and tracing on 
the ground contrasted with the grim spectacle seen in the capital of global 
finance in New York. Between countries, differences were commonly 
attributed to the particular combinations of strong public health infra-
structure, successful state surveillance of private mobility data and social 
control in places with strong state institutional capacity such as China 
and Korea, reflecting national political contexts and institutional forms. 
Clearly, what was at stake was a moment when global forces landed locally, 
reconfiguring the DNA of cities through multiple drivers that distinguished 
unevenly between urban concentrations on the planet. Such diversity 
reflected distinctive combinations of social and material conditions in 
different cities that qualify the propensity of cities to respond to sudden 
change, partially traced to what has been described as an ‘infrastructural 
turn’ in studies of the contemporary city.
As we suggested in the introduction, the recognition of the powers of 
combination of social, cultural and material forms at the heart of the 
putative ‘infrastructural’ turn in urban studies could be traced back a 
decade or more in anthropology and other disciplines. In the introduction 
we also drew genealogically on the twentieth-century research of anthro-
pologist Jane Guyer that influenced Achille Mbembe’s breakthrough volume 
On the postcolony (Mbembe, 2001). In the conclusion we turn to their 
work again heuristically, instead to consider how what is shared by some 





















































168 African cities and collaborative futures
in her more recent work reflecting on a long career, the particularities of 
(normally African) context demand an analytical imagery appropriate 
for the third machine age. She characterises the ‘real economy’ in any 
place at a particular time as an aggregation of ‘platforms’. Her definition 
of the platform economy is both more analytically specific and more long 
term than in most common usages of the term. The platform for her is 
an infrastructural framework for diverse applications, but also ‘a stage 
for amplification of some voices and presences over others; a focus of 
collective access and attention; a way of enabling specific owners and 
engineers to reorient it for new purposes; and a place for announcing 
originality’ (Guyer, 2016: 4).
In Guyer’s coinage the platform economy is not just something becoming 
but is a form that in some ways has always been. As invoked today it most 
commonly tends to be seen as the invention of disruptive tech corporates, 
either FAANG (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and Google) in the 
US or BATX (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent and Xiaomi) in China. But these 
platforms are merely a logical end point to the geographically and histori-
cally contingent architecture of markets, impure mixtures of cultural life, 
law and economics. The platform for Guyer is instead an architecture 
that connects infrastructures through the triplet of ‘legacies, logics and 
logistics’ (Guyer, 2016). In the chapters of this volume these infrastructures 
make visible systemic combinations of resilience, informality, city morphol-
ogy, food, water, waste and power. Guyer’s framing closely corresponds 
to these themes: the sense of the path dependencies of urban form (their 
legacies), the structures of scientific knowledges that make the workings 
of cities visible (their logics) and the forms of infrastructural combinations 
that lubricate their working (their logistics).
Because – as some of the authors we considered in the introduction 
also stress – for all the litanies of dysfunctional facets of urban life, African 
cities do in many ways ‘work’. How they are made to work is a matter of 
logistics, however durable. This is why ‘the platform as an image also 
invokes an architectural structure in the most literal sense; vulnerable to 
heedless neglect of the need for repair or updating; weakened by zealous 
hacking into its foundations and pillars, open to renovation and embel-
lishment’ (Guyer, 2016: 4). In one sense logistics emerges as a category 
of analysis as the combination of infrastructures, networks and urban 
speed. And so the logistics of the city highlight a focus of study that is 






















































work the ways that they do alongside a translational obligation for scholar-
ship to consider how things might configure differently. This links the 
introduction’s consideration of epistemology and disposition to a possibly 
emergent nuancing of urban studies by the considerations of such platform 
logistics.
In the introduction we used the work of Achille Mbembe to highlight 
what we suggested are diverse understandings of what the interdisciplinary 
project of urban studies might mean in an African context. We focused 
in particular on issues of epistemology and sensibilities of disposition.
In terms of the epistemologies of different natural sciences and social 
sciences we suggested that diverse disciplines, professions, forms of knowing 
the city, are based on sometimes incommensurable analytic structures. 
They cannot always be reconciled. They may be logically correct in their 
own terms but, as they land in the cities of distinct parts of Africa, the 
interface between one logical system and others locally disturbs complex 
systems differently, disrupts existing configurations of social, economic 
and ecosystem life in unique patterns and combinations. We argued for 
a recognition that different epistemologies make visible different subjects 
in the city and perform very differently in city halls, stock markets and 
community halls alike. They privilege diverse scales of time and space. 
This makes it important to render visible how privileging one discipline 
at the expense of another excludes some concerns and generates trade-offs 
between competing ways of making sense of urban dynamics. In this way 
it is important to ask, for example: What do engineering solutions not 
consider? What do resilience strategies create as well as prevent? What 
does a priority on energy transition disrupt in informal economies that 
sometimes sustain the majority of city residents?
In terms of disposition we argued for a commitment to forms of 
translational research. The chapters in this volume echo a theme about 
the shortcomings of different approaches to the city. They highlight what 
is not achieved and what is (not always but too often) excluded by certain 
kinds of research as well as what they address. For example, at times both 
neoclassical economics and critical urbanism can share an ethical com-
placency: the former by burying ethical dilemmas in norm-free science, 
the latter by complacently assuming the moral high ground. Sustainability 
science can exclude the impossible dilemmas of intergenerational ethics. 
Engineering, hydrology, architecture and planning are as situated in place 
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Irmelin Joelsson’s chapter here. So the sense of the dispositional that we 
argue for in this volume is one that maintains a respect for both the 
critical deconstruction of existing conditions of the city and for the careful 
deployment of new forms of social scientific data analytics alongside it: 
the logics of utility-optimising forms of economics, the array of natural 
scientific techniques for diagnosing pathology and pattern. The sense of 
the translational is no more nor less than an invocation to researchers to 
combine a small dose of disciplinary humility with a commitment to 
make sense of why particular circumstances of history and geography 
might occasionally undermine their innate presuppositions. Reason and 
the rational are invariably situated.
One translator of his writing suggests that Mbembe offers an alterna-
tive ‘cartography (of reason) in two senses: a map of terrain sedimented 
by centuries of history, and an invitation to find ourselves within this 
terrain so that we might choose a path through it – and perhaps even 
beyond it’ (Dubois, 2017: ix). In his more recent work, Critique of black 
reason, Mbembe argues that it is contact between two worlds (Western 
and African) that has produced two narratives: the Western conscious-
ness of blackness and the black consciousness of blackness (Mbembe, 
2017: 27–9). He draws heavily on the work of Franz Fanon to situate his 
configuration of ‘Black Reason’ and the genealogy of such contact zones. 
Fanon’s studies were in turn themselves rooted in a space that crossed 
medicine, psychiatry and political philosophy, and Mbembe suggests that 
Fanon’s interdisciplinary reasoning demands a positioning of writing on 
Africa that is clearly located, a form of ‘situated thinking, born of lived 
experience that was always in progress, unstable and changing’ (Mbembe, 
2017: 161). And so it is in this vein that David Theo Goldberg summarises 
in his reading of Mbembe’s work that ‘black reason is itself constituted 
ambiguously, partly from the outside, partly self-constituting’ (Goldberg, 
2018: 208).
This raises a dilemma that is directly relevant to the contributors of 
this volume. Mbembe’s metaphor of contact is productive. Contact is 
experiential, cultural, ephemeral, based on difference of practices, pro-
nouncements and discourses. It is inside the city where contact, contamina-
tion, creolisation take place. But it is also outside the city in transnational 
domains of teaching and practising, across diverse urban professions and 
a spectrum of urban sciences where different ideas flow. And it is outside 
the city that longer-term processes of global change and inter-national 






















































It is in the contemporary urban arena that international knowledges that 
aspire to universal science come into contact with different morphological 
forms of the built environment and diverse conjunctural configurations 
of governance and rule. International finance flows across boundaries. 
Contact takes place in the recent past and the geographical present, 
evidenced in short-term historical legacies and diverse urban path 
dependencies. Professionals brought up in Africa, educated in the US 
and working for multinational European corporations may be at the helm 
of generic infrastructural regimes in specific city sites. In the search for 
universal reason scholars similarly seek excellence in medicine, engineer-
ing, waste disposal, hydrology and flood protection. And so it should 
be. It is after all better if a building stands up and a bridge does not fall 
down. Academics also cross boundaries. The taxonomy of African (or 
for that matter Chinese, Indian, Latin American) academics is likewise 
not straightforward when universities have built three decades of claims 
of elitism on the premise of liberalised international recruitments that 
configure common rooms of (limited) diversity and a transnational 
credentialising of area-based research expertise. To repeat an argument 
in the introduction of this volume, this is not making a case to sur-
render knowledge foundations of the natural sciences to any form of 
cultural relativism. It is instead making a case to make visible the routes 
through which both academic expertise and scientific practice travel 
and land.
Like Mbembe’s characterisation of black reason, the ‘African city’ is 
constituted ambiguously, partly from the outside, partly self-constituting. 
Any understanding of it demands an analytical gaze that sees inside the 
urban but also places the city in global and relational context. A tension 
of critical distance. So in the conclusion it is some of these forms of 
contact that we considered it appropriate to consider, the dimensions of 
what might lie outside the definition of the African city that structure 
what goes on inside the categories of urbanism that are captured by the 
descriptor. We identify four such contact zones (Pratt, 1992) here, but 
they are offered more as exemplary rather than exclusive regimes of 
exchange through which these chapters might insert themselves into 
further stories of global urban transformation.
It is perhaps these contact zones that define some of the themes that 
emerge from this volume and suggest some, not all, possible avenues for 
further study in the field. They relate in turn to the sometimes fragile 





















































172 African cities and collaborative futures
in the name of the Anthropocene understanding of the urban system at 
the planetary scale, the dynamics of climate change and the contours of 
global political economy. All of them constitute what we might understand 
as urban ‘platforms’.
The contact zones of city networks internationally
It is clear that a growing number of international networks generate forms 
of exchange between cities. Michele Acuto and Steve Rayner (2016) 
identified a database of 170 city networks in 2015 to represent the range 
of formal organisations of cities in national and international affairs. These 
networks cover a wide range of alliances, consortia and coalitions, constitut-
ing the basis for formal and informal modes of exchange, learning and 
conversation. They range from the C40 network of the world’s megacities 
committed to addressing climate change or grassroots networks such as 
Slum Dwellers International (SDI) to more formal structures, such as the 
United Cities and Local Government, more curatorial institutions working 
under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) such as UN-Habitat and its 
regular World Urban Forum or semi-formal groupings like the U20, set 
up to provide an urban voice to shadow the meetings of the G20 (Acuto 
and Rayner, 2016).
Some argue that cities are closer to realities on the ground than nation 
states: cities are forced to reconcile pragmatically the multiple demands 
and interests that structure governance of the here and now as much as 
high principles of the organisation of economy and demography. This 
argument generates a genre of writing that valorises the transformative 
power of cities individually to shape their own futures, even when faced 
with nation states either in denial about scientific truths or uncertain 
how to act in the face of issues that may be contentious in public opinion. 
In the US, city recognition of the demands of climate change were more 
realistic and more urgent than those found in the corridors of Donald 
Trump’s Washington. The same is true for cities that form the Amazon 
Region, across nine different Latin American countries, whose climate 
policies may have more similarities with one another than their own 
nation states. The reality of irregular or ‘illegal’ migrants on the streets 
of urban Europe prompt actions that are obliged to consider public health 
in the light of people rendered invisible at the scale of the nation state 






















































The study of the proliferation of such city links across boundaries and 
the contact zones created in their wake has begun to be codified and 
researched. But there is perhaps limited demonstrable evidence of the 
extent to which they represent ‘flat’ networks of finite points of contact 
showcasing ‘best practice’ and mayoral missions or more embedded 
multidimensional forms of exchange between the complicated landscapes 
of urban governance internationally (Acuto and Rayner, 2016). It is also 
less clear how effective these networks are in providing meaningful flows 
of practice horizontally or leverage vertically within structures of global 
governance that are not themselves in the rudest of health. But they do 
represent arenas in which it becomes progressively less persuasive to 
speak entirely in the language of national or international exceptionalisms 
of urban transformation.
If one argument of this volume is that the ‘local’ matters in histories 
of the present and how forms of scientific expertise ‘land’, then it is also 
the case that city networks are arenas that provide contact zones between 
the designers, rulers, campaigners, civil society and private interests alike 
in a fashion that crosses borders. But such contacts and exchanges imply 
forms of communication that are themselves dependent on what political 
theorists would normally describe as the public sphere or spheres. Publics 
as well as public spheres do not exist in a social vacuum and their constitu-
tion needs to be situated similarly in terms of their geography and history. 
So any consideration of the efficacy of such city networks in Africa might 
need to make sense not just of the traffic of communication they facilitate 
but also the ways in which such communication surfaces in the arenas 
where community voices, political power and private interests meet across 
the continent.
Wale Adebanwi (2017) has argued recently that such publics in an African 
setting might be understood by revisiting the work of 1970s sociologist Peter 
Ekeh and placing his writing in dialogue with Foucauldian understanding 
of regimes of governmentality. Of significance here, Adebanwi argues 
that the conventional reading of the bourgeois public sphere needs to 
be rearticulated through a history of Africa’s ‘two publics’, the civic and 
‘primordial’ domains formed through colonialism that remain a facet of 
political life in the present. The case is strong and in some ways echoes 
the argument Mahmood Mamdani made two decades ago, also discussed 
in the introduction. But most straightforwardly the diverse existence of 





















































174 African cities and collaborative futures
nationally as much as in Africa itself might be deemed worthy of further 
research consideration in framing continental city futures.
The contact zones of the Anthropocene
To the extent that the configurations of the African city are particular 
and unique, some of the drivers of urban form and city futures also share 
influences that operate at a planetary scale. Most obviously a burgeoning 
field of interest across social and natural science has focused on how the 
long history of humanity is worthy of recognition in geological time in 
its duration and analytical scrutiny in consideration of the many, sometimes 
catastrophic, impacts humanity has delivered to the globe (Lewis and 
Maslin, 2015). In this definition of the ‘Anthropocene’, the move of humanity 
to cities has been a clear marker, structuring its dynamics of environmental 
degradation and depletion.
In a productive sense this may foreground the ethical dimensions of 
the global contact zone of the Anthropocene for the African city, where 
‘ethical discourse … must account for the indebtedness and responsibility 
of human life to the “inhuman” and also “non-vital” forces of the earth’ 
(Skrimshire, 2019: 64). After all, the city belongs to those who have yet 
to be born and those who are yet to arrive, not least in Africa itself. 
But thinking ethically, juxtaposing human and geological times of the 
Anthropocene generates its own problems, not least the surfacing of 
the rational foundations of diverse traditions of philosophical thought 
(De Landa, 1997). Stefan Skrimshire has argued that the rooting of such 
discussions cannot ignore the historical genealogies and influence of 
European thought in particular, arguing for the continued relevance of 
post-secular processes that acknowledge that many of the ethical debates 
about city futures owe more to the longue durée of Christian legacies 
and other faith-based traditions (Gray, 2002). It also defines a territory 
where different forms of scientific knowledge engage with multiple forms 
of moral philosophy.
As a professor in the philosophy of science, Isabelle Stengers’ work over 
recent decades working across both natural sciences and philosophy has 
pioneered a critical analysis of the ways in which such scientific knowledges 
can be simultaneously both analytically powerful and instrumentally 
appropriated. Among other areas, her writing has examined how scientific 
findings are established and verified and in particular how technical facts 
translate into political problems rather than as straightforward trade-offs 






















































work considering the ways in which science comes into the world, Stengers 
also has a cautionary take on what she critiques as the ‘intrusion of Gaia’ 
(Stengers, 2015: 41). Her work In catastrophic times outlines how the ‘cold 
panic’ induced by looming ecological crises such as climate change is 
actively produced by the so-called ‘guardians’ of the status quo. Crisis is 
for her too often translated into new regimes of governance that privilege 
some interests over others while claiming legitimacy in the name of all.
For Stengers the ethical dilemmas of the indifference of Gaia to human-
ity’s fate can only be addressed by living with the ecological damage done 
by humanity and to engage with it on a temporality that is plausible. Her 
powerful analyses at the interface of natural science and philosophy work 
across the borders of both. She considers how the early history of the 
twenty-first century demonstrates the manner in which the appropriation 
of the catastrophic serves particular interests. It amplifies securitisation 
and division in New Orleans and across the US in the aftermath of Hur-
ricane Katrina. Science in the face of catastrophe can be manipulated by 
urban actors, logically today perhaps in the wake of the COVID-19 global 
pandemic. It has the propensity to camouflage specific interests in the 
guise of public goods.
In a sense the issue is again dispositional. Carelessly considered, the 
stinging analysis of how the ecological crises are manipulated by particular 
interests at particular times is one of many hallmarks of Stengers’ work. 
But more recently, historical examples of how ecological crisis can be 
manipulated by ‘guardians’ of specific interests leads to the assertion by 
Stengers (2015: 74) that ‘the state must not be trusted’. One problem with 
such an assertion is that such a disposition opens the way for an equivalence 
(not made by Stengers herself) between culpability and interest. There 
might just be enough guilt to go round. So while her work is extremely 
powerful, we may yet need research that interrogates the distribution of 
interests but does not sacrifice the imperatives to organise around how 
states generate institutional capacity and scientific expertise internationally, 
nationally and at the city scale to intervene in the social and economic 
domains as well as the regimes of ecosystems. In a post-COVID-19 world 
the appeals to strip the state or the city of their capacity to intervene in 
social, economic and ecosystem domains in situations of pressing need 
may appear less appealing than in recent decades, even if we might remain 
cautious about who controls the levers of their powers.
For example, waste ‘brings into sharp resolution the interplay between 
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but significant activity’ (Hird, 2017). Waste connects here and there, past 
and present. Shipped between places, produced in one place to service 
the demands of another, it creates its own contact zones. Hird suggests 
that its ‘placelessness’ exemplifies Stengers’ critique of the limits of logics 
of (localised, placed) citizenship. But if we do not trust the state naively 
we would be foolish to understate its propensity to act, to regulate and 
to intervene. It is this context that the chapter by Henrik Ernstson and 
colleagues in this volume needs to be considered alongside their critique 
of the vein of thinking and writing through the lens of the Anthropocene, 
or what they elsewhere describe as the ‘Anthropo-obScene’ (Swyngedouw 
and Ernstson, 2018). They catalogue what they describe as a series of 
views through this lens that they call ‘Anthropo-obScenes’ ranging from 
geo-engineering and earth system science to more-than-human and 
object-oriented ontologies that ‘place’ things and beings, human and 
non-human, suggesting that such framing is unhelpful. For Erik Swyn-
gedouw and Henrik Ernstson, such thinking is hermetic, it has no outside 
that allows engagement from alternative points of view. Hence their 
argument in this volume that waste in contemporary Africa needs to be 
understood socially, economically, ecologically and politically at the same 
time. They start from an alternative lens while not undermining Stengers’ 
consideration of the relationship between interests and scientific knowl-
edges, a recurrent theme that describes one of the key contact zones we 
are trying to analyse in this collection and that may be generative of 
pragmatic, locally engaged urban research that is aware of its planetary 
setting. It also begins to foreground a sense less of ‘not trusting the state’ 
in urban contexts than surfacing the terms of engagement between govern-
ment and people, the transactional flows between ‘states’ and ‘publics’ in 
shaping city futures in Africa and elsewhere.
The contact zones of the climate crisis
But perhaps the most pressing contact zone of the Anthropocene for 
African urban futures is the domain of global climate change, realised 
globally but with profoundly spatialised differences of outcome. This is 
already witnessed in evidenced and imminent sea-level change, global 
warming and associated processes driving agricultural systems, population 
mobilities and the propensity to flood massive demographic concentrations 
in many African cities but also in locations as diverse as the eastern 
seaboard of China and large areas of Bangladesh. For the UN the continent 






















































of water supply, coastal ecosystems, food security and public health (ACPC, 
2013).
Cities globally may often witness the most severe forms of ‘lock-in’ 
challenges as optimal long-term locations for urban settlements on 
floodplains and coasts become rapidly susceptible to extreme weather 
events. More positively, Harriet Bulkeley et al. (2014) have argued that 
the diversity of city forms allows room for a more positive sense of the 
possibilities of developing new interventions in the urban fabric to address 
issues of climate change adaptations. Cities in the global north have become 
locked in to environmentally wasteful norms and practice. In principle 
this opens up scope for more ecologically sustainable urban transformations. 
At a mundane level there is no need to mix brown and white water and 
supply potable water through domestic toilets as in most of Europe. There 
is no need – as in much of the Americas and the developed north – for 
buildings to depend on such high demands for air conditioning and 
cooling systems that ignore nature-based and architectural alternatives 
that might be cheaper and more ecologically friendly.
But principle and practice can be at a distance from one another, in 
turn highlighting the multi-scalar lenses necessary for the urban responses 
to such profound environmental reshaping of the planet, the capacity of 
nations and cities to adapt to rapid change. This is sometimes highlighted 
through discourses of adaptation and of resilience, as Mark Pelling and 
colleagues explore in this volume. And as their chapter demonstrates, it 
is possible to learn resilience transnationally while acknowledging urban 
differences between and within nation states, at the same time being 
careful how resilience interventions can serve to amplify rather than 
mitigate divisions of economy and society.
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2008) has argued that global demographics are 
the ‘elephant in the room’ in the age of climate change, an elephant that 
undermines humanistic reason. National debate and single actions are 
limited in the face of rapidly evolving developmental trends internationally. 
For Chakrabarty this demands a sensibility that recognises transnational 
senses of obligation and a metric of intergenerational ethics. It surfaces 
the moral debts that exist across borders of time and space at a time when 
the approximately 3 billion combined populations of China and India, 
let alone the additional forecast demographics of Africa, require much 
in the way of carbon-fuelled emissions and development to catch up with 
the economies most responsible for global warming over centuries. 





















































178 African cities and collaborative futures
of innovative adaptation and localised solutions but their power will always 
be dependent on alliances that stretch beyond metropolitan and national 
boundaries.
Chakrabarty has questioned the implicit logic of an increasingly global 
debate on climate change. He suggests that the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) focus on greenhouse gases and the technological 
wit to retrofit global systems for a carbon-zero future privileges knowledge 
centres in the global north. Their positionality is contrasted with an 
alternative disposition that suggests that climate change should be seen 
as ‘part of a complex family of interconnected problems, all adding up 
to the larger issue of a growing human footprint on the planet that has, 
over the last couple of centuries and especially since the end of the Second 
World War, seen a definite ecological overshoot on the part of humanity’ 
(Chakrabarty, 2017: 29).
In part, the latter perspective leads in a direction similar to Stengers because 
it also became clear who set the terms of the discourse. It was the scientists 
of nations that played a historical role in precipitating the problem of global 
warming through their emission of polluting greenhouse gases – for example, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and other developed 
countries – who played two critical roles: as scientists, they discovered and 
defined the phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change, and as public 
intellectuals they took care to disseminate their knowledge so that the 
matter could be debated in public life in an informed manner. (Chakrabarty, 
2017: 35)
But when highlighting the geographies and forms of expertise that are 
made visible in the domain of climate change, and the work of the IPCC 
in particular, Chakrabarty may be at least in part missing the point. In 
this vein Nicholas Beuret (2017) cites the argument from a prominent 
NGO worker present at a recent IPCC round of talks that were heading 
for impasse. They asserted:
the best deal would be no deal as any deal would just make the problem 
worse … any international agreement between governments would in all 
likelihood make the problem worse by enshrining the particular economic 
processes that produce climate change, making them legitimate and giving 
them the veneer of being solutions to a problem rather than its cause. An 
international agreement would make things ‘more fucked’, rather than less. 
(Beuret, 2017: 259)
And while Chakrabarty’s scepticism about the geographies of scientific 






















































the flaws of the geopolitical present might prompt an unintended politics 
of the global future of similar nihilism. In contrast perhaps, several of 
the chapters in this volume attempt to think through what local interven-
tions might be possible; how African cities might make their own sustain-
able futures, if not in global conditions of their own making. In thinking 
about risk, resilience, energy poverty, dwelling and waste, various chapters 
ask what sorts of interventions might be most likely to realise more sustain-
able urban transitions.
When prioritising the sorts of intervention most effectively championed 
by philanthropic organisations and funding, the Rockefeller Foundation 
has powerfully analysed the importance of energy poverty as a major 
barrier that might be susceptible to fundable interventions that can generate 
a step change in economic fortunes. It has identified sustainable energy 
transitions as a focus to define the most effective interventions in some 
parts of the world (Rockefeller Foundation, 2019). And certainly while 
energy poverty is critical to systemic ‘underdevelopment’, it is also the 
case that landing Western systems out of context can produce catastrophic 
failures. Notoriously, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID), hardly the most radical voice, condemned attempts to fund a 
standard power plant and grid system in Haiti in the wake of the 2010 
earthquake which wasted US$30 million or more through failing to 
understand a context of weak state structures and poor private-sector 
capacity, resulting in ‘misjudged demand, stalled reforms and deficient 
oversight’ (USAID, 2018).
Set against such high-profile failures, the Rockefeller Foundation 
advocates for local community-based solutions and ownership of small-
scale micro-grids, recognising the challenges and disasters of trying to 
create twentieth-century utility infrastructures in sites where both private 
and public providers are institutionally weak, financially challenged and 
vulnerable to capture of public goods by private interests. Its investment 
in India in particular is scaling up, but some challenge how the new 
interventions will hit the ground in informal settlements where ‘generator 
wallahs’ provide power to invisible majorities in some urban spaces and 
a subsistence living for themselves in contexts where informal realities 
may outweigh the logics of formal and ostensibly rational city protocols 
and public goods.1
Similarly, in South Africa, where municipal revenues are in part tied 
to energy provision, the local context may provide paradoxical problems 
while still recognising the imperative for sustainable energy transitions. 





















































180 African cities and collaborative futures
could potentially provide immediate power, while municipalities are 
incentivised to power cities on grid rather than off grid through a distributed 
network by the architectures of city governance that tie their ability to 
intervene in just urban transitions to revenues on the ground.
In this spirit, as the chapter by Federico Caprotti and colleagues explores 
in this volume, the influence of global institutions in rethinking the carbon 
consequences and practical development of energy systems can be seen 
on the ground but also invokes the local configurations of human needs. 
Infrastructural systems are socio-technical systems. An appropriate 
understanding of both the social construction of need and the technological 
construction of digital platforms and how new technologies land in place 
will caution against a straightforward celebration of an African platform 
urbanism (Caprotti, 2018). Again the domains of climate change knowl-
edges, practices and politics stretch beyond the inside of the South African 
city but simultaneously valorise the contributions of this volume to a 
wider debate.
The contact zones of economy and finance
As various chapters in the volume describe and imply, the development 
of cities across Africa is structured by both local and international capital 
(Goodfellow, 2018). Modes of investment create forms of contact between 
global norms, local interests and fiscal architectures that become financial 
infrastructures in their own right that interface with the built form of the 
city. Within urban studies there has been both a long-standing recogni-
tion of how the city is made ‘in the image of capital’ and a more recent 
strand of work on the manner in which built forms such as housing 
and major infrastructural interventions become a focus of contemporary 
city life through the increasing ‘financialisation’ of urban development. 
Financialisation is generally understood as the increasingly sophisticated 
ways in which major investments can be managed through the appropriate 
stewardship of debt financing, whether by the state or by markets, structur-
ing investment as a return on a calculable risk. This can at times be too 
easily equated with the forms of economic governance reforms characterised 
most often in terms of the histories of neoliberalism (Davies, 2014). Some 
authors have made the point that this is too simplistic, that implicit in 
the financialisation of urban transformation are both new temporalities 
(Grafe and Hilbrandt, 2019) and new demographies (Loftus and March, 






















































important to distinguish financialisation from the neoliberal because 
the former involves sometimes overlapping but fundamentally different 
ways of ‘knowing’ the city, making sense of city futures. Financialisation 
for them requires specific epistemologies involving the creation of money 
in financial markets, the transactional focus of finance, the centrality of 
financial markets to economic management, the orthodoxy of shareholder 
value, and the intensely micro-economic approach to financial calculation 
(Davis and Walsh, 2017).
What this might mean in the contact zones of the African context is 
uncertain. As we described in the introduction, a significant World Bank 
report has argued that what holds back the ‘African lions’ of urban develop-
ment is the insufficiently open markets (Lall et al., 2017). But markets 
have different architectures (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and how such markets 
might be regulated begins to define a contact zone between international 
investment and the African context. As the cautionary chapter by Joelsson 
demonstrates, it should be straightforward to use the financialisation of 
a long-awaited bridge in Dar es Salaam to generate a reasonable return 
on capital investment from China, support from the World Bank and 
technical engineering knowledge from Egypt. But the contact zones of 
finance and city generate new disruptions between economy, emergent 
state welfare and local articulations of risk management. In this sense, 
perhaps, emerging contact zones of international finance and African 
urbanism demand a close scrutiny of how economic expertise and new 
financial instruments, flows and infrastructures also land in place.
Implications for the everyday reader, for city hall,  
for scholarship
This message of the chapters of this volume, its introduction and conclusion 
share an appeal not to discount the knowledge of ‘experts’. But it is also 
an assertion that such knowledges are invariably going to privilege some 
logical structures and causal chains over others. In the most basic rules 
of complex urban systems, the interdependencies of these forms of 
knowledges and practices sit at the interfaces of different city systems – in 
the way that electrification reconfigures markets, waste disposal reconfigures 
hydrology, behavioural norms and forms reconfigure the public health 
interventions of new systems of governance by surveillance.
These interfaces surface ethical dilemmas. They do not provide straight-





















































182 African cities and collaborative futures
‘platforms’. If it is the role of critical scholarship to make visible the 
inequities of emergent forms of urban life, it is also the imperative of the 
social sciences to make clear what is social about the adoption of different 
diagnostic forms of expertise and the trade-offs that are at stake when 
comparing different city logics. At times urban studies has been stronger 
on the former than the latter. So as the African studies specialist Elísio 
Macamo advocates in understanding specifically urban studies in Africa:
We don’t study the urban for the sake of the urban. We study it in order 
to know how to study it. … Scholarship is not defined solely by the conclu-
sions we can draw about our study objects. It is also, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, defined by the ability to reflect on the best way to organize 
our ways of knowing. (Macamo, 2018: 8)
As we submitted this volume to a UK publisher, politicians at the heart 
of the COVID-19 global pandemic repeated ad nauseam every night on 
mass media that their actions ‘followed’ the science. They were obliged 
to reconsider the critique of ‘experts’ that was central to the global rise 
of populist leaders such as Bolsonaro, Modi, Putin, Johnson and Trump 
in the 2010s. In part this might be seen as a responsible alternative to the 
nostrum that ‘you can have your own opinions but not your own facts’, 
so strongly critiqued in the piece by Nobel economist Paul Krugman 
which we quoted in the introduction. But it also worked transparently 
as rhetoric, an early attempt to shift the blame for uneven numbers of 
the dying between cities and between nations away from the domain of 
the political, a strategy of what some might describe as the ‘post-political’. 
If it was the scientists who got it wrong in anticipating the scale of the 
pandemic, then perhaps logically it was scientific reason rather than weak 
political will or entrenched social divisions that was at fault for the variations 
in mortality. But perhaps inevitably it also inadvertently politicised the 
science as divisions arose between different scientific disciplines measuring 
epidemiology against virology against World Health Organization policy. 
In this volume, in the wake of such ‘post-truth politics’ across the globe, 
we have gently suggested not simply that the science should be ‘politicised’ 
for African cities in the face of the exponential urban growth across the 
continent. Instead we argue for an understanding of how science lands 
in place in the shaping of infrastructural urban futures; how the platforms 
of urban life are lubricated by the logistics of knowledge flows and govern-
ance practices. The difference is more a matter of disposition. Because, 






















































not so much about the progress of reason as it is about the history of 
reason’s unreason’ (Goldberg, 2018: 208).
Note
1 This insight was generated in an ethnographic project by Bhawani Busawala 
as part of the PEAK Urban programme (www.peak-urban.org). See also Oda 
and Tsujita (2015: 11).
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